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Potential adversaries throughout the world continue to acquire and develop sophisticated 
multi-layered, anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) systems. To maintain its maritime 
superiority, the United States must continue to innovate systems that are capable of 
operating in and defeating these A2AD environments. In particular, command of the 
undersea domain remains vital and will increasingly be critical in facing this future battle 
space. 
The challenges our nation faces, however, are not limited only to the 
technological capabilities of the warfighters, but also include a myriad of confounding 
constraints. In addition to the expected shortfalls of mission-ready assets, the Submarine 
Forces also must address significant pressures in defense spending. Nevertheless, 
unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) remain one of the top priorities of the Chief of 
Naval Operations, as UUVs serve as effective force multipliers, while greatly reducing 
risk, in critical missions in A2AD environments. 
This report presents the findings of analysis and assessment conducted by an 
integrated systems engineering and analysis team of military officer students at the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Their operationally driven tasking seeks to design a system-of-
systems of unmanned and manned undersea vehicles to ensure undersea dominance both 
in the near term and into the next decade. The importance of the systems perspective to 
this study is reflected by the extensive engagement with many operational stakeholders, 
academic researchers, industry partners, and acquisitions programs across the Naval 
enterprise. The capability-based approach highlights the mission suitability of both 
currently fielded UUVs and also technologies realizable within the next decade. The 
capstone final report summarizes these critical insights and provides detailed 
recommendations to inform decision makers of the present to prepare for the undersea 
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Ongoing research in the field of unmanned technologies led to the following 2013 
Systems Engineering Analysis project tasking: 
Design a system of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) that will 
provide an operational undersea force available for tasking over a 
range of missions by 2024. Consider current fleet structure and 
funded UUV programs as the baseline system of systems to conduct 
current missions. Include in your analyses attributes of the vehicles, 
payloads, projected costs, possible mission sets, and concepts of 
operations. The system may be a totally unmanned force or a 
combination force of manned platforms and unmanned undersea 
vehicles that can execute missions in an integrated fashion. A full 
range of alternatives should be considered. Of major importance in 
successfully deploying such a capability in the desired timeframe is 
acquisition strategy and DOTMLPF execution. 
In response to this tasking given by the Deputy Director for Warfare Integration 
and the Executive Director of Submarine Forces, the SEA-19A project team 
recommends the following sustained UUV force structure: 
• 26 Large Displacement UUVs (LDUUVs) 
• 120 Recoverable 21-inch UUVs 
• 121 Expendable 21-inch UUVs 
Total life-cycle cost for the proposed UUV fleet over its 20-year program is 
$3.65B (in FY13 dollars). This conservative estimate accounts for the entire life cycle, 
including procurement, continuous operations, maintenance, and training. 
Four high-level decision drivers, based on the extensive concept generation 
modeling, simulation, analysis, lead to the above recommended UUV force structure: 
1. UUVs are essential to maintaining undersea dominance. Increased 
operational capability and reduced risk for personnel and high value 
platforms are provided by unmanned systems. UUVs provide greater 
operational reach to both subsurface and surface manned combatants. 
2. Employment of multiple UUVs provides a significant increase in 




3. Utilization of expendable UUV variants provides unique capabilities 
and cost savings, especially for missions where probability of survival is 
low, or there is no need to recover the UUV. 
4. An appropriate balance of critical unmanned capabilities is required 
for effective mission performance. All UUVs must have the capability to 
maneuver, survive, and persist in challenging environments. However, the 
cost vs. benefit analysis of advanced mission functionality often shows 
negligible gains in mission success, at a relatively disproportionate 
increase in cost. 
Using a systems engineering methodology, SEA-19A addresses problems related 
to increasingly complex anti-access area denial (A2AD) environments. These 
environments require stealthy vehicles to execute critical mission sets. Stakeholder, 
functional, and mission-based analyses lead to the selection of the following four 
missions for inclusion in the proposed 2024 A2AD UUV concept of operations: 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
2. Information Operations (IO) 
3. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
4. Offensive Attack Operations (including ASW, ASUW, and offensive 
mining) 
These operations are assessed to be the most likely missions that benefit in the near-
term from UUV technologies by 2024. These assessments are based upon current 
programs of record and technology readiness levels across the Navy, and in industry and 
academia. 
LDUUVs are a critical component of the proposed force structure due to the 
inherent capabilities of larger and more capable sensors, greater payloads, and 
longer endurance. Specifically, LDUUVs are required for persistent ISR and various 
offensive attack operations, but face operational and cost effectiveness constraints. Only 
60-inch diameter and smaller LDUUVs are included in the analysis due to the operational 
constraints of the Universal Launch and Recovery Module in development for the 
Virginia Payload Module. To provide maximum operational flexibility, the Littoral 





Twenty-one inch and smaller diameter UUVs provide substantial capability 
for all proposed missions. The 21-inch UUVs are capable of being launched from all 
manned platforms, with the size only being constrained by current torpedo tube 
diameters. This effectively turns any manned platform into a UUV launch and recovery 
vessel. Analysis also shows that significant cost savings can be realized by designing 
several 21-inch variants as exclusively expendable. 
Robust autonomous collision avoidance capabilities are key technology 
enablers which are necessary to reduce unanticipated UUV losses due to circumstances 
such as grounding and entanglement in fishing nets. Continued research needs to be 
conducted to develop innovative ways to overcome these operational issues. Until these 
technologies mature, the employment of multiple UUVs in squads provides an 
advantageous solution to maintain acceptable probabilities of mission success. This 
concept factors significantly into the proposed force structure. 
To maintain the proposed sustained UUV force levels over the projected 20-year 
period, a total of 35 LDUUVs, 167 21-inch Recoverable UUVs, 440 21-inch 
Expendable UUVs are to be procured. The proposed acquisition strategy accounts for 
operational and training losses, while maintaining sufficient force levels for large-scale 









The students of Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 19, Team A would like to 
thank our advisor Dr. Timothy Chung, Assistant Professor of Systems Engineering, NPS, 
for his guidance and patience throughout the duration of our study. 
SEA-19A would also like to thank the Systems Engineering Analysis curriculum 
faculty for their instruction and dedication to excellence in preparing us with the 
intellectual tools required to complete a study of this magnitude. 
While many stakeholders provided excellent information and guidance, SEA-19A 
would specifically like to thank and acknowledge the following people for their 
contributions to our study: 
RADM (ret.) Jerry Ellis, NPS 
RDML (ret.) Rick Williams, NPS 
CAPT (ret.) James Eagle, NPS 
CAPT (ret.) Wayne Hughes, NPS 
CAPT (ret.) Jeff Kline, NPS 
Dr. Daniel Nussbaum, NPS 
Jeff Smith, COO Bluefin Robotics 
Organizations 
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Panama City 
Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory 
Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory 
Finally, we would like to thank our families for their patience and understanding 
through the duration of our studies. Without their selfless support, none of this would 










In 2002, former Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral (ret.) Vern Clark, 
introduced Sea Power 21 which described the overarching vision of the U.S. Navy 
entering into the 21st century. In the document, he prescribed the use of unmanned 
vehicles for naval applications (Clark 2002). Admiral Clark understood the pivotal role 
that unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) played in modern warfare and saw the untapped 
potential of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) to be critical force multipliers for naval 
operations. 
With significant shortfalls in major naval platforms on the horizon, the 
Department of the Navy (DoN) continues to rely on technology to fill operational gaps 
and maintain highly favorable exchange ratios. In January 2012, the U.S. Director of 
Undersea Forces (OPNAV N97) published the Unmanned Undersea Systems Strategy 
which outlines the use of unmanned systems in future naval operations. Specifically, the 
document addresses the need to compensate for the future submarine shortfalls: 
This Strategy provides a long-range vision, and a short-range way 
ahead, to develop a robust unmanned undersea vehicle capability for 
the Navy. This capability will improve coverage in environments 
challenging for manned platforms; provide responsive and far-
forward coverage throughout all phases of conflict against traditional 
and emerging undersea threats; and extend the reach, and enhance 
the capability, of the attack submarine force to help compensate for 
the planned shortfall of SSNs and the retirement of SSGNs.  (U.S. 
Director of Undersea Forces 2012) 
In September of 2012, SEA-19A was tasked by the Deputy Director for Warfare 
Integration (N9IB) Mr. Mike Novak and Executive Director of Submarine Forces Mr. 
Charles Werchado to study the evolving undersea force structure, focusing on a system-
of-systems approach to manned and unmanned vehicle platforms, which will allow the 
United States to maintain undersea dominance both in the near term and into the next 
decade. The official tasking statement is as follows: 
Design a system of UUVs that will provide an operational undersea 
force available for tasking over a range of missions by 2024. Consider 




system of systems to conduct current missions. Include in your 
analyses attributes of the vehicles, payloads, projected costs, possible 
mission sets, and concepts of operations. The system may be a totally 
unmanned force or a combination force of manned platforms and 
unmanned undersea vehicles that can execute missions in an 
integrated fashion. A full range of alternatives should be considered. 
Of major importance in successfully deploying such a capability in the 
desired timeframe is acquisition strategy and DOTMLPF execution. 
Your research and analysis should consider and address these 
elements to the extent possible. (Novak and Werchado 2012) 
A. PROJECT TEAM 
The Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 19, Team Alpha (SEA-19A) 
Capstone Project Team consists of nine Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) students and 
several cross-campus subject matter experts. Six of the nine students are part of the 
Systems Engineering and Analysis (SEA) curriculum and the remaining three members 
are engineering students participating in the Singapore Temasek Defense Systems 
Institute (TDSI) program. The core project team and their respective backgrounds are 
shown in Table 1. 
 
 
SEA-19A Capstone Project Advisor 
Dr. Timothy Chung (NPS Assistant Professor, Systems Engineering) 
 
SEA-19A Technical Advisors 
RADM (ret.) Winford G. (Jerry) Ellis (NPS Chair of Undersea Warfare) 
RDML (ret.) Rick Williams (NPS Chair of Mine and Expeditionary Warfare) 
 
SEA-19A Capstone SEA Students 
LT Mathiew Blandin (Surface Warfare Officer)   
LT Jeremy Brux (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT Christopher Caraway (Surface Warfare Officer, Nuclear) 
LT Steven Hall (Surface Warfare Officer) 
LT J.P. Kish (Aviation, SH-60 Pilot) 
LT Stephen Szachta (Surface Warfare Officer) 
 
SEA-19A TDSI Students 
 
LT Jamie Cook (Submarine Warfare Officer) 
LT Samuel Fromille (Submarine Warfare Officer) 
LT David Haertel (Submarine Warfare Officer) 




The team initially formed in September of 2012. At that time, only six SEA 
students were tasked with completing this study. Although several of the SEA students 
had previous operational experience as Anti-Submarine Warfare Officers and as prior 
enlisted submariners, it was important to add further undersea operational experience to 
the project team. In response to this need, three Submarine Warfare Officers were added 
in January of 2013. 
 
Figure 1.  SEA-19A Project Team Photo. From Left to Right, Top Row:  Dr. Timothy 
Chung, LT David Haertel, LT Steven Hall, LT J.P. Kish, LT Mathiew Blandin;  Bottom 
Row:  LT Jamie Cook, LT Christopher Caraway, LT Samuel Fromille, LT Jeremy Brux, 
LT Stephen Szachta. 
 
In order to build cohesive working relationships with warfighters, industry, and 
academia, our team has reached out to operational, naval enterprise and Naval 
Postgraduate School cross-campus stakeholders in order to provide a study that will 
heavily influence the future integration of unmanned undersea vehicles to the fleet. With 




Naval Officers are responsible for fielding equipment that above all contributes to 
mission success. 
B. PROJECT BACKGROUND 
The United States Navy (USN) has a proud history of operation in the undersea 
domain. By continuously evolving and improving its warfighting strategies and 
technologies, the USN has established its commitment to dominance of the maritime 
environment. This project seeks to further that tradition of support by considering the 
current practice of Undersea Warfare (USW) with an appreciation for its impending 
inclusion of UUVs. The employment of unmanned systems in the undersea domain is a 
natural continuation of the well-recognized spirit of innovation in the USW domain. 
 Reflection on the history of USW provides perspective in understanding and 
assessing our current undersea capability, as well as insight into future challenges and 
advances that will be critical to continued success. Recognizing future implications is as 
critical as it is challenging. Remembering a 1904 British exercise in which five small 
Holland submarines tasked with harbor security sunk four warships, Admiral of the 
Royal Navy Jackie Fisher wrote, “It is astounding to me, perfectly astounding, how the 
very brightest among us fail to realize the vast impending revolution in Naval warfare 
and Naval strategy that the submarine will accomplish” (Commander Submarine Forces 
2011). Recognizing the consequences of such miscalculations, the USN has committed to 
a rigorous consideration of the effects of undersea systems in naval operations. 
Since World War I, militaries and other organizations have been exploiting the 
undersea domain for a variety of purposes:  Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance (ISR), covert insertion, coastal security, oceanography, kinetic combat 
operations, etc. Throughout World War II and especially the Cold War, advances in 
technology and accumulated operational experience drove the evolution of USW from 
maritime interdiction, through Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) and into the present 
mission environment of littoral ISR. The foundational military concept, which supports 
this USW construct, is the leverage derived from effective undersea concealment, 
otherwise known as stealth. The resulting operational impact is the ability to conduct 




protective cover for greater survivability, and to operate inside an enemy defensive 
perimeter where other friendly forces cannot penetrate. (U.S. Director of Undersea Forces 
2012) 
Appreciation of a flexible USW concept is well documented in current U.S. Naval 
publications, including Undersea Warfighting and the Design for Undersea Warfare. 
These documents capture critical insights that motivate this project. The inherent 
capabilities and enabling attributes of undersea forces are basic tenets that must be 
embodied by a recommended solution system of unmanned assets. 
Undersea forces, when used effectively, operate far forward and 
independently. They exploit stealth and survivability and carry 
offensive payloads. They penetrate adversary safe havens and hold 
critical assets at risk, whether those assets are ships, submarines, land 
targets or even critical information.  (Commander Submarine Forces 
2011) 
The development and employment of undersea systems is fundamentally complex 
and expensive. Systems uniquely capable of deterrence, intelligence collection, and 
ordnance delivery are further enhanced by leveraging the ability to penetrate adversary 
defenses, survive without significant defensive payloads, and exploit the ambiguity of the 
undersea domain. These complex missions place a high premium on technological 
innovation which is the substantial driver of program costs. 
Operational ambiguity is a concept that can be abstract to those without first-hand 
experience. As a factor contributing to the effectiveness of undersea forces, it provides 
enhanced survivability and value of deterrence. Equally important is the challenge faced 
in design and operation of undersea systems in an environment where data always comes 
with qualifiers and the confidence of decisions must be weighed against carefully 
estimated risk. 
In the air and surface domains, the un-aided human eye is capable of 
long-range detection of targets and, as a result, even unsophisticated 
adversaries can monitor those domains. Not only can targets be seen, 
but they can be quickly recognized and tracked with sufficient 
precision to enable making confident decisions. The contrast with the 





A leading priority is the ability to non-provocatively gain early access, far-
forward in adversary safe havens. This addresses a primary need in the undersea force to 
challenge the impact of enemy Anti-access Area Denial (A2AD) systems. To ensure 
continued maritime superiority and effective global and regional deterrence, the undersea 
force will carry the mantle of assured access under hostile conditions. Specifically: 
U.S. undersea forces must include a broad enough mix of platforms 
and systems such that there is no geographic location or depth of 
ocean-connected water that is beyond the reach of U.S. undersea 
forces. For maximum effectiveness, U.S. undersea forces will strive to 
deny potential adversaries any safe haven at all.  (Commander 
Submarine Forces 2011) 
Current responsibility for assured access rests primarily with the submarine force, 
which can be limited by platform size and water depth. Additional constrains are 
projected force size reductions in the SSN fleet and the impending retirement of SSGNs. 
To meet those challenges and further enhance capabilities, this project will examine the 
role of unmanned undersea systems. This opportunity to maintain mission coverage and 
increase operational reach is documented throughout the guiding literature for the U.S. 
undersea force. A robust unmanned undersea vehicle capability for the Navy will: 
Improve coverage in environments challenging for manned platforms; 
provide responsive and far-forward coverage throughout all phases of 
conflict against traditional and emerging undersea threats; and 
extend the reach, and enhance the capability, of the attack submarine 
force to help compensate for the planned shortfall of SSNs and the 
retirement of SSGNs.  (U.S. Director of Undersea Forces 2012) 
The international strategic environment amplifies the significance of this 
objective. The eight assumptions delineated in the original publication of the Design for 
Undersea Warfare are: 
• A chaotic and disorderly global security environment will increase demands 
on the U.S. Navy and U.S. Undersea Forces. 
• Globally proliferating submarines are increasing pressure on freedom of the 
seas and contesting our undersea superiority. 
• A2AD systems challenge our surface and air forces, placing increased 





• America’s vital undersea infrastructure (energy and information) is becoming 
even more critical and more vulnerable. 
• Our shrinking submarine force size requires that each platform must 
individually support more requirements across a broader area. 
• Deterrence provided by our stealthy, agile, persistent and lethal submarines 
(SSBNs, SSNs and SSGNs) will remain important against both state and non-
state actors. 
• Ubiquitous media presence means we will need to exploit our concealment to 
provide our leadership options by remaining undetected and non-provocative 
when desired. 
• The expanded decision space that undersea forces provide will be increasingly 
valued by senior leadership as the security environment grows in complexity, 
leading to increased requests for undersea support. 
These assumptions outline a setting in which global proliferation of submarines, 
advances in A2AD systems, and ubiquitous media coverage will stress the USN ability to 
conduct operations in support of national objectives. This environment will be further 
exacerbated by force size reductions, expanding criticality of friendly undersea 
infrastructure, and increasing demand for undersea missions. 
The project team seeks to address the problem of effectively integrating 
unmanned undersea systems into the existing force in support of current and future USW 
initiatives. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Beyond the source documents and literature aforementioned, this study 
incorporated and researched many other publications to provide a firm academic 
foundation to build upon. The literature review began with a broad foundational basis of 
the need for undersea dominance in the current environment. Technical documentation 
such as individual mission areas, detailed unmanned systems development and previous 
research related to our topic were then analyzed to determine what is feasible within our 
given timeframe. The goal of this project is to develop the future force structure of 
undersea forces focusing on the inclusion of UUVs. This force structure will be a 
combination of manned and unmanned systems to ensure undersea dominance and 
unfettered access to the global maritime environment. To this end we synthesize and 




understanding and background for the application of the systems engineering process and 
in depth qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
The overarching strategy document addressing the security needs and goals of the 
United States of America is the National Security Strategy (NSS) of May 2010, which is 
approved by the President of the United States. This document outlines the current world 
strategic geopolitical situation as well as security goals and needs of the United States. 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is just one of many elements that are required to 
execute the NSS. There are very clear statements on the responsibility of the DoD, which 
accounts for seventy percent of all federal procurement spending, to be responsible 
stewards of taxpayer funds. This responsibility necessitates that the weapon systems 
procured should offer exceptional capabilities to warfighters while providing an 
exceptional value to the taxpayer. 
To address the military contribution to the security of the United States of 
America, the 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) “emphasizes how the Joint Force 
will redefine America’s military leadership to adapt to a challenging new era.”  This 
document acknowledges the ever-changing environment and delineates that the military 
will ensure access to and freedom of maneuver within the global commons. Future 
capabilities will include “modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed 
in the full range of military operations.”  A unique aspect of this document is that it 
addresses the demanding and dangerous A2AD environment. It states that Joint Forces 
will train and exercise in degraded air, sea, cyber, and space environments. It 
acknowledges and respects the ability of sophisticated adversaries to deny the United 
States the traditional advantage of technological superiority. The NMS gives broad 
direction for the force structure of the future maritime force. 
Joint forces will include an appropriate mix of small, mission tailored 
and large, multi-mission capable units, formations and platforms. 
This will provide the ability to conduct the full range of naval 
operations across the spectrum of maritime environments.  
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2011) 
The NSS and NMS lay the broad framework for how the U.S. military executes 




Century Seapower details the overarching strategic goals of the sea services. The sea 
service goals of ensuring access to the global commons and preserving the oceans as a 
source of security and prosperity are expounded upon and specific details regarding how 
security and stability are achievable are detailed. The main principle of the strategy is a 
combat force that is credible and capable of winning wars while at the same time 
deterring aggression. A key point of the document is that “preventing wars is as 
important as winning wars.”  This is done through cooperation with allies as well as 
“regionally concentrated, credible combat power” that is “globally distributed as mission 
tailored maritime forces.” 
From the Maritime Strategy of the United States and the ultimate source 
document, the United States Constitution, the mission of the United States Navy is 
established.  “The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready naval 
forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the 
seas.”  This constitutionally authorized requirement on behalf of the American citizenry 
is the ultimate foundation for this study, our daily operations, and the missions and 
visions of the warfare communities that comprise the USN. 
The submarine force has a firm vision linked directly to all of the aforementioned 
documents. The vision of the United States Submarine Force is: 
The U.S. Submarine Force will remain the world’s preeminent 
submarine force. We will aggressively incorporate new and innovative 
technologies to maintain dominance throughout the maritime 
battlespace. We will promote the multiple capabilities of submarines 
and develop tactics to support national objectives through battlespace 
preparation, sea control, supporting the land battle and strategic 
deterrence. We will fill the role of the Joint Commanders’ stealthy, 
full spectrum expeditionary platform. (Submarine Warfare Division 
[N77] 2013) 
Possessing key capabilities such as stealth and combat power, the submarine force 
is able to address many of the issues and requirements delineated in our master strategy 
documents. The development of UUVs and integration into the current undersea force 





Specific documents that detail the development of UUVs are the Design for 
Undersea Warfare, the UUV Master Plan, the USN UUV Roadmap, and the Unmanned 
Undersea Systems Strategy. These documents give a detailed outline of the mission sets 
that are applicable or potentially applicable to UUVs and a broad outline of the 
introduction of UUVs in to the fleet. The USN UUV Roadmap is especially useful as it 
provides an initial framework with which to examine mission sets. 
From broad strategy documents the project team progressed towards more 
specification and detail oriented documentation. To gain a deep understanding of the 
technical issues involved with the development and employment of UUVs the project 
team attended a week long short course at Pennsylvania State University’s Applied 
Research Laboratory (Penn State ARL). The topics covered in this course ranged from 
broad missions to detailed specifications of existing vehicles and vehicles in 
development. Propulsion, sensors, navigation, communications, control systems, and 
communications were covered in great detail. Nearly all technical aspects of UUVs were 
addressed, giving the team an excellent foundation grounded in technical reality. 
Following the Penn State ARL short course the team examined previous Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) Systems Engineering thesis projects that related to UUVs. 
The first thesis that was researched was the Systems Engineering and Analysis 
Cohort 17, Team Alpha (SEA-17A) June 2011 thesis titled “Advanced Undersea Warfare 
Systems.”  This thesis developed the Advanced Undersea Weapons System (AUWS) 
concept. This concept is a long term vision of a family of theoretical vehicles that operate 
in both sea surveillance and attack modes. It is a novel concept that opens the door to a 
more offensive use of unmanned vehicles in the undersea domain. The key differentiation 
between the AUWS concept and the SEA-19A proposal is that the AUWS system only 
addresses systems used for offensive attack and mining. The SEA-19A report is designed 
to provide a future force structure of various vehicles, over a range of applicable 
missions. 
Another 2011 thesis that was researched was “A System to Integrate UUVs with a 
Submarine Host Platform” (Calvert et al. 2011). This systems engineering thesis lays out 




from SSNs. Many of the issues discussed are addressed in the development of the 
submarine universal launch and recovery module (ULRM) that is currently in 
development. The SEA-19A project goals are broader than those of the Calvert thesis and 
address the implementation of a system-of-systems involving multiple UUV platforms. 
Other NPS theses were examined and a recurring theme was that the theses 
addressed specific vehicles and associated capabilities or were very broad and forward 
looking. The SEA-19A project, in contrast, is directed at the near-term and addresses 
UUVs and undersea dominance from a system-of-systems perspective. 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS AND PROCESS MODEL 
The systems engineering process is iterative in that it continuously revisits project 
sections in an effort to continually improve solution recommendations. Considerable 
effort is given to avoiding convergence to a solution too early in the study process. To 
guide the project team and allow traceability through this process, a process model was 
tailored to this project’s needs. Due to the fact that this project will not go through 
prototype development and production with subsequent implementation into test and 
operations phases, the project team determined that a waterfall systems engineering 
process model best fits this project. 
A generic waterfall process model (Figure 2) is modified due to the complexity of 
the problem and to focus on the processes leading up to system design. With multiple 
mission sets being considered for the future force structure, the project had to take a 
system-of-systems approach. Knowing that a system-of-systems approach was necessary 
and knowing that multiple missions needed to be performed by the force, the problem 
was initially worked using a bottom-up approach. This meant functional decomposition 
had to be done on each mission separately, which would in turn provide insight into how 
the system would function as a whole. The final tailored waterfall diagram developed for 






Figure 2.  General Systems Engineering Waterfall Model (From SQTLAB, 2012).  General 
waterfall model used to sequentially step through phases of system development 
beginning with initial conceptualization and concluding with the operations and support 
of deployed systems. 
 
Figure 3.  Tailored Waterfall Model Process Diagram.  The SEA-19A tailored waterfall 
model uses a mission based approach to analyze system functionality, capabilities, and 
requirements. This information is used to determine notional system architectures and 
recommended force structures. Green arrows below the boxes indicate sequential 
processes and the yellow arrows above the boxes indicate iterative feedback loops used to 




As seen in Figure 3, much of the generic process is still intact. With any system 
engineering process the first thing developed is the problem definition. In the problem 
definition stage stakeholder analysis, needs analysis, initial scoping and technical 
research are performed. From these activities, the need to look at each mission set 
separately is determined. During the mission analysis process, mission specific functional 
decomposition/flow analysis, design reference mission (DRM) development and re-
scoping are performed. The mission functional decompositions are then consolidated to 
determine how the overall system needs to function which led to the development of the 
concept of operations. This provides the direction needed to determine the system 
capabilities required in order to not only perform the missions but to also have a desired 
level of sustainment. After capabilities are determined more research is conducted to 
determine a list of requirements for the UUV force, which are feasible with consideration 
to existing and emerging technology. 
After developing requirements, an analysis of alternatives is performed to see if 
the missions to be performed would benefit from using UUVs. In the analysis of 
alternatives existing platforms are examined and compared to the notional UUV force 
with consideration to cost vs. capability to determine whether UUVs are needed. Once 
the usefulness of UUVs is validated, system architecture is developed with an emphasis 
on Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and 
Facilities (DOTMLPF). From the notional system architecture a recommend solution is 
presented. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
The basic outline of this project report roughly follows the same logical flow seen 
in our tailored systems engineering process model (Figure 3). A thorough background 
research (Chapter I) and stakeholder analysis (Chapter II) are completed to determine 
current UUV capabilities and fleet needs with respect to undersea dominance. 
Functional understanding (Chapter IV) of the systems under review is a critical 
component of all systems engineering efforts. This allows development of system 
requirements while at the same time, attempting to remain solution neutral. With a firm 




(Chapter III) to reasonable expectations. This allowed the team to focus efforts on 
mission sets dedicated to providing new and improved capabilities in the context of an 
A2AD environment (Chapter V). With mission sets determined, specific requirements 
and capabilities are then identified. 
Modeling and simulation (Chapter VI) is used to explore different system 
attributes and configurations within a simulated A2AD environment. The analysis of 
alternatives (Chapter VII) takes all of the quantitative data obtained from modeling and 
simulation, and combines it with qualitative data to provide decision makers with system 
alternative rankings and assessments. 
One of the more difficult tasks is determining how much developmental systems 
are going to cost taxpayers (Chapter VIII). With very few historical UUV systems to 
draw data from, other systems such as torpedoes had to be used to develop cost 
estimation models. 
The final deliverable of this report is the recommended force structure (Chapter 
IX). Great effort is placed on recommending a total system that can meet the objectives 
of the proposed CONOPS. A time-phased acquisition and implementation plan, along 
with a conservative program cost estimate are included to provide realistic program 
readiness expectations and to identify required funding and technology enablers to make 
the program a reality. 
Finally, several key concepts and innovative ideas discovered throughout the 
systems engineering project are presented to provide context for future studies and 
research (Chapter X). This also includes areas of analysis that are included as part of this 
study, but can benefit greatly from additional, focused research. 
F. REPORT CONTRIBUTIONS 
Potential adversaries throughout the world continue to acquire and develop 
sophisticated multi-layered, anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) systems. To maintain its 
maritime superiority and undersea dominance, the United States must continue to 





Unmanned Undersea Vehicle (UUV) research and development remains one of 
the CNO top priorities. UUVs may serve as effective force multipliers, while also 
providing significant extensions of capability to current and future manned platforms. 
SEA-19A’s mission is to provide unbiased, cutting-edge research and assessment 
in the domain of unmanned undersea warfare. As Naval operators ourselves, our goal is 
to make recommendations that provide warfighters with the tools necessary to execute 
undersea missions, when and wherever directed. Significant modeling and simulation 
efforts have been undertaken to analyze the mission effectiveness of UUVs operating 
under the purview of the derived 2024 UUV Concept of Operations. Analysis of the 
resultant data has been used to develop a notional, build-to force structure that consists of 
two classes of UUVs:  Large Displacement UUVs (LDUUVs) equipped for ISR and 
offensive attack operations, and 21” and smaller UUV variants capable of operations 
within all mission areas. Another concept vehicle analyzed is a new UUV glider mine 
variant for offensive area-denial operations. 
Innovative UUV concepts derived over the course of study include:  Covert Q-
route mapping operations for high value unit passage through mined areas, long-
endurance decoy and deception operations, mobile minefield networks, and UUVs 










 NEEDS ANALYSIS II.
A. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS 
Stakeholders are defined as any entity, internal or external, which can directly or 
indirectly affect the problem or be affected by the problem or recommended solutions 
(Romeo 2008). Stakeholder analyses are used to identify, classify, assess, and determine 
the individual needs and wants of stakeholders. The two critical components generated 
from this stakeholder analysis are first an accurate and well-defined problem statement, 
and second a detailed list of system needs (Table 3) that is used to generate system 
requirements. 
The goal of the systems engineering process as a whole is to pair the right 
solution with the right problem.   Understanding the right problem requires an in-depth 
analysis of both the supply and demand aspects of a given problem. Systems delivered to 
the fleet are all too often either over budget, behind schedule or do not meet the needs of 
the users (Defense Acquisition University 2001). Likewise, users often want more from a 
system than a manufacturer is able to provide due to technological or financial 
constraints. Thorough stakeholder analysis seeks to link the needs of all stakeholders into 
one coherent document that can, in turn, be used to identify and define specific system 
requirements. 
Identification and Classification 
In order to obtain exposure to the community of UUV development and 
operations, the SEA-19A project team met on-campus with several influential leaders of 
innovation, industry, and the operation of UUVs. Initial stakeholder interactions 
included:  SEA-19A project sponsor Mr. Mike Novak (OPNAV N9IB), Mr. Charles 
Werchado (Executive Director of Submarine Forces), Captain Jeffery Jablon 
(Commander Submarine Development Squadron [SUBDEVRON 5]), Mr. Bill Glenney 
(Deputy Director CNO Strategic Studies Group), Mr. John Benedict (Johns Hopkins 
Applied Physics Laboratory [Johns Hopkins APL] / LDUUV AoA Director), Dr. 




Systems Education and Research [CRUSER] Director of Research and Education), and 
several other NPS subject matter experts (SMEs). 
In order to further broaden our foundation of unmanned technologies and 
capabilities, select members of the SEA-19A project team attended several naval 
enterprise meetings and site visits as shown in Figure 4, notably including:  Penn State 
ARL Undersea Technology Short Course, Office of Naval Research (ONR) Unmanned 
Systems Review in Panama City, CRUSER Warfare Innovation Workshops at NPS, 
Boeing in Seattle, the Columbia Group in Panama City, General Atomics in San Diego, 
and Liquid Robotics in Sunnyvale.  
 
Figure 4.  U.S. Naval Enterprise Stakeholders.  The majority of SEA-19A stakeholder 
interactions took place with Naval Enterprise organizations. Significant interactions 
include:  Penn State ARL, Johns Hopkins APL, NAVSEA Panama City, Office of Naval 
Research, The Columbia Group, and DEVRON Five. 
 
The project team also interacted with battle force commanders in order to elicit 
their operational perspectives on issues they currently face and are expecting in the future 
with respect to capability gaps and how UUVs could be utilized as force multipliers. We 
reached out to the following operational military stakeholders as shown in Figure 5:  




Group 7, 8, and 10, Task Force 54, 69, and 74, as well as various Mine Countermeasure 
(MCM) and Surface Commander Task Forces. 
 
Figure 5.  U.S. Military Operational Stakeholders.  Operational stakeholder analysis is 
conducted primarily through documentation and instructions available from the various 
Submarine Commanders around the globe. 
 
These meetings and site visits enabled the project team to meet and interact with a 
variety of operational, naval enterprise, and academia stakeholders. Since the focus of our 
study is on a system-of-systems approach, stakeholders are classified and grouped into 
broad categories rather than mapping each individual stakeholder to each need (Langford 
2007). This approach leads to reduced bias towards individualized opinions or 
recommendations presented by stakeholders, during background research. 
Identified stakeholders are classified into the following the groups: 
1.0   Investors 




3.0   Infrastructure providers 
4.0   Infrastructure supporters 




6.0   Customers 
7.0   Partners 
8.0   Suppliers and supply chain partnerships 
9.0   Competitors 
10.0 Adversaries 
Stakeholders are classified in this manner to encourage the project team to 
analyze UUV systems from multiple perspectives. This also prevents the project team 
from being heavily influenced by stakeholders attempting to market privatized products 
for corporate gains. 
Primitive Needs 
Once stakeholder classification is completed, the next step is to identify and understand 
the primitive needs and wants of each class in order to further define the problem and 
form the foundation for effective needs. Primitive needs are the most basic needs of 
stakeholders. For example, a civilian manufacturer needs to make a profit and the 
customer needs the system to operate as designed and complete desired mission 
objectives. Table 2 shows each classification group, with a working definition of that 




Table 2.   Stakeholder Primitive Needs.  To generate the systems primitive needs, general stakeholder classifications are generated, 




Definition ENTITIES PrimItive Need 
1.0 
Investor 
Those who give authority over assets 
or resources in exchange for a return 
on investment. 
U. S. Government, 
CNO,  OPNAV, 
NAVSEA-SYSCOMS, 
PMO/PMA 
 To obtain a significant 
operational return on UUV 
investment and fulfill operator 
and customer’s needs in order 






Those who imagine and idea for 
generation and evaluation from data 
or experiences. 




To create or advance UUV 
concepts that will be developed 
into operational systems to fill 
an emergent need.  
Designers Those who creates and often 





To design UUV systems that 
meet operational requirements. 
Builders Those who build or supervise 




To build UUV systems in 
return for compensation. 
3.0 
Infrastructure Providers 
Those who build or construct the 
basic framework or underlying 
foundation of the system. 
TRANSCOM, Port 
Authority, NAVFAC, 
host vessels, defense 
facility contractors  
To provide an operational 
UUV system infrastructure that 
supports the system life cycle 









Those who maintain and operate the 
basic framework or underlying 








To ensure continued operation 
and maintenance of UUV 
system infrastructures 




Those who physically operate and 





To utilize and maintain UUV 









To man, train and equip 
operators with highly capable 




Those who share in the system 
results but operate independently 
from the system. 
Coalition forces, UN, 
other military entities 
To share the benefits from the 





Those who provide for the system to 








To provide customers and 
operators with the materials 
and services needed to operate 









Those who are rivals in the 





To have market competition 
that drives technological 
innovation and cost 
effectiveness of UUV systems. 
10.0 
Adversaries 
Those who contend with, oppose, or 





To resist or defeat the intent of 






Determining the stakeholder effective needs is necessary to generate the overall 
system needs that in turn are used to generate system requirements. This process is often 
referred to as the stakeholder requirements definition process which is intended to elicit, 
negotiate, document, and maintain stakeholders’ requirements for the system of interest 
within a defined environment. This part of the stakeholder analysis focuses on the 
specific needs of stakeholders that are of critical importance to system design and 
operation. 
The effective needs of each stakeholder classification have been discovered 
through background research and through direct interactions with individual stakeholders. 
The following sections, which are broken down by stakeholder classification, document 
the stakeholder effective needs and supporting documentation. 
1.0 Investors 
The investor group effective need is to maintain undersea dominance of the seas 
as related by direct statements from those in the key roles in the United States 
Government. 
Undersea dominance is critical to the security of the nation. It is a 
warfare area assigned, uniquely, to the Navy alone….This is the one 
domain in which the United States has clear maritime superiority – 
but this superiority will not go unchallenged. (Chief of Naval 
Operations 2011) 
Related to this primary need, investors also stressed the importance of the need “to have 
the ability to defeat complex A2AD environments” (Chief of Naval Operations 2012). 
The CNO has also expressed the need to press forward with the implementation 
of UUVs into the fleet. Unlike the military services’ relatively fast acceptance of several 
UAV platforms, the Navy has been slower to progress and integrate UUV platforms into 
the fleet due to significant communication and command/control issues (Whitman 2002). 
In an effort to place focus on UUV development and integration, the CNO has set a goal 
of obtaining a “squadron of ten operational large diameter unmanned undersea vehicles 
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(LDUUVs) by 2020 and to increase the endurance for a LDUUV to be able to conduct 
fully independent 60 day missions by 2017” (Chief of Naval Operations 2011). 
The investors’ needs also require that UUV development and integration be 
executed in a cost effective manner. President Barack Obama directly said in regards to 
maintaining freedom of the seas that we must “spend the taxpayers’ dollars wisely” 
(White House 2010). Especially with looming budget cuts projected in the near future, 
the need to ensure that systems engineering processes are followed can even be traced to 
our teams’ assignment to this project.   Cost is one of the driving factors of any project 
and the goal of any systems engineering process is to design systems that meet the triple 
constraint of cost, schedule and performance (Defense Acquisition University 2001). 
Several investors have also expressed the need to leverage proven technologies and 
investments that have already been made in an effort to bring immediate UUV 
capabilities to the fleet, which can fill critical capability gaps. Finally, several investors 
stressed the importance of the need for affordable force multipliers in the undersea 
domain to augment the submarine fleet. 
2.0 Developers 
Simple economics drive the primary need of developers. Stakeholders in this 
classification need to make a profit, stay in business, or obtain specific returns from the 
system. To ensure adequate and ongoing compensation, organizations and businesses 
need to advance emerging technologies, build quality products, and meet the needs of 
customers in a cost effective manner. 
A stated UUV system developers’ need is to incorporate modular system designs. 
This allows UUVs to share common hardware/software such as propulsion units, sonars, 
obstacle avoidance programs, and hulls.  “Unmanned vehicle systems must employ 
modular hardware and software design, and an open system architecture that will support 
rapid, affordable insertion of new technologies and payloads” (Piggott 2006). Modularity 
is also closely tied with the need for UUV systems to utilize commercial off the shelf 
(COTS) products.   This is not only important at component levels, but there are also 
several proven, commercially available UUVs and UUV products, such as software, that 
can be directly used for military applications.  “As systems continue to increase in size 
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and complexity, researchers continue to investigate improvements in engineering 
methodologies in order to build systems of high quality, in reduced time, and cost 
effectively. The use of COTS components is viewed as a solution to these problems” 
(Tumuluri 2001). 
The developer group also has a need to create systems that can operate and 
survive in harsh maritime environments. Compared to both UAVs and USVs, significant 
complications such as platform endurance, seawater intrusion, undersea communications, 
and limited visibility make many UUV missions extremely difficult to execute.  
“Corrosion, bio-fouling, extreme pressure, and unpredictable marine environments place 
demands on UUVs that have no analogy on land or in air” (Frink 2012). 
3.0 Infrastructure Providers / 4.0 Infrastructure Supporters 
To be considered effective in an A2AD environment, UUV systems need to 
possess a high degree of operational availability. A significant portion of operational 
availability is the ability for the system to be mobile and easily transportable to mission 
areas around the world. UUV platforms are inherently slow and have limited endurance 
when compared to other undersea and surface maritime combat units. These factors drive 
the need for UUV systems to be integrated into other stealthy units such as submarines, 
LCSs, and aircraft to reduce transit distances to operational areas. Constraints, such as 
size and weight limitations related to ULRMs, torpedo tubes, LCS cranes, and aircraft 
payload bays, are all important considerations when generating UUV support 
requirements. 
5.0 Operators 
The primary need of all operators is that systems successfully accomplish the 
missions for which they are designed. Operators also need systems that exhibit a high 
degree of the “ilities” such as reliability, maintainability, and availability. 
Due to habitability constraints of many host vessels, operators need to be 
equipped with systems that are relatively easy to operate and maintain. LCS and 
submarine platforms have been designed with minimal manning in mind and UUV 
systems need to minimize manpower footprints aboard these vessels (Government 
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Accountability Office 2007). In keeping with efforts to re-engage USN sailors as the 
primary operators of naval systems, UUV systems should use USN sailors rather than 
civilian contractors to perform organizational level maintenance and operations to the 
greatest extent possible. Systems that are easy to operate are anticipated to reduce the 
cost in training new operators, decrease operator error, and increase overall operational 
safety. Ideally the systems will have extremely high reliability and low maintenance 
requirements so that systems can be integrated without effecting the current naval 
manning requirements of host vessels. 
UUV systems need to be safely transported, deployed, operated, recovered, and 
maintained. Many UUVs utilize high-power density battery systems that may be 
potentially volatile or otherwise dangerous. Among other complications, this issue was 
one of the primary reasons for the setbacks to the Advanced Seal Delivery System 
(ASDS) program in 2008 (Cavas 2008). As such, advanced fault mitigation systems and 
procedures need to be implemented to reduce the risk of fire or explosion onboard host 
platforms. 
Specifically in regards to submarine operations, launch and recovery of UUV 
systems cannot reveal the position of the submarine. UUV systems are intended to be 
affordable force multipliers that extend the reach and coverage of manned platforms. 
They are not intended to place our high value assets at risk. Either technological 
improvements to reduce noise generation or evolved operational procedures need to be 
implemented to limit the acoustic exposure related to submarine UUV operations. 
6.0 Customers 
The primary need of the customer is to provide operators with the assets, training, 
and support necessary to execute mission directives. This need includes the identification 
of capability shortfalls and needs that can effectively be executed by UUV platforms in 
support of undersea dominance. 
Customers essentially act as the “middle men” between operators and both 
investors and developers. The primary objective of the customer is to fight and win 
America’s wars. To achieve this objective, customers need to effectively balance the cost, 
schedule, and performance factors of UUV system acquisition. Often in warfare, a 
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limited capability is better than no capability at all. To this end, nearly all customers have 
expressed the need to bring UUV capabilities immediately to the fleet. This led to the 
need for our systems engineering process to develop a time phased approach to UUV 
implementation. 
Significant financial constraints will continue to influence military decisions over 
the next decade. Customers need to demand that UUV systems are built with a high 
degree of modularity so that as technologies mature, they can be inserted into existing 
UUV system structures. Modularity also needs to be stressed so that UUV platforms can 
be utilized to perform multiple mission sets, thereby reducing total system ownership 
costs. 
Due to the assumed A2AD operational environment, UUV systems also need to 
incorporate a certain degree of operational expendability. The cost of losing or scuttling a 
UUV needs to be much lower than the cost of losing major platforms. Several 
stakeholders have even expressed the need for some UUVs to be designed as purely low 
cost, expendable platforms. 
7.0 Partners 
There are very few nations currently pursuing unmanned undersea technologies 
for military applications, but trends are suggesting that the total numbers of UUV systems 
worldwide will double over the next decade (Defense Security Service 2011). Although 
many of our coalition partners do not have a significant monetary stake in the 
development of UUV systems, they may directly benefit from the increased undersea 
capabilities afforded by these systems. 
Partners may need to know the UUV capabilities available to a COCOM. An 
increasingly joint and multi-national operational environment necessitates that all 
members of the coalition be at least aware of the general capabilities of military assets. 
For the sake of advancing UUV technology and effectiveness, partners with similar 





8.0 Suppliers / 9.0 Competitors 
Suppliers need to have adequate UUV repair parts and consumables in stock to 
maintain high levels of operational availability. Effective systems of systems also need to 
exhibit a fair amount of market competition. This leads to higher quality products at 
relatively lower costs to the customer (Kranton 2001). This need also encourages 
developers to advance developmental technologies using internal research and 
development funds in order to outperform the competition and secure contracts with 
suppliers and customers. 
10.0 Adversaries 
Military adversaries need UUV systems to not perform as designed and not meet 
mission objectives. A2AD environments are carefully designed to counter the military 
efforts of opposing forces. As UUV systems continue to increase in both capability and in 
quantity, adversaries need to look for ways to counter these threats. Likewise, the United 
States and its allies need to anticipate future UUV proliferation and develop defensive 
strategies and counter-UUV systems. Figure 6 shows many of the countries around the 




Figure 6.  Top Regions Targeting UUV Development (From Defense Security Service 
2011).  Several countries around the world are actively pursuing UUV technology 
for both military and commercial applications. UUV development in East Asia exceeds 




Potential adversaries also include those internal to the host countries. There has 
been and will continue to be legal and political resistance to the application of unmanned 
or autonomously operated vehicles, especially those that incorporate lethal payloads 
(Anderson and Waxman 2013). UUV systems need to be designed with fail-safe 
mechanisms to prevent unintended activations. They also should comply with 
environmental standards to the maximum extent possible. Addressing these concerns 
early and often in the systems engineering process can reduce complications later in the 
system life cycle. 
B. PROBLEM DEFINITION PROCESS 
The first block in our tailored waterfall process (Figure 3) is Problem Definition. 
Both a thorough literature review and stakeholder analysis were finished prior to 
completing the problem definition in order to remove as many biases and misconceptions 
as possible. 
The project team’s original tasking was to design a system of UUVs that will 
provide an operational undersea force available for tasking over a range of mission by 
2024. What this tasking lacked was the context for why UUVs are required in the first 
place. Through our research, the project team determined that UUVs have the ability to 
execute new mission sets and extend the functionality of current and future platforms in 
order to maintain our maritime superiority in challenging A2AD environments. 
Derived Problem Definition 
Potential adversaries continue to acquire and develop sophisticated multi-layered 
A2AD systems. In order to maintain our maritime superiority, the United States must 
continue to field systems that have the specific capability to enter into and defeat these 
A2AD environments. 
Increasingly complex A2AD environments require stealthy vehicles to execute 
critical mission sets. For over half of a century the United States Submarine Force has 
primarily taken on the task of exploiting A2AD environments, but the U.S. faces 
significant challenges as the total numbers of mission-ready submarines are reduced. Just 
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as UAVs have revolutionized the air domain, UUVs have the potential to act as 
affordable force multipliers in the undersea domain, while greatly reducing risk to high 
value units and personnel conducting critical mission sets in A2AD environments. 
C. MAPPING OF STAKEHOLDER NEEDS 
Traceability throughout the system engineering process ensures that stakeholder 
effective needs are met by the designed system of systems. Table 3 provides a 
comprehensive list of system needs that can be traced back to individual stakeholder 
classifications. This list includes not only the effective needs of stakeholders but also the 
needs presented by the derived problem definition. System requirements generated during 
the systems engineering process are then mapped back to these needs. 
 
Table 3.   Stakeholder to Needs Mapping.  System effective needs are generated from the 
thorough analysis of stakeholder documentation, interviews, and derived primitive needs. 
Effective needs are used later in the systems engineering process to aid in the 





2.1 1.0 Investors Systems need to support undersea dominance. 
2.2 1.0 Investors Systems need to be able to enter into and defeat 
enemy A2AD environments. 
2.3 1.0 Investors Systems need to incorporate an operational 
organization and structure. 
2.4 1.0 Investors Systems need to meet mission-appropriate endurance 
requirements. 
2.5 1.0 Investors Systems do not need to consider nuclear propulsion 
methods. 
2.6 1.0 Investors Systems need to be cost effective. 
2.7 1.0 Investors Systems need to be implemented in a time-phased 
approach. 
2.8 1.0 Investors Systems currently developed that can make an 







2.9 2.0 Developers Systems need to utilize COTS components and 
platforms when feasible. 
2.10 2.0 Developers Systems need to incorporate modular system designs. 
2.11 2.0 Developers Systems need to survive in expected maritime 
operating environments. 
2.12 2.0 Developers Systems developers need to receive adequate 
compensation.  
2.13 3.0 Infrastructure 
Providers 
Systems need to be transportable by current and 
planned operational platforms. 
2.14 4.0 Infrastructure 
Supporters 
System transportation methods need to be integrated 
onto stealthy platforms. 
2.15 5.0 Operators Systems need to be safely deployed/recovered from 
host vessels. 
2.16 5.0 Operators Systems need to be safe to operate. 
2.17 5.0 Operators Systems need to be safe to maintain.  
2.18 5.0 Operators Systems need to be stealthy.  
2.19 5.0 Operators System launch and recovery needs to mitigate host 
platform vulnerability.  
2.20 5.0 Operators Systems need to be relatively easy to operate. 
2.21 5.0 Operators Systems need to exhibit high degrees of the “ilities.” 
2.22 5.0 Operators Systems need to utilize USN sailors for operation and 
organizational level maintenance. 
2.23 6.0 Customers Systems need to be able to be deployed rapidly 
worldwide. 
2.24 6.0 Customers Systems need to account for operational 
expendability. 






2.26 6.0 Customers Systems need to operate with minimal manning. 
2.27 6.0 Customers Systems need to be able to conduct various missions 
using open architectures.  
2.28 6.0 Customers Systems need to communicate between unmanned 
and manned system effectively. 
2.29 6.0 Customers Systems need to incorporate covert communication 
methods. 
2.30 6.0 Customers Systems need to conduct data collection and 
dissemination. 
2.31 6.0 Customers Systems need to incorporate autonomous 
technologies. 
2.32 7.0 Partners Systems need to interface with joint operating 
environments. 
2.33 8.0 Suppliers Systems need to incorporate efficient logistical 
support. 
2.34 9.0 Competitors Systems need market competitors to incentivize 
technology advancement and affordability. 
2.35 10.0 Adversaries Systems need to minimize susceptibility to enemy 
countermeasures. 
2.36 10.0 Adversaries Systems need to operate with minimum impact to the 
environment. 
2.37 10.0 Adversaries Systems do not need to consider chemical, biological 
or radiological weaponization.   
2.38 10.0 Adversaries Systems need to minimize collateral damage.  
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter summarizes the significant stakeholder interactions that have taken 
place over the course of the study. These interactions led to the derived problem 
statement that focuses the project efforts on conducting operations in an A2AD 
environment. The needs analysis also identified the following key enduring capabilities 






• Effective sensors 
• Mission flexibility 
• Communications 
• Self-sufficiency 
Project expectations from our primary stakeholders are also clarified through 
several site visits and personal interviews. Over the duration of the study, SEA-19A team 
members participated in many demonstration, symposium, conference, and program 
review related to unmanned undersea technologies. 
With a strong fundamental understanding of project expectations and current 
UUV capabilities, the team had to scope the project to reasonable expectations based on 
project duration, and available manpower. Results of the concepts, attributes, and 
characteristics that are both included and not included in the capstone report are 





A. SCOPE METHODOLOGY 
The focus of this study is to determine UUV contributions to the future force 
structures of the USN. These contributions are of particular interest due to the fact that 
senior naval leadership expects the full integration of UUVs into the fleet by 2024. To 
enhance the overall effectiveness of the study, the project team defined system 
characteristics that are within the scope of the project and those that are outside of the 
scope. Utilizing the iterative systems engineering process, the team initially defined what 
to include/exclude for the project and then conducted more detailed scoping after 
completing the stakeholder analysis described in Chapter II. As we continued to progress 
through the waterfall process, the team conducted further scoping based upon applicable 
undersea missions and the dimensional analysis of current and planned UUVs. 
The SEA-19A project team believes that the scope of this project is both 
grounded in reality yet flexible enough to envision systems or systems-of-systems that 
can bring revolutionary capabilities to the undersea warfare domain. 
B. IN SCOPE 
Initial project scoping comes from the problem statement which focuses on 
operations in an A2AD environment. This is an environment where undersea dominance 
and the associated capability of stealth offer the ability to penetrate layered enemy A2AD 
defenses which consist mainly of weapons such as anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), 
anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), submarines, mines, and air defenses. The A2AD 
operating environment is assumed based upon the mass proliferation of these weapons 
throughout the world and through a threat analysis of potential adversaries that possess 
the capability of effectively deploying this genre of maritime weaponry. The Air-Sea 
Battle concept, generated by General Schwartz and Admiral Greenert, also identifies the 
A2AD environment as one of the primary threats to American power projection (Greenert 
and Schwartz 2012). 
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The undersea warfare domain is unique, due primarily to significant 
environmentally-based complications with undersea command and control and 
communications. Various platforms offer differing levels of capability to overcome these 
challenges. A system-of-systems approach is used to determine which platforms are best 
utilized. All UUV host platforms are considered as a system-of-systems, but in terms of 
major combatants, the focus of our study is on submarines and surface ships as potential 
launch platforms. UUVs of all types are considered, to include varying levels of 
autonomy and remotely operated vehicles that are either tethered or untethered. 
Expendable and reusable UUVs are also considered in the study. Other manned and 
unmanned platforms such as aircraft, UAVs, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), as 
well as other unmanned sensors are given consideration as support elements of undersea 
dominance. 
In development of the concept of operations, all physical conditions of the 
maritime operating environment are considered with special emphasis given to the most 
likely operating environments. These likely operating environments are derived from 
existing force deployment locations as well as developing regions of strategic importance 
in the global commons. The physical elements considered include, but are not limited to, 
such factors as temperature, pressure, water depth, water salinity, sea state, turbidity and 
visibility. 
 The 2020 to 2024 timeframe and immediate implementation of a system is a 
main driver in the level of technological maturity that is included for analysis. Primarily, 
only technologies that have reached Technology Readiness Level Four (TRL-4) are 
considered for inclusion. Per the U.S. DoD Technology Readiness Assessment Guidance, 
TRL-4 is defined as component and/or breadboard validation in a laboratory environment 
(Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering 2011). Technology not 
currently at the breadboard validation level or higher is unlikely to have the capacity for 
incorporation into a system or system of systems in the near term at a reasonable cost. 
However, any technologies below TRL-4 that show significant promise of bringing 
critical capabilities to UUVs within the scoped timeframe may be considered during the 




Cost estimation of the proposed system of systems recommended by the team is 
included in this study. Comparison of cost effectiveness with regard to specific measures 
of effectiveness (MOE) and measures of performance (MOP) are examined in the 
recommendation process. All costs, including life cycle cost, are estimated based on 
current FY13 dollars. Future budget allocations are not considered in the systems 
engineering process, but have a role in the recommended solution implementation path. 
In addition to a focus on the contribution of UUVs to undersea dominance, other 
elements of existing weapon systems that contribute to future undersea dominance are 
examined. Recommendations for modification of in-service weapons systems that 
enhance undersea capabilities or adoption into an unmanned weapon system are 
considered. Leveraging existing capabilities in new and unique manners has the ability to 
transform and extend the functionality of current and future platforms. 
Nonmaterial solutions and recommendations have an important role to play in 
undersea dominance and have been incorporated into this study where feasible. Such 
solutions include changes and modifications to doctrine, organization, training, 
manpower, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities referred to commonly as 
DOTMLPF. 
To provide structure to the study all missions listed in the United States Navy 
UUV Master Plan are given initial consideration as viable missions for UUVs. This list is 
augmented by new mission sets as a result of stakeholder analysis and critical group 
assessment of the A2AD operational environment. After starting with this initial study 
framework, specific missions were excluded from the study. The 2024 timeframe and 
technological limitations are the primary driving factors on missions excluded from our 
analysis. Due to its importance to our study, specific information on the missions 
analyzed and scoped is provided in the mission scoping section of this chapter. 
C. OUT OF SCOPE 
One of the main goals of this study is that it be grounded in the reality of both the 
present and near-future force structure of the United States Navy. Developmental naval 
platforms, to include submarines and surface combatants, which have not yet reached 
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developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) are not considered in the analysis. The goal of 
this project is not to develop a major manned or unmanned weapon system from scratch, 
but rather to incorporate manned and unmanned technologies that are already in service 
or proposed in the force in the near term. This project is not designed to provide detailed 
architectural or software designs of potential developmental UUVs, but rather to provide 
critical elements of systems-level design that facilitate UUV operational success. 
Regarding UUV recommendations, certain aspects are not examined. In CONOPS 
development, a United States only force structure is assumed. Although communication, 
interaction, and cooperation with multi-national forces will be required in future naval 
operations, it is assumed that only current platforms in the inventory of the United States 
Navy will communicate with and exercise command and control over the proposed UUV 
systems. Future work may address the interoperability standards required for multi-
national use, but for the purposes of this study it is outside the scope. 
Several specific technologies are also excluded from consideration including low 
power nuclear reactors or radioisotope power generation systems. Although these 
systems are highly capable and have been demonstrated in space system applications, the 
project team does not feel that an unmanned nuclear reactor or radioisotope power 
generation system on the planet’s surface is politically acceptable in the United States or 
the international community. Utilization of these power sources in unmanned vehicles 
also violates key tenets of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program (NNPP) such as the 
need for human oversight and supervision. In the event of a mishap or system 
compromise, there are potentially catastrophic dangers to personnel, the environment, 
and the national security of the United States and its allies (U.S. Department of Energy 
2013). 
The inventory of unmanned and “smart” weapons will continue to increase as the 
growth of computing power progresses. The enhanced autonomy capabilities that this 
increased computing power brings to the undersea domain are explored in this project, 
however, any additional moral and ethical considerations are not within the purview of 
the project. Varying levels of autonomy are discussed in this project but no moral 
attachments or interpretations are made. Such interpretations of legality in relation to the 
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use of force and autonomy are currently unresolved and reside with the civilian 
leadership of the United States government as well as the international community (DoD 
Defense Science Board 2012). 
D. MISSION SCOPING 
The project scoping statement is not meant to be an all-inclusive list of what is 
considered within the project, but rather a framework that guides the study. The iterative 
systems engineering process is used to define and scope the mission sets analyzed by the 
team. Initially, all mission sets in the UUV Master Plan are considered as viable mission 
sets: 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
2. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
3. Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) 
4. Inspection / Identification 
5. Oceanography 
6. Communication / Navigation Network Nodes (CN3) 
7. Payload Delivery 
8. Information Operations (IO) 
9. Time Critical Strike (TCS) 
10. Barrier Patrol (Homeland Defense, Anti-Terrorism / Force Protection (ATFP)) 
11. Barrier Patrol (Sea Base support) 
To scope the breadth of the project, these missions were reorganized based upon 
functional characteristics required to execute the missions. Missions that exhibited 
similar functional traits were combined to reduce the complexity of analyzing and 
modeling each mission individually. To further scope down the missions to be analyzed, 
the project team analyzed which missions would have the greatest probability of suffering 
from technology development limitations, and which missions had the least likelihood for 
successful operational integration within the given 2024 timeframe. Final mission 
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exclusions were made based on the relevancy of the missions in an assumed A2AD 
environment. Final mission scoping resulted in the examination of the following four 
mission areas: 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
2. Mine Countermeasures (MCM)   
3. Offensive/Attack Operations 
4. Information Operations (IO) 
ISR missions are a top priority in undersea dominance. Other mission sets that are 
incorporated into the ISR category are inspection/identification and oceanography due to 
their functional similarities. The offensive/attack mission set comprises ASW, ASUW, 
payload delivery, and offensive mining operations, all of which involve the delivery of a 
payload effector; whether it is a weapon, sensor, or support equipment. MCM missions 
encompass all aspects of the location, identification, and neutralization of undersea 
mines. IO is a unique mission set with unique functions, such as military deception 
(MILDEC) and submarine decoy operations, which can be heavily influenced by 
advanced UUV technologies. 
The CN3 mission set is not within the scope of this study since communications 
network development and implementation represents an entirely separate study. The 
project team examined communications but not specifically the development of mobile or 
emplaced communications systems. Professor Joseph Rice and the Sea Web program at 
Naval Postgraduate School, and other industry partners, continue to conduct extensive 
research on undersea communications networks. UUVs may serve an important role in 
this mission area as undersea communication technologies continue to evolve in the 
future. 
Time critical strike is a unique and required mission set in modern warfare. The 
current submarine force offers proven and capable platforms to conduct TCS on critical 
targets with little or no warning to the enemy. From a submerged platform, the 
Tomahawk missile is the primary weapon system capable of executing TCS missions. 
The project team examined the specifications necessary for a UUV to conduct TCS 
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missions with a Tomahawk missile and determined that the length and weight are 
prohibitively large for a UUV. Each Tomahawk missile is over twenty feet long and 
weighs approximately 3,300 pounds (Naval Air Systems Command 2013). A payload 
section of greater than twenty feet would likely require a propulsion section of 
commensurate length. This would lead the overall vehicle size to be much larger than any 
currently planned UUV platform. TCS is best performed by the current submarine and 
surface fleets and is excluded from the study. Although excluded from our study, our 
project team does acknowledge that small scale TCS, utilizing smaller munitions, may be 
feasible from a UUV within our 2024 timeline, and will be included in the offensive 
operations mission analysis. 
Barrier patrol for both homeland defense/anti-terrorism force protection (ATFP) 
and sea base support is outside the scope of this study. The ATFP mission is either better 
performed by fixed sensors or other systems such as USV’s since there is essentially no 
requirement for stealth. Barrier patrol UUVs for sea-based support would be required to 
delouse operating areas ahead of a Carrier Strike Group (CSG) or Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG). This mission set requires significant speed and endurance capabilities to 
advance at the same rate as the units it is defending. These speed and endurance 
requirements suggest that this mission is best executed by the SSN force. However, both 
of these missions are essentially ASW missions and could conceivably be performed to a 
certain degree by the alternatives analyzed for offensive/attack missions. 
E. DIMENSIONAL SCOPING 
An upper bound on the size of UUVs being considered for this study is also 
considered. To determine a maximum size, a basic transportation analysis is conducted to 
examine vehicle size in the context of transportation system limitations and a simulation 
to examine the time required for a UUV to deploy to a target area. This transportation 
analysis utilized the dimensions and weights associated with the Deep Submergence 
Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) and the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS). Details of this 
analysis are included in Appendix B. 
Based on the results of the transportation analysis and the weight/size limits 
associated with current transportation methods, our project team scoped the maximum 
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bound for UUV size to those that can be deployed from an LCS without significant 
alterations to the ship. There is no minimum size requirement. 
Additional dimensional analysis was conducted to categorize size classes of 
UUVs for endurance vs. size modeling, which is utilized extensively in the analysis of 
alternatives. This analysis resulted in three broad categories of UUV size that are 
considered. The three classes of consideration from largest to smallest are: 
1. LCS compatible 
2. SSN compatible via ULRM 
3. Vehicles less than or equal to 21 inches in diameter 
The LCS is specifically designed to be a forward-deployed platform capable of 
high speed, littoral operations. Mission modules for the ship are currently being produced 
that utilize one of the largest UUVs, known as the Remote Multi-Mission Vehicle 
(RMMV). The RMMV dimensions (United States Navy - RMMV 2012) are: 
• Length:  23ft 
• Diameter:  4ft  
• Weight:  14500lbs 
These parameters are not given to restrict potential design specifications, but to 
give a general magnitude of the size of UUV capable of being deployed or retrieved from 
an LCS. For this study the heaviest UUV being considered is 18000 lbs. which 
corresponds to the LCS handling crane weight limit (Pierzga 2012). 
Both SSGNs and Virginia Class SSNs are expected to be outfitted with the 
tactical ULRM. In this case the tube length and diameter of the Vertical Launch System 
(VLS) physically constrain the dimensions of the UUVs. Notional dimensional 
restrictions for UUVs operating with ULRM capable submarines (U.S. Director of 
Undersea Forces – Appendix A 2012) are: 
• Length:  20ft 
• Diameter:  ~60in 
• Weight:  30000lbs  
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UUVs that are less than 21 inches in diameter can be deployed from almost any 
naval platform. This size class of UUVs is the most widely available and researched 
variant and will factor heavily into the future UUV force structure. The maximum 21-
inch diameter restriction on this class is determined from the standard submarine torpedo 
tube diameter. 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides the critical elements of consideration that will be analyzed 
throughout the remainder of this report. Just as important, it also provides ample 
justification for why many elements are being omitted. 
In the context of the assumed A2AD operating environment the following four 
missions will be analyzed throughout the remainder of the report: 
• Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
• Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
• Offensive/Attack Operations 
• Information Operations (IO) 
Different UUV sizes will also be analyzed for mission effectiveness. Operations 
from both the LCS and submarines equipped with ULRMs provide the approximate 
LDUUV dimensions for consideration.  60” is the anticipated largest diameter UUV 
compatible with the ULRM and is therefore the largest diameter considered in this study. 
Maximum diameter and length restrictions for LCS operations have yet to be determined.  
21” and smaller UUVs are assumed to be operable from practically any platform. 
Other important considerations within the scope of the project are to explore the 
effectiveness and cost of both expendable and recoverable UUVs. Tethered or 
autonomous operations are another important factor to consider. 
The next chapter leverages background research and stakeholder analysis, to 
decompose the essential functions necessary to perform undersea missions, which are 
then used to identify many of the critical system level requirements to be analyzed in 
modeling and simulation. 
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 FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS IV.
A. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS APPROACH 
Functional analysis is accomplished to determine the UUV systems’ underlying 
component functions. Specifically, the objective of this analysis is to capture the primary 
functions needed to execute undersea missions. Using the mission based approach, 
individual mission functional decompositions are completed on the four scoped UUV 
mission areas identified in Chapter III. As expected, the majority of the mission specific 
component functions are very similar to one another. This facilitates the development of 
the top-level functional hierarchy for a multi-mission capable system to perform undersea 
missions shown in Figure 7. 
Testing the continuity and completeness of the functional hierarchy is 
accomplished by sequencing functions, with respect to time, in a Functional Flow Block 
Diagram (FFBD) illustrated in Figure 8. After several iterations, functional gaps can and 
should be identified and appropriately filled. 
It is difficult to see the complex workings of a technical system using just the top-
level functional hierarchy and FFBD. Lower-level, or more detailed, functional 
decompositions and FFBDs are provided in the sections that follow, in order to analyze 
UUV system characteristics and aid in system level requirements generation. Ultimately, 
any selected UUV systems need to perform the functions necessary to complete its 
respective mission. Finally, traceability of the analysis of alternatives to functionality is 
used to ensure that candidate UUV systems perform the necessary functions to meet 
specific mission requirements. 
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B. TOP-LEVEL FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS 
1. Top-Level Functional Decomposition 
 
Figure 7.  Top-Level Functional Hierarchy.  Functions are identified using both top-down 
and bottom-up methods in an attempt to capture all the primary functions required for the 
system to maintain sustained operations in the intended environment. 
 
This hierarchy not only describes the primary functions of an individual UUV, but 
also forms the framework from which the larger system of systems can function. A force 
structure comprised of many UUVs also performs all of the same functions. Visualization 
and interpretation of the hierarchy is intended to be generic in both nature and application 
to all UUV systems and force structures. To provide clarity, the five primary sub-
functions of the “Perform Undersea Missions” block are defined. General descriptions of 
second level sub-functions are also provided to facilitate functional understanding. 
2. Top-Level Functional Definitions 
Navigate (1.0) Function:  This function describes the systems physical movement 
through an undersea environment. The three sub-functions of the Navigate (1.0) function 
capture the notional navigation life cycle of a retrievable vehicle. The Launch (1.1) sub-
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function describes the initial movement away from the host platform. The Maneuver (1.2) 
sub-function describes the transit and station-keeping phases. The Recover (1.3) sub-
function describes the vehicle recovery phase. It is important to highlight that not all 
UUV systems may require the recovery sub-function. Additionally, the launch and 
recovery functions do not necessarily have to be performed by the same unit. 
Sense (2.0) Function:  This function describes the use of sensors for data 
collection and internal/external monitoring. The Sense Self (2.1) sub-function senses 
parameters vital to the internal operation of system components such as battery life, 
water/air intrusion, speed, etc. The Sense Contact (2.2) sub-function senses contacts of 
interest above and/or below the waterline depending on mission configuration. The Sense 
Environment (2.3) sub-function senses environmental factors, such as temperature, depth, 
pressure, etc., through which the system travels. 
Communicate (3.0) Function:  This function describes both internal and external 
data transfers. The Send Data (3.1) and Receive Data (3.2) sub-functions describe 
internal and external data transfers. The internal transfer captures the information 
exchange between individual components, such as between a receiver terminal and a 
decryption unit. The external transfer describes information exchange through an external 
medium between another platform and the vehicle.   
Perform Command and Control (4.0) Function:  This function describes the 
processes internal to the system associated with analyzing data and making decisions that 
drive the actions the system will perform. The Store Data (4.1) sub-function describes the 
system ability to store data received into the system. The Process Data (4.3) sub-function 
describes the ability to drive the system actions required by data received or internal data 
instructions. The Perform Specific Task (4.2) sub-function refers to the execution of 
designed mission parameter, such as visual/acoustic ISR collection, mine identification, 
launch offensive weapon, etc. 
Provide Support (5.0) Function:  This function describes the mechanisms used to 
keep the system operational. The Equip (5.1) sub-function describes all equipment, spare 
parts, and supplies necessary to conduct undersea missions. The Man (5.2) sub-function 
describes all the personnel required at the depot, intermediate and organizational levels 
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necessary to execute the system life cycle. The Train (5.3) sub-function describes the 
training required for leadership, operators and maintenance personnel. 
3. Top-Level Functional Flow 
As mentioned in the Functional Analysis Approach (Chapter IV. A), the FFBD 
(Figure 8) is used primarily to identify gaps in the functional hierarchy and also to 
provide a visualization of the functional process used to perform undersea missions with 
UUVs. 
 
Figure 8.  Top-Level Functional Flow Block Diagram.  First, the system must be able to 
physically move through an undersea environment. Then to be of any usefulness the 
system must gather data from onboard sensors and eventually be able to communicate the 
gathered information to system users. The system must also be able to react and make 
decisions based on designed mission. Throughout the entire process, support is required 
for sustained operations. 
 
Upon completion of the top-level FFBD, there are two primary functions that are 
not linear in regards to execution. The Support (5.0) function was required in parallel 
throughout the process and the Command and Control (4.0) function acts iteratively, in 
that it can process data and re-initiate action of an earlier process. While useful to 
understand the basic functional process, the top-level FFBD does not provide the 
complexity necessary to confidently state that all primary functions have been identified. 
In order to develop a more complete and comprehensive FFBD, detailed sub-functional 
decompositions are developed. 
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C. DETAILED FUNCTIONAL DECOMPOSITION 
1. Sub-Functional Decomposition 
Navigate (1.0) Functional Decomposition: 
 
Figure 9.  Navigate (1.0) Functional Decomposition.  The system must be able to depart the 
launch platform, maneuver as necessary to reach intended destinations, and if required 
return to a specified area to be recovered. 
 
The Navigate (1.0) function is broken down into three major secondary tiers 
which include the Launch (1.1), Maneuver (1.2), and Recover (1.3) sub-functions. These 
sub-functions are further decomposed to provide sufficient functional understanding. 
Launch (1.1) – This sub-function describes the initial movement of the system 
from a point of origin or release. In the case of a singular vehicle it would describe the 
entry of the vehicle into the water and the physical detachment of the vehicle from the 
host platform. 
Maneuver (1.2) – This sub-function describes the transit and station-keeping 
phases of the system or vehicle, to include object avoidance. For example, a completely 
autonomous vehicle requires the ability to follow a pre-determined navigation plan, with 
the additional ability to deviate from a planned track to avoid impeding obstacles. 
However, remotely operated vehicles may not necessarily require the ability to follow a 
pre-determined navigation plan. The 4th tier sub-functions essentially describe the 
rudimentary functions necessary for the system to move in three-dimensional space. 
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Recover (1.3) – This sub-function describes either the return of the system to the 
point of origin or the destruction of the system to prevent enemy use. When considering a 
singular vehicle it can describe the re-capture of the vehicle by the host or other capable 
platform. It is important to note that the launch platform does not necessarily have to 
serve as the recovery platform. For systems designed to be expendable, or systems that 
have been compromised during operations, self-destruction or scuttling of the vehicle has 
been determined to be an important function to prevent enemy use of critical technologies 
or sensitive data. 
Sense (2.0) Functional Decomposition: 
 
Figure 10.  Sense (2.0) Functional Decomposition.  The system must be able to determine its 
spatial location in reference to the environment and be able to determine if its subsystems 
are operating as designed. Onboard sensors need to function as designed to gather 
required mission data. 
 
The Sense (2.0) function is broken down into three major sub-functions based on 
spatial considerations. The sub-functions of sense contact and sense environment refer to 
sensing of objects external to the system. Sense self refers to intra-system sensing for 
monitoring and geo-spatial locating purposes. 
Sense Self (2.1) – This sub-function describes the ability to conduct internal 
monitoring of the system or vehicle components, to include temperature, pressure, 
ambient moisture, and fluid levels. Other sub-functions identify the various systems used 
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for allowing a UUV system to spatially locate and position itself as required by the 
mission. 
Sense Contact (2.2) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system to 
sense an external contact or impeding obstacle. Sensing can be accomplished via active 
or passive means by leveraging visual, acoustic or electromagnetic technologies. This 
sub-function also includes the function of localizing contacts in relation to the system.   
Sense Environment (2.3) – This sub-function describes the ability to sense the 
environment in which the vehicle is operating, to include the electromagnetic and oceanic 
environments. Particular parameters to sense may include pressure, temperature, salinity, 
acoustic noise levels of the surrounding water, as well as the pervading electromagnetic 
spectrum external to the water as required by the mission. 
Communicate (3.0) Functional Decomposition: 
 
Figure 11.  Communicate (3.0) Functional Decomposition.  Gathered internal and external 
data must be able to be sent and received through an appropriate medium. 
 
The Communicate (3.0) function consists of two sub-functions:  Send Data (3.1) 
and Receive Data (3.2). Only two sub-functions are defined since the actual movement of 
data is assumed to occur when these to functions are carried out. These sub-functions are 
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further broken down to describe data transmission external to the system as well as within 
the system architecture. 
Send Data (3.1) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system to transmit 
data both internally and externally. Transmission of data can be via a hardwired/tethered 
or wireless link. In regards to wireless data, information can be transmitted acoustically, 
optically, or via radio frequency; in the wired case, data can be transmitted via fiber optic 
cable, copper cable, or other wired mediums. 
Receive Data (3.2) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system to 
receive data both internally and externally. The same wired/wireless links described in 
Send Data (3.1) are available for this sub-function. 
Perform Command and Control (4.0) Functional Decomposition: 
 
Figure 12.  Perform Command and Control (4.0) Functional Decomposition.  The system 
must be able to either temporarily or permanently store input data. Processing of the data 
occurs so the system can make required functional decisions. Finally, the system must be 
able to perform the mission specific function for which it is designed. 
 
The Perform Command and Control (4.0) function comprises three main sub-
functions, two of which perform actions involving the processing and storage of data and 
one which prompts actions specific to the assigned mission.  
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Store Data (4.1) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system to store 
information received from a sensor or communication link. This is inclusive of the ability 
to make those data accessible for use as required by the mission or specific action being 
performed by the vehicle. 
Perform Specific Task (4.2) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system 
to make decisions based upon processed information to perform a specific task, whether 
in the direct execution of a mission (i.e., releasing an offensive weapon) or in support of a 
specific mission (i.e., maneuvering to avoid a contact). Consistent with these two 
applications is the ability to issue a command to the appropriate components and in the 
appropriate order to perform a task (i.e., issue signal to propulsion system to increase 
speed by the appropriate amount to avoid an object). 
Process Data (4.3) – This sub-function describes the ability of the system to 
analyze and execute internal instructions to other system components based on received 
sensor or communication data (i.e., discern signal of interest from background noise). 
This sub-function also includes packaging that data in an appropriate manner for 
transmission or storage. 
Provide Support (5.0) Functional Decomposition: 
 
Figure 13.  Provide Support (5.0) Functional Decomposition.  The system requires the 
appropriate manning, training, and equipment necessary to maintain sustained system 
operation. 
 
As shown in the top-level FFBD (Figure 8), the Provide Support (5.0) function is 
necessary over the duration of system operation. It is divided into three main sub-
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functions, Equip (5.1), Man (5.2) and Train (5.3), that are consistent with DOTMLPF 
considerations. 
Equip (5.1) – This sub-function describes the material support necessary for the 
system to perform its mission, and includes maintenance requirements, system 
acquisition strategy, and payload outfitting. 
Man (5.2) – This sub-function describes the human support component required 
for successful operation of the system. This sub-function includes maintainers and 
operators, and considers the human costs associated with manning UUV squadrons. 
Train (5.3) –This sub-function describes the training of leadership, operators and 
maintainers necessary for successful operation of the system. 
2. Detailed Functional Flow 
Decomposing the system to third and fourth-tier functions makes it possible to 
define a more coherent functional flow. The detailed FFBD in Figure 14 provides the 
complexity necessary to confidently state that all primary functions have been identified 
in regards to the UUV system of systems. 
 
Figure 14.  Detailed Functional Flow Block Diagram.  Primary sub-functions are included to 
provide a clear sequential understanding of system functional operation. This FFBD is 
used to validate the functional hierarchy shown in Figure 7. 
 
The detailed FFBD shows how the system operates under typical conditions. 
Beginning with launch, the system detaches from its host platform and then transits or 
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maneuvers to the destination. During the transit, the system will continually sense the 
environment, scan for objects, and perform internal monitoring and diagnostic processes 
within the system. Relevant data and information are sent and received between system 
platforms as required by the mission. Depending on data received, either organically or 
from outside sources, the system will process the data for immediate decision making or 
store the data in memory for subsequent data analysis. Once the mission is complete, the 
system either returns to a retrieval platform or initiates a scuttling sequence. 
 
Chapter Summary 
The functional analysis in this chapter provides information on how a baseline 
UUV system of systems functions. Specific mission functions are intentionally omitted so 
that preferences towards specific missions do not cloud the essential functions and 
requirements demanded by all mission sets. 
Top level functions required by all UUV systems to perform undersea missions 
are: 
• To Navigate 
• To Sense 
• To Communicate 
• To Perform Command and Control 
• To Provide Support 
These functions help to identify functional areas that require further technological 
innovation to effectively execute desired missions. Many of these key enablers are 
identified throughout the remainder of this report. 
As identified in our project scope (Chapter III, Section D), there are four specific 
missions that are most applicable to our project tasking. The next chapter provides more 
specific analysis of these mission sets and serves as the UUV Concept of Operations 
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 CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS V.
The concept of operations provides operational mission visualization, 
accompanied by a comprehensive narrative, of how the project team envisions the future 
of unmanned undersea warfare by 2024. To increase the value added by this report, the 
intent is to investigate the applicability and usefulness of UUVs to execute new mission 
sets and extend the functionality of current and future platforms in order to maintain our 
maritime superiority in challenging A2AD environments. 
Figure 15 provides a visualization of the overall CONOPS for the various 
missions that UUVs will be capable of performing by 2024. Primary missions include but 
are not limited to:  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Mine 
Countermeasures (MCM), Anti-Submarine/Surface Warfare (ASW/ASUW) attack 
operations, and various Information Operations (IO) missions. To provide greater clarity 
to the overall CONOPS, applicable missions are analyzed individually for their 




Figure 15.  FY2024 UUV CONOPS.  Forward operating UUVs provide new capability and 
risk reduction to high value units operating in potentially hostile A2AD environments, 
which may consist of layered enemy defenses such as submarines aircraft, ASCMs, 
ASBMs, and mines. 
 
There are several UUV programs of record, such as those being used for 
oceanographic research, which are either already operational or will be operational prior 
to 2024. These programs are already in production or funded with existing CONOPS 
specifically designed for these programs already in place, and have therefore been 
excluded from this CONOPS. However, much of the top-level CONOPS is still 
applicable to many of these systems. Major areas covered by this CONOPS are 
organization, deployment methods, command and control, communications architecture, 
and modes of operation. 
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A. TOP-LEVEL CONOPS 
1. Organization 
The CONOPS begins with organization. Development of a UUV Squadron 
(UUVRON) organization, based roughly on existing helicopter squadrons, may be 
appropriate for initial implementation. Recently, many UAV squadrons have adopted 
similar organizational structures (Fuentes 2011). Commander Submarine Forces has 
tasked SUBDEVRON 5 with the responsibility of implementing the initial command 
organization to support UUV operations. Pending a revolutionary change in standard 
operating procedures over the next decade, the following paragraphs introduce some 
notional organization designs that may be used to bring UUVs into mainstream naval 
operations. 
Many UUV platforms are high-technology assets that require specialized 
maintenance, operations and training of personnel. Notional UUVRONs will operate and 
maintain a variety of vehicles based upon operational need. Detachments (DETs) from 
the main UUVRON may embark individual launch platforms and be forward-deployed to 
operational areas. When required, each DET also provides the requisite amount of 
manpower necessary to operate and maintain the UUVs embarked. This concept closely 
resembles how helicopter squadrons embark surface combatants in the USN. This 
organizational method has proven to be highly successful for decades and could 
potentially be an excellent model to build upon. 
Other UUV platforms, such as those designed for expendability, may only need to 
be treated as “fire-and-forget” weapons. In this capacity the host platform is only 
responsible for the launch of the vehicles and may not need specialized operational and 
maintenance personnel embarked. This concept also opens the door for any type of air, 
surface, and sub-surface unit to become a UUV host platform. 
2. Command, Control, and Communications (C3) 
Tactical control of UUVs initially resides with the unit they are embarked upon. 
The embarked UUV DET has a direct reporting relationship to the host vessel 
Commanding Officer. The host unit may be tasked by higher authority to utilize the UUV 
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to conduct specific missions, or to launch the UUV and handover control to other capable 
units or a master control station (OPNAV Instruction 3120.32D 2012). It is important to 
note that the degree of external command and control available is directly linked to 
external communication paths available. This drives the requirement for all untethered 
UUVs to incorporate some degree of autonomy, when external communication links are 
lost or degraded. 
UUVs primarily operate in one of three modes of operation:  manual, semi-
autonomous, and fully autonomous; as described in the Unmanned Systems Safety Guide 
for DoD Acquisition (Department of Defense 2007). In manual mode, a human operator 
gives all or most of the significant commands when in direct communication with the 
UUV. If communication is lost, the UUV reverts to pre-programmed actions. In this 
mode of operation a human is almost always in the loop and requires a two-way 
communication infrastructure. In a semi-autonomous mode, the UUV makes the majority 
of the decisions autonomously and only communicates with human operators as required 
by mission programming. In this mode, the human operator issues important command 
and control decisions in regards to mission execution.   Semi-autonomous modes also 
require a two-way communication infrastructure. In the fully autonomous mode, the 
UUV has the ability to execute entire mission sets without human operator interaction. 
Only one-way communication infrastructures may be needed to transmit data collected 
by fully autonomous UUVs. However, two-way communication infrastructures in 
autonomous modes may allow for greater mission flexibility and reconfiguration. 
A notional UUV should have the ability to communicate with capable platforms 
when in terrestrial line of sight via hard-wire, radio frequency, optical or acoustic 
communications methods. Over-the-horizon UUVs should have satellite or other long 
distance communication capabilities, in order to at least receive or transmit positional 
data. This capability fosters the ability to control multiple units via a master control 
station. All UUVs must also be capable of communicating positional data at variable 




Notional UUVRON DETs should be capable of air mobility, in order to deploy 
from the United States aboard strategic airlift aircraft such as the C-5, C-17, and C-130. 
This allows flexibility for reducing the number of globally pre-positioned units, hereby 
potentially reducing the total inventory of UUV assets required. The smallest of the 
aircraft, the C-130 can accommodate the largest variant of UUV system considered in 
this report. This offers the unique capability to deploy anywhere in the world, in close 
proximity to where a surface ship or submarine can dock on short notice. Air mobility 
also provides the potential for airborne launch of UUV variants, thus potentially 
eliminating the need for conventional platforms to pull into port facilities to embark UUV 
assets. This transportation concept is analogous to the mobility infrastructure that Special 
Operations Forces (SOF) utilize to overcome operational constraints, such as the limited 
availability of personnel and equipment. 
Conventional pre-deployment loadouts of many UUV variants onboard host 
platforms may also be utilized, contingent upon UUV asset availability. This method 
provides significant UUV capabilities to be immediately available to operational 
commanders in current areas of interest. 
B. MISSION SPECIFIC CONOPS 
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
The ISR CONOPS includes a broad spectrum of mission sets focused on 
gathering critical mission data. This mission area is applicable in both peacetime and 
wartime and comprises a major requirement for current SSN mission assignment. UUVs 
offer unique capabilities to the ISR mission due to their small size, covert operation, and 
risk mitigation. The effectiveness of SSNs to perform the ISR mission is limited by the 
number of platforms available for tasking, water depth, and susceptibility to detection in 
A2AD environments. UUVs may serve as an affordable force multiplier and also provide 
an extension of capability to current manned platforms. Figure 16 provides visualization 
for ISR CONOPS in which UUVs are launched from host platforms, transit to operational 
areas, conduct the mission, and return to a retrieval platform. Potential missions include 
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coastal surveillance, signal intelligence (SIGINT), harbor imagery, and undersea terrain 
mapping. 
 
Figure 16.  Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance CONOPS.  UUVs may be used to 
penetrate into shallow and contested waters to conduct ocean bottom terrain mapping or 
to conduct imagery and SIGINT operations along an enemy coastline or harbor. 
 
The first design reference mission (DRM) comprises persistent coastal 
surveillance. A UUV is deployed from a host unit and transits to the area of interest. 
When on station, it uses a robust sensor suite and advanced autonomous control to avoid 
obstacles, navigate precisely, and collect data. The targeted data of interest could include 
radio frequency (RF) signals, visual images, acoustic recording, or environmental data. 
The UUV must provide this data back to a host unit or controlling station, either by 
traditional line of sight RF communications, satellite communications, covert undersea 
acoustic communications, or upon physical connection after vehicle recovery. The data 
may be transmitted at specified time intervals or event triggers, or in near real-time as the 
mission scenario requires or permits. This communications profile of the mission depends 
on the time sensitivity of the data, and accepted level of risk of counter-detection. Vehicle 
 63 
 
capabilities, with regard to communication systems, mission endurance time, and 
available power, also determine an acceptable communications plan. 
ISR may also include more specific desired collection such as bathymetric 
surveys of areas of interest. These missions would not necessarily require the same level 
of autonomy or communications capability, and could be performed primarily in a pre-
programmed fashion with allowances for obstacle avoidance. Collected data could be 
obtained upon vehicle recovery, subject to time sensitivity of the information. This 
mission subset is currently conducted by the submarine force, but introduction of UUVs 
allows for shallower operations and may free up submarines to conduct other pressing 
missions. 
An additional area where UUVs provide a unique capability is in open water 
surveillance of targets of interest. Adversary naval operations could be observed at closer 
range than is now acceptable with SSNs or other platforms. The covert posture afforded 
by the undersea environment offers significant benefits for specified signal collection, 
tactics observation, and capability assessment. In this context, the UUV would likely 
return to the host unit for recovery and data transfer, as requiring real time transmissions 
would unnecessarily risk counter-detection and compromise the covert observation 
posture. 
The ISR mission area requires vehicles with significant endurance and sensor 
capabilities as well as advanced autonomous control. The UUV must have the necessary 
endurance to transit an adequate distance to the area of interest in order to decrease the 
susceptibility of the deploying platform. On-station time must be sufficient to perform the 
assigned tasking with allowances for the additional power requirements necessitated by 
obstacle avoidance in congested littoral regions. Sensor payloads must be adequate to 
capture information of interest with a high degree of accuracy, accounting for the 
limitations of the autonomous control algorithm to effectively employ the platform. 
Without direct human-in-the-loop control, it must be assumed that some 
collection opportunities may be missed due to the inability of the vehicle to adaptively 
operate in complex environments. This limitation must be mitigated by capable sensors 
that can either utilize advanced autonomous target recognition (ATR) software, or be able 
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to capture large amounts of data with a high degree of accuracy for post-mission analysis 
by human discriminators. Likewise, collection opportunities may actually increase due to 
the removal of the human distraction element. For example, if a human operator steers a 
UUV off the programed course to further investigate a contact, one or more contacts that 
the UUV could have been sensed, had it remained on the intended course, could slip by 
undetected. Critical attributes to assess the effectiveness of UUVs to perform this mission 
include endurance, data storage capacity, stealth, and contact detection capability. 
Endurance encompasses vehicle range, speed, and available on-station time. 
2. Mine Countermeasures (MCM) 
The CONOPS for MCM provides limited MCM capability to any ship or 
submarine that is UUV-capable. This transfers operational risk to UUV platforms and 
decreases risk to human life by reducing the need for high-value manned vehicles to enter 
into an area suspected of containing undersea mines. 
The CONOPS can further be broken into overt and covert MCM. Overt MCM is 
defined as openly (i.e., no requirement for stealth) conducting mine countermeasures and 
neutralization. This type of MCM is applicable when MCM forces are not under direct 
threat of A2AD environments. The other subset of MCM is covert operations, where 
friendly forces are under threat from A2AD weapons and stealth is critical to preparing 
the battlespace for follow-on forces. The covert subset of MCM focuses on locating and 
identifying mines to establish Q-routes for the safe transit of HVUs. In both mission sets, 
it is important for the UUV to have extremely high detection rates and low false positive 
rates. Figure 17 provides visualization for MCM CONOPS in which UUVs are launched 
from host platforms, transit to operational areas, conduct mine sweeping, localization, 




Figure 17.  Mine Countermeasure CONOPS.  UUVs may be used to map Q-routes through 
hostile minefields for follow-on forces. Some advanced UUVs may be equipped with 
mine neutralization capabilities. 
 
Overt mission profiles consist of UUVs being deployed from, e.g., helicopters, 
surface ships, submarines, or USVs, to a suspected minefield. Once on station, the UUV 
works cooperatively with other units conducting mine sweeping, localization, and 
neutralization. Much of the Navy’s current MCM UUV focus and analysis is centered on 
overt MCM to provide a suitable replacement to the aging fleet of MCM ships. 
Therefore, to provide sufficient value-added by our report, the focus in this study is on 
covert MCM mission profiles that can contribute to future MCM operations and doctrine. 
Covert mission profiles consist of UUVs being deployed from outside enemy RF 
and acoustic detection ranges in an A2AD environment. Once deployed, the UUV 
covertly transits to the suspected minefield. The UUV then searches for and localizes 
enemy mines. Mine locations are then securely transmitted to receiving stations, which 
are then used to map Q-routes to mitigate undersea mining threats for follow-on forces. 
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3. Offensive Attack Operations 
Offensive UUV operations include coordinated ASW/ASUW attack and offensive 
mining operations. Attack CONOPS offer a unique expansion of current offensive 
capabilities, but undeniably pushes the limits of currently available technology, such as 
UUV size, speed, endurance, and ATR. 
Figure 18 provides graphical representation of the offensive CONOPS in which 
UUVs are deployed from the host platform armed with a torpedo-like weapon that has 
been modified to engage both surface and subsurface targets. The UUV transits to the 
operating area and executes its search and destroy mission protocols. In the case of a 
reusable UUV variant, the UUV exits the operational area and returns to a retrieval 
platform for rearming and refueling. This concept is very similar to the AUWS concept 
proposed by the SEA-17B project team. In some cases the UUV and the weapon may be 
one in the same, in that the UUV is designed as an expendable asset that is launched with 
no intention of recovery. This concept is very similar to the Mk-48 torpedo conversions 
programs currently in development (U.S. Navy – ISLMM 2013). 
 
Figure 18.  Offensive Attack CONOPS.  As shown, UUVs may be used as offensive weapons 
to assist in coordinated ASW and ASUW operations, acting as sensor or weapon delivery 
platforms, or both. Other UUVs may be used as effective offensive mining platforms. 
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Attack vehicle operations require attack UUVs to sense, identify, and attack 
enemy targets of opportunity. While not required for unrestrained warfare, attack UUVs 
should incorporate a high degree of target discrimination to prevent unintended targeting 
and collateral damage to innocent persons and vessels. UUVs may conduct attacks either 
autonomously or cooperatively with other UUVs, surface ships, aircraft, and submarines. 
In a cooperative ASW/ASUW warfare setting, UUVs act as either armed or 
unarmed sensor platforms that operate in conjunction with surface, air, and submarine 
units. Cooperative offensive operations effectively extend the combat radius of host 
vessels through the use of UUVs. Figure 19 represents a notional CONOPS for UUVs 
operating cooperatively with an LCS, Fire Scout UAV, and other maritime aircraft. The 
ability for the UUV to act as a forward sensor and sentinel could provide early detection 
and targeting information for other friendly forces. The UUV could just as easily be 
utilized as the effecting platform, in that it receives targeting information from other units 
and launches offensive weapons accordingly. 
 
Figure 19.  Cooperative Attack CONOPS.  UUVs operating in conjunction with other 
ASW/ASUW assets, such as aircraft, surface combatants, and submarines, to extend 




In an offensive mining role, UUVs are utilized to provide new mining capabilities 
to the USN. Operations may consist of UUVs stealthily infiltrating enemy harbors and 
waterways to deliver and place a wide variety of mines. Alternatively, expendable UUVs 
can simply convert into highly capable mines once they have reached their intended 
destinations. Figure 20 illustrates UUVs conducting far-forward offensive mining 
operations. Undiscriminating offensive mining CONOPS can be executed well within the 
bounds of current technology, but “smart” offensive mining poses significant technical 
challenges. 
 
Figure 20.  Offensive Mining CONOPS.  UUVs may be used as delivery platforms for mines 
or UUVs may simply convert into sophisticated mines upon reaching intended 
destinations. 
 
The ability of surface ships and aircraft to effectively deliver mines to decisive 
locations in an A2AD environment may be questionable and perhaps impractical, leaving 
the United States with limited options for delivering offensive mines. Current U.S. 
submarines are capable of conducting offensive mining operations, yet it is a capability 
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that until recently has rarely been exercised. UUVs may prove to be excellent platforms 
to fill this critical capability gap, due to their inherent risk reduction and far-forward 
mining capabilities. 
It is important to note that the lines of differentiation between offensive mining 
and ASW/ASUW attack operations are significantly blurring, and often become one in 
the same. Technical definitions and classifications of offensive UUV assets seem to be 
drawing a great deal of attention from the operational and legal communities. In 2013, 
Dr. Myron H. Nordquist, Professor, Center for Oceans Law and Policy, University of 
Virginia, led a discussion on the following topic: 
Status of Unmanned Maritime Systems. Are they vessels?  Are they 
mines?  Does the status depend on where, how, and in what manner 
they operate (e.g., independently propelled, tethered, or immobile)?  
What is the consequence of the status determination (e.g., sovereign 
immunity, applicability of various legal regimes)?  (Norris 2013) 
While the legal ramifications of such systems are still unclear, it is still important to 
advance these technologies and be prepared to deploy them in support of United States 
defense and policy. 
4. Information Operations (IO) 
The CONOPS for IO incorporates several individual mission sets. These include 
decoy operations, network exploitation, and psychological operations. Employment of a 
UUV for cooperative deception also adds a new tactical dimension to USW. Figure 21 
provides visualization for IO CONOPS in which UUVs are launched from host 
platforms, transit to operational areas, conduct decoy, network exploitation, and military 




Figure 21.  Information Operations CONOPS.  UUVs may be designed to complete decoy 
missions that lure enemy combatants away from high value unit operating areas. UUVs 
may also be used as MILDEC platforms that are able to broadcast propaganda or project 
malicious signals into enemy infrastructures. 
 
The first application in the IO domain is to deploy a UUV as an advanced 
countermeasure. A submarine being tracked acoustically can deploy the UUV, which can 
then act as a decoy. The UUV emits acoustic signals intended to imitate the host platform 
and carry out a pre-programmed or adaptively determined route and behavior profile to 
provide a distraction, allowing the host platform to covertly evade track. Employment of 
the UUV should result in increased survivability of the high value unit. 
Alternatively, a decoy UUV could be deployed to intentionally trigger adversary 
defenses such as a fixed harbor security system. By preemptively creating a diversion, the 
UUV can distract defensive resources and reduce the counter-detection risk of a friendly 
submarine inserting Special Forces or conducting targeted surveillance in other locations. 
Another mission profile consists of a deployed UUV impersonating a friendly 
submarine to infiltrate and probe adversary areas of interest. This disguise could be in the 
form of acoustic transmissions or a dummy periscope. As an option for non-escalatory 
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action, a UUV could observe naval operations at close range, and if counter-detected 
(intentionally or unintentionally) a friendly submarine can observe the adversary reaction 
from a safer vantage point. 
In addition to decoy operations, a UUV offers a unique platform from which to 
exploit the electromagnetic signal spectrum. A small, unmanned, and nominally 
expendable vehicle can take greater risk in operating closer to adversary shores than 
manned high-value units like SSNs. A friendly antenna covertly positioned close to 
enemy shores offers new opportunities to exploit enemy wireless networks by inserting 
malicious signals or broadcasting propaganda messages. These transmissions are 
traditionally considered an unacceptable counter-detection risk for submarines. 
These scenarios all present a challenge with respect to recovery of the UUV. If 
the objective is to attract adversary attention away from the host unit, it is 
counterproductive for that host to attempt recovery of the decoy. In all of these 
conditions, the UUV would need to possess a self-destruct or scuttling capability in case 
of prosecution or capture. Similarly, each mission profile would require significant 
autonomous performance. Acoustic or RF signaling by a host controlling unit would pose 
an unnecessary counter-detection risk and negate the advantage offered by a robust decoy 
vehicle. 
The IO mission area requires a vehicle with significant endurance, autonomy, and 
a robust sensor suite. Large payloads or weapons are not required for this mission area. 
Vehicles should be as simple and inexpensive as possible, as recovery rates are expected 
to be low when employed in this capacity. 
Chapter Summary 
Innovative UUV concepts of operation have been derived over the course of the 
capstone project. Examples include:  Covert Q-route mapping operations for high value 
unit passage through mined areas, long-endurance decoy and deception operations, and 
mobile minefield networks. UUVs specifically designed for expendability are also 




In order to identify which UUV characteristics and attributes most heavily 
influence mission performance and effectiveness, modeling and simulation is used to 
simulate combat operations in a challenging A2AD environment. Both mathematically-
based models and behavioral-based simulation programs are used in the next chapter to 




 UUV CAPABILITY MODELING AND SIMULATION VI.
A. MODELING AND SIMULATION APPROACH 
The goal of modeling and simulation is to gain insight on how systems behave 
prior to real world testing and evaluation. The key advantage of modeling and simulation 
is that it is relatively easy to vary parameters related to system capabilities and to thereby 
judge which system capabilities are most important for the particular mission being 
modeled.   
System requirements and capabilities analysis associated with scoped mission 
areas are accomplished to determine focus areas for modeling and simulation. Results 
obtained from modeling and simulation are then used to provide significant insights for 
the analysis of alternatives and proposed future UUV force structure. 
System requirements and capabilities are approached from both a functionally-
derived perspective and by determining critical operational issues (COIs) in an effort to 
capture requirements that would have otherwise been overlooked. The requirements 
analysis located in Appendix D is used to provide an educated baseline of metrics to 
model to. Derived directly from this requirement analysis, the following measures have 




• Sensor Effectiveness 









The analysis tools used included both stochastic, discrete-event simulation, and 
also deterministic, physics-based models. Diligent effort is placed on ensuring that model 
and simulation inputs are reasonable and defensible. 
B. MANA V OVERVIEW 
MANA V is a modeling program developed by the New Zealand Defense 
Technology Agency. MANA V stands for Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata Vector. 
The program is a defined as an agent based distillation model. Distillation, as described 
by the creators of MANA, creates a bottom-up abstraction of a scenario that captures 
essence of a situation, but avoids non-essential detail. MANA V is based on two key 
ideas; first is that the behavior of the entities within a combat model, both friend and foe, 
is a critical component of the analysis of possible outcomes. The second idea is that when 
human decision making is a key element being modeled, the use of highly detailed, 
physics-based models for determining force mixes and combat effectiveness may be 
misplaced analytical effort.  (McIntosh, et al. 2007) 
SEA-19A chose MANA V as our primary modeling and simulation tool because 
it is a well-understood, well-documented, and easily used agent-based simulation 
program. Agent-based simulation programs are particularly useful in modeling that 
involves critical interactions between multiple platforms or agents. The final and most 
compelling reason to use MANA V is that it allows for variable behaviors to be modeled 
within the same entity. Autonomy and behavior profiles play a significant role in 
unmanned systems and the ability to create and experiment with different behavior 
profiles improves the modeling of interactions between agents. 
MANA V is particularly useful because it incorporates many factors that are 
critical in combat such as stealth, sensor capabilities, weapon capabilities and 
communications capabilities. Another high point in the program is that it allows behavior 
to be modeled according to agent state. This allows for the incorporation of dynamic 
combat tactics in to what would otherwise be a static model. Combat units are 
fundamentally individual agents that do not act in totally predictable manners. 
Environmental and tactical conditions almost always dictate the movement of combat 
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units and any attempt to model combat in any other manner excludes critical variables 
related to mission success or failure. 
Modeling in MANA V can be complicated. This is a result of the vast number of 
factors that can be varied in the program. Detailed tracking of changes in variables must 
occur to prevent unintended variations when comparing separate scenarios. The level of 
complexity and number of processes that are occurring at each time step also require a 
significant amount of processing power. 
Another significant movement limitation in MANA is the inability for speed to be 
varied according to a distribution within a single agent state. This complicates modeling 
efforts, as speed is then required to be varied using multiple different states for the agent. 
This creates a highly complex model where mistakes can easily be made. Despite the 
limitations that we encountered using MANA, we found it to be an intriguing simulation 
program that allowed the project team to model UUV operations in complex ways which 
appeared to be realistic. 
C. BACKGROUND MODELING 
Background and foundational modeling is utilized to explore critical topic areas 
that must be addressed to explore technical requirements associated with current UUVs 
and future UUV development. The second purpose is to provide realistic physics-based 
inputs for modeling in MANA V. Subject matter experts, technical documentation, and 
other model results are used to provide MANA V inputs. The three primary background 
models produced are:  endurance capability, sensor capability, and kinematic 
engagement. 
1. Endurance Capability Model 
The endurance capability model is constructed to provide detailed energy storage 
and consumption characteristics with regard to size and energy capacity vs. velocity. This 
model provides a solid foundation to examine the capabilities of UUVs with regard to 
actual power constraints. Configurations examined include a variable diesel 
engine/lithium-ion hybrid combination and a lithium-ion battery only configuration.    
Notional hybrid UUV dimensions for endurance model: 
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• Shape:  Cylindrical 
• Length:  22ft 
• Diameter:  21in, 48in, 60in 
• Fuel, Power, Propulsion Section Length:  10ft 
• C3, Weapons, Guidance, Sensor Section Length:  12ft 
The configuration of the propulsion section was modeled as an optimization 
problem using Excel Solver. The objective of the model is to maximize the endurance of 
the UUV by modifying the kWh available from different combinations of diesel fuel and 
lithium-ion batteries. The dominating constraint in the model is the amount of “stealth 
time” required.  “Stealth time” relates to how long the UUV must be able to operate on 
battery only to achieve a given mission. 
The assumed lithium-ion battery volumetric energy density of 0.3 kWh per liter is 
based on a value that is technically feasible and slightly above the range of what is 
typically employed in current UUV systems from manufacturers such as Bluefin 
Robotics, Yardney, and Kongsberg Maritime. This value was also confirmed as a 
reasonable assumption during the Penn State Undersea Technology Short Course in 2012. 
The diesel fuel volumetric energy density 2.61 kWh per liter is derived from 
manufacturer specifications of fuel consumption rates for commercially available marine 
diesel engines. Manufacturers’ fuel consumption figures for generic 7.6 kW and 11.5 kW 
generators are used. It is apparent that a commercially available diesel engine would 
require significant modification to function in a small UUV; however the fuel 
consumption specifications will likely remain in the same range. 
The endurance model is designed for maximum flexibility and reconfiguration. 
Modifiable endurance model parameters and key assumptions include: 
• Diesel fuel kWh per liter – The amount of kWh generated per liter of diesel 
fuel is obtained from commercially available generator ratings, and divided by 
the fuel burn per hour of operation. Assumed diesel fuel volumetric energy 
density:  2.61 kWh per liter. 
• Lithium-ion battery kWh per liter – The amount of kWh generated per liter of 
lithium-ion batteries is obtained from commercially available technical 
specifications of batteries. Assumed lithium-ion volumetric energy density:  
0.3 kWh per liter. 
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• Energy section length and diameter – 10ft length is assumed with variable 
diameters. 
• Energy section hull thickness – A two inch hull thickness is assumed to allow 
for steel, aluminum, or other materials to be used for hull construction. No 
analysis on thickness required for specific depths was conducted, but two 
inches offers a robust thickness. 
• Proportion of unusable energy section volume – 30% of total energy section 
volume is assumed to be unusable. This assumption accounts for hull support 
structures and required mounting and support equipment that would be 
required in the energy section. It also allows control surfaces and the propeller 
installation in the after portion of the hull.  
• Diesel generator volume – Volumes from commercially available generators 
are assumed. 
• Electric propulsion motor volume – The electric propulsion motor is assumed 
to be 0.127 cubic meters. A common figure of 24” x 18” x 18” is assumed. 
This size will allow for a commercially available 7 kW continuous duty 
electric motor with a peak power output of 12 kW. Without exact 
specifications it is difficult to determine a power requirement for the vehicle 
propulsion. Data from the Penn State ARL Short Course is used to make this 
assumption. 
• Propulsion power consumption – An average propulsion power of 6kW is 
assumed. This value is based upon propulsion characteristics exhibited by the 
Penn State University APL LTV38P UUV. 
• Hotel load power consumption – An average value of 1 kW is assumed for 
navigation, system, and mission electronics. This is the power associated with 
all other power draws other than propulsion. 
• Reserve power – 30 kWh of reserve power is assumed.  30 kWh with 20% of 
that unusable would allow the vehicle to operate for approximately 3 hours in 
an emergency at full power. 
• Unusable battery capacity – An unusable battery capacity of 20% is assumed. 
Near the full discharge of a lithium-ion battery, the voltage begins to fall and 
power becomes unreliable. 
• “Stealth time” required – This is the amount of time the vehicle must operate 
on battery only power without snorkeling. This is the primary constraint in the 
model and is varied to produce the results mix if diesel fuel and batteries are 
required. 
• Battery recharge rate – Optimally, the maximum amount of power will be 
dedicated to charging the batteries to shorten the battery charging cycle time 
and minimize the risk of detection. Sufficient power must also be available for 
continued operations and maneuverability while recharging the battery. 
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a. Hybrid Diesel-Electric UUV Endurance Analysis   
The standard 48 inch diameter UUV configuration is used for the 
following analysis. 
Based on a diesel fuel-only configuration, the total possible operational 
endurance of the UUV is 864 hours for the 7.4 kW generators and 574 hours for the 11.5 
kW generators. As expected the 11.5 kW generators have a larger volume as well as a 
higher fuel consumption rate than the 7.4 kW model. This diesel-only configuration has 
all of the total possible operational endurance on the surface or near-surface snorkeling 
with zero “stealth time” endurance. 
Battery only configurations resulted in decreased total possible operational 
endurance as compared to the diesel fuel only variants. Total possible endurance for a 
battery only UUV is 63 hours of continuous “stealth time” based on the assumed 0.3 kWh 
per liter capacity of lithium-ion batteries. 
Hybrid configurations result is much greater cumulative “stealth time.”  
The 11.5 kW generators also provide increased endurance over the 7.4 kW versions, due 
to the 11.5 kW generators faster recharge rates for the lithium-ion batteries. These faster 
recharge rates enable the UUV to utilize increased cumulative “stealth time” over the 7.4 
kW versions and burn less diesel fuel to complete a full battery recharge. These models 




Figure 22.  Hybrid Diesel/Electric Endurance Profile.  This profile shows a tradeoff profile 
for diesel fuel and battery cells. UUVs that only need a short duration of stealth battery 
time can greatly extend amount of total endurance/range by carrying more diesel fuel 
rather than battery cells. UUVs that need to remain stealthy on battery power for long 
durations require more battery cells rather than diesel fuel, thereby reducing total mission 
endurance/range. 
 
UUVs designed with hybrid propulsion plants would likely operate under 
similar conditions as diesel submarines. This notion necessitates that the majority of the 
snorkeling time required to run the diesel generators would have to be completed in 
conditions (such as darkness) that reduce the probability of visual detection by 
adversaries. Operation in a snorkeling mode does leave the UUV vulnerable to infrared 
detection, however mission requirements ultimately dictate the required continuous 
“stealth time,” and will also drive the storage ratios between diesel fuel and battery 
compartments. 
b. Battery-Only UUV Endurance Analysis 
Most current UUVs are designed with battery only configurations. 
Sufficient understanding of energy density was obtained by completing the hybrid 
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analysis. Especially in regards to battery only UUV technologies, it is also important to 
understand the effect of speed variations on total energy consumption. 
Power equations are derived for power draw required, as a function of 
speed, for a vehicle of given diameter. Performance data provided by Bluefin Robotics 
was fitted with a third order polynomial to represent the physics of hydrodynamic drag. It 
can be shown theoretically that propulsion power varies with the cube of vehicle velocity 










Power is equal to the velocity times the drag force imposed on the body. 
Drag force is proportional to the density of the fluid, the cross-sectional area of the body, 
and the square of the velocity. 
Therefore, accounting for speed and vehicle size, fitting constants are 
obtained to represent the drag coefficient and propulsive efficiency. The third order 
polynomial fits accurately and represents the provided data and consequently provide an 
acceptable closed form relationship to estimate propulsion power required for a vehicle of 
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These power equations were modeled to provide the performance 
characteristics of maximum UUV range vs. UUV speed as shown in Figure 23. These 
basic performance characteristics provided inputs for MANA V simulations. Detailed 




Figure 23.  Battery Only UUV Maximum Range vs. UUV Speed — Power Consumption 
Characteristics.  The most efficient speeds are between 2–4 knots for all UUV 
sizes analyzed. As UUV speed is increased, maximum range is reduced according to the 
profiles shown. 
 
Figure 23 illustrates that two to four knots is the most efficient speed for 
UUV operations. The results of the analysis closely resemble the performance 
specifications and endurance characteristics for current UUVs from various 
manufacturers. This figure also shows that ranges in excess of 1000 nautical miles are 
feasible with battery only configurations. 
This analysis has shown that battery-only systems have the capability to 
provide sufficient endurance to field systems with far-reaching military capability. 
Hybrid systems also may provide significant military capability depending on mission 
requirements. 
2. Sensor Capability Models 
a. Acoustic Sensor Capability Model 
A passive acoustic sensor model was used to predict acoustic detection 
ranges of targets. The basic sonar equation and process for range determination is derived 
from the second edition of the Principles of Naval Weapons Systems (Payne 2010): 
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SL-TL-NL+DI ≥ DT 
SL = Source Level 
TL = Transmission Loss 
NL = Noise Level 
DI = Directivity Index 
DT = Detection Threshold 
The greater than or equal to condition is normally written as an equality. It 
is then understood to mean that if the left hand side’s algebraic sum is greater than DT, 
detection is possible. Rearranging this equation and negating directivity index (DI) we 
have: 
DT = SL – NLENVIRONMENT – NLSELF NOISE – NLSHIPPING –TL 
The source level of the target vessel is used and the factors of own ship 
self-noise, environmental noise, and shipping noise are all subtracted from the source 
level to determine the target detection threshold. Transmission loss is calculated through 
the equation for total propagation loss (Payne 2010): 
TL = 10logR +30 + R +A 
TL = Total propagation loss 
R = Range 
A = Loss due to screening by fixed objects 
The total propagation loss equation is used to determine the amount of 
propagation loss. Detection with certainty is assumed for detection ranges up to one 
kilometer. Cylindrical spreading is assumed after the first kilometer. The loss due to 
screening by fixed objects (A) is ignored as an open ocean environment is assumed. 
Surface ship frequency of interest is assumed to be at 5 KHZ for propagation loss. 
Submarine frequency of interest with regard to propagation loss is assumed to be 400 HZ. 
 Using Excel spreadsheet modeling, the maximum range is determined by 
finding that range resulting in a signal excess of 0 db. To generate usable data for MANA 
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V simulations, all target noise levels are converted into detection ranges. Each time the 
simulation is run, a new combination of noise levels is examined to account for 
variability in ocean environments. Table 4 shows the respective noise levels assumed for 
the model. These noise level assumptions were collected and based upon data from 
various Wenz noise curves (Payne 2010), (Urick 1983), and (Powell and Forest 1988). 
 
Table 4.   Acoustic Noise Levels.  Decibel levels obtained from Wenz noise curves. 
 
Active sonar ranges are calculated using the same process except the 
active transmission was utilized for source level. In addition, two-way attenuation of the 
signal was accounted for with an assumed active sonar transmission frequency of 5 KHZ. 
This effectively doubles the transmission loss. 
Detection ranges for acoustic sensors deployed from aircraft were treated 
in a different manner. It is assumed that maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) and helicopters 
will utilize sonobuoys to attempt to localize UUVs and submarines. It is assumed that a 
pattern of sonobuoys will be laid following initial detection by a cueing platform. It is 
also assumed that the aircraft is vectored to within a ten nautical mile radius of the 
submarine or UUV location. From this point, the sonobuoy is treated as a cookie-cutter 
sensor with a set detection radius of 1,000 meters. The highest probability of detection 
assumed with vectoring of the aircraft is 8%. At the lowest detection probability of 1%, 
the cookie-cutter assumption is made that the MPA can hold one sonobuoy for each of 
the 100 square nautical miles in the simulation, and the MPA is searching without cueing. 
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With all required input data collected, 10,000 simulation runs are 
conducted for each sensor and target pair. It is important to note that this particular model 
only deals with direct path propagation in the ocean. Bottom bounce and convergence 
zones are not examined in this model due to assumed limitations of UUV sonar and the 
associated processing capability required. Descriptive statistics and a histogram are 
created for each target/sensor pair and detection probability tables are generated. These 
detection probability tables located in Appendix C, Section B are then used to generate 
the acoustic sensor detection profiles in MANA V. 
b. Radar and Electronic Support Measures (ESM) Models 
Detection with radar sensors is governed by the radar range equation 
(Payne 2010):  
( )arg17 ,transmitter t etR h h= +  
where range (R) is in kilometers and height (h) in meters. The heights utilized in the 
modeling are shown in Table 5. Calculations for electronic support measures are 
estimated by adding 50% to the radar range to model atmospheric ducting. 
 
Table 5.   Radar Sensor Heights 
Helicopter and maritime patrol aircraft pilots were consulted to determine 
approximate airborne radar detection range probabilities. These probabilities are also 
applied to land-based radar ranges. Corrections are made for increased sea state 
conditions and operator ability to discern the target periscope from background clutter. 
Land-based radars were assumed to be capable conventional radars and airborne radars 
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are assumed to be highly capable inverse synthetic aperture radars. The result is a very 
demanding environment for UUVs and submarines to operate with an exposed mast, 
especially close to shore. Radar and ESM detection probability tables are also located in 
Appendix C, Section B. These detection probability tables are then used to generate the 
radar and ESM sensor detection profiles in MANA V. 
c. Kinematic Engagement Model 
The probability of kill associated with each weapon is estimated based 
upon an Excel simulation that accounts for variation in engagement geometry, vehicle 
kinematics, countermeasures and weapon reliability. The weapons that are modeled are 
Mk-46 and Mk-48 torpedo-equivalent weapons. These two weapons are modeled for both 
friendly and enemy units. The Mk-46 equivalent specifications are an 11,000 meter range 
with a velocity of 20 meters/second (Jane’s 2005). The Mk-48 equivalent specifications 
are a 38,000 meter range with a velocity of 28 meters/second (Jane’s 2005). Weapon 
reliability for all weapons is assumed to be 90%. Weapon susceptibility to 
countermeasures is assumed to be 33% for weapons fired at manned platforms and 15% 
for weapons fired at UUVs. UUVs are assumed to have a more limited evasion and 
countermeasure capability than manned platforms. Initial detection velocity and torpedo 
evasion velocity assumptions for various platforms are detailed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6.   Kinematic Engagement Velocity Inputs.  Initial velocities are the assumed 
standard operational speeds. Evasion velocities are the assumed maximum speed of each 
platform. UUV and merchant vessels are assumed to not have the capability to detect that 
they are being targeted, and therefore do not employ evasion tactics. 
 
For each unique target, that target velocity and the weapon velocity are 
used to determine minimum and maximum closure rates. The maximum closure rate 
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occurs when the weapon and target are on opposite, head-on collision courses. The 
minimum closure rate occurs when the weapon and target are on the same course. The 
minimum and maximum values are then utilized to generate a random closure rate 
between these values for simulation purposes. 
The next step in the process is to examine how far the weapon can close 
the target before the target can effectively evade at maximum speed. This is the delay 
time to maximum evasion course and speed. Two factors are considered, attack 
recognition time and time required for evasive action. 
Attack recognition is defined as the time required for the attacked unit to 
recognize that there is a torpedo in the water, conduct counter-fire, and then order an 
evasion course and speed. This time is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of 
45 seconds and a standard deviation of 10 seconds. 
The evasive action time is defined as the time that is required to turn the 
ship to an evasion course and increase to maximum speed and is assumed to be uniformly 
distributed between 0 and 90 seconds. These values were chosen because the target vessel 
is between 0 and 180 degrees from the optimum evasion course and a 2 degree per 
second turn rate is assumed for all vessels. The assumed tactic in this simulation is that 
the target vessel recognizes it has been shot at, returns fire and then turns to the opposite 
course as weapon bearing and opens the range at maximum speed. 
Attack recognition delay and evasion delay are summed to determine the 
total delay. Total delay time is then multiplied by the weapon speed to determine the 
range the weapon closes before the target begins to open the range. Total delay time is 
then subtracted from total weapon run time to determine the amount of available run time 
left on the weapon. Closure rate is then recalculated for the new weapon and target 
geometry and kinematics. This new closure rate is multiplied by the remaining weapon 
run time to determine if sufficient closure is possible for a potential kill. 
This simulation is run 10,000 times to generate a probability of kill for a 
given range. The simulation is iterated in increasing 1000 yard increments until a 
probability of kill of zero is achieved. Probability of kill is then multiplied by the 
assumed reliability of the weapon and susceptibility to countermeasures. Targets that 
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have no detection capability against a torpedo can also be modeled by negating attack 
recognition and evasive action times. 
Probability of kill assessments for the various platforms and ranges are 
included in Appendix C, Section C. These probability tables are then used to generate 
weapon effectiveness parameters in MANA V. 
D. MANA V MODEL VALIDATION 
Prior to full scale utilization and modeling with MANA V the project team 
validated the motion engine in MANA V to ensure that the background inputs and 
processes occurring in the program do in fact represent reality. To conduct this validation 
a distilled motion model was produced. This model utilized an enemy submarine and 
UUV which are randomly placed on a twenty five by twenty five nautical mile map. The 
enemy submarine and the UUV search for each other at eight knots and four knots 
respectively. Each has an average path length of 10,000 meters. The time to first 
detection is the output of this model. The model was replicated 1000 times and the results 
were compared to the value that is expected from the random search with dynamic 
enhancement equation. 
To validate the MANA model, it was compared to the random search model for 
area search. The random search model predicts that the probability of detection by time t 





= −  
where, 
PD(t) = probability detection as a function of time 
W = searcher sweep width (twice the detection range) 
V = searcher speed 
t = time 
A = search area 
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Additionally, this model also utilized a searcher dynamic enhancement speed to 
allow the random search model to accommodate both a moving searcher and target. The 
dynamically enhanced speed (
~
V ) is approximately the mean relative speed between the 
searcher and target. The dynamic enhancement speed relationship is as follows (Eagle 
2011): 
~
2 21 max( , )
2
V U V U V = + +
   
where, 
~
V = searcher dynamic enhancement speed 
V = searcher speed 
U = target speed 
An important assumption in this area search model is that the searcher has a 
cookie-cutter sensor, and the searcher’s sweep width is then twice that of its sensor’s 
detection range. In a perfect scenario, a searcher would search an area continuously and 
have no overlap and cover all of the search area. In reality, searches will have overlap, 
either due to the necessity to turn, imperfect navigation, environmental uncertainties, or 
target motion. Figure 24 shows probability of detection by time t from the MANA V 
simulation and from the random search model. The results match well, and support the 




Figure 24.  MANA V Motion Validation.  The similar curves show that MANA V probability 
of detection models closely match the accepted mathematical models used for validation. 
 
E. MISSION MODELING 
1. Design of Experiments 
The base MANA V model is designed to simulate 100 NM by 100 NM A2AD 
environments where the enemy exhibits control of the sea, air, and the electromagnetic 
spectrum. A visual snapshot of the MANA V model is shown in Figure 25. 
Calculation mean detection 
time = 49.2 hours 
 





Figure 25.  MANA V Simulation Screenshot and Legend 
Figure 25 also illustrates a challenging high contact density environment. Aside 
from the high contact density, the enemies possess a robust communications capability. 
Enemy units have real-time tactical data links between multiple platforms such as enemy 
surface combatants, submarines, aircraft, and land based sensors. This allows for the use 
of real world tactics where the surface combatants vector maritime patrol aircraft to 
prosecute sub-surface contacts. Enemy aircraft conduct cyclic operations to simulate 
realistic enemy air cover in the A2AD environment. Adversary surface combatants and 
submarine initial starting positions are randomly generated and motion follows random 
search with average path lengths of 10,000 meters. The mission of the enemy units is to 
find and kill friendly submarines and UUVs in the operating area. 
All players are assigned behavioral traits to account for unit level tactical decision 
making. Appendix C, Section D details the specific behaviors that are programmed into 
both the friendly and adversary mission platforms within the MANA V model. 
All scoped missions, with the exception of mine countermeasures, utilized a full 
















and was executed in a smaller area to simulate a heavily mined, geographically 
constrained navigational area such as a chokepoint. 
Variable simulation factors include contact density, employment of enhanced 
UUV avoidance, and vehicle size. Significant factors and factor levels are listed in  
Table 7. 
 
Table 7.   MANA V Variable Factors.  The model factors and factor levels show the 
different variations that are investigated to evaluate UUV measures of performance and 
effectiveness. 
 
2. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
The United States Navy is committed to developing a fleet of large diameter 
UUVs (LDUUVs) to be operational within the next decade. LDUUVs concepts may have 
a distinct advantage over smaller sized UUVs for ISR missions due to increased 
endurance and sensor capacity. Several missions call for persistent ISR coverage and a 
long endurance vehicle seems to be an appropriate tool for completing these mission 
requirements. Although the Navy is moving forward with the LDUUV program, its true 
operational capabilities and value added to the naval force are yet to be determined. 
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Until sufficient test and evaluation data for current developmental LDUUV 
programs of record becomes available, it is useful to conduct analysis on other factors 
that may affect ISR UUV performance and mission success. In particular, the goal of the 
SEA-19A ISR analysis is to identify critical operating issues with missions conducted in 
heavily contested A2AD wartime environments. Critical analysis of the ISR mission area 
identified three areas of interest to explore: 
1. Number of UUVs used per sortie 
2. Recoverable versus expendable UUVs 
3. Avoidance programming versus non-avoidance programming 
These three factors were chosen because the results of the analyses can be 
extended to other possible performance factors such as number of contacts sensed, 
maximum operating ranges, and vehicle size. 
a. ISR Mission Success Based on Number of UUVs Deployed per 
Sortie 
SEA-19A desires to explore how deploying greater numbers of UUVs can 
impact overall mission success. The scenario consisted of UUVs departing a launch 
platform and transiting to an operational area. Upon reaching the coast, UUVs conduct 
mobile ISR missions along a 90 nautical mile shoreline and then return to the vicinity of 
the original launch location for recovery. The mission is considered successful if a single 
UUV returns to the launch platform regardless of the number deployed. The model was 
run by varying initial launch distance from shore and by varying number of UUVs 
deployed per sortie. For sorties with more than one UUV, the number of UUVs were split 
equally and sent along the same path but in reciprocal patterns as shown in Figure 26 





Figure 26.  ISR UUV MANA V Mission Profile.  UUVs are launched and transit to coastline. 
Upon arrival, UUVs conduct ISR operations along the 90 NM coastline. If required, the 
UUV then transits back to a recovery area. If more than one UUV is utilized, the vehicles 
travel in reciprocal patterns as shown by the yellow and red tracks. 
 
Initial launch distances were varied between 12–65 nautical miles and the 
number of UUVs deployed per sortie varied between 1–8 UUVs. Figure 27 shows the 




Figure 27.  ISR Mission Success Based on UUV Sortie Size.  As the numbers of UUVs 
deployed are increased, the probability of mission success also increases. The most 
significant increase occurs between 1 and 2 UUV configurations. The law of diminishing 
returns also begins to apply after the deployment of 4 UUVs. 
 
The results are predictable, in that as greater numbers of UUVs are 
deployed, the probability of mission success increases. Although predictable there is 
useful analytical information that can be drawn from the data. First, the most dramatic 
change in mission success rates by proportion occur between the 1 UUV and the 2 UUV 
sortie sizes, with the disparity in success rate between these two groups expanding as the 
launch distance from shore is increased.  2 UUV sorties result in a 9% increase in mission 
success rate between the two groups at 50 NM and surges to 29% increase at 65 NM. 
This trend of expanding differential success rates between groups as launch distance 
increases can be applied to all sortie sizes. As a result, increased numbers of UUVs 
deployed should be considered as launch distances increase. 
The second important thing to draw from the data is that variation in 
mission success rates decreases as the number of UUVs increases over the range of 
distances. For example, looking at the 1 UUV sortie size the variation in success rate 
between 12 NM and 65 NM is 21%. Over the same range of launch distances, the 
variation in the 8 UUV sortie is only 1%. 
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Data also reveals that the law of diminishing returns takes hold relatively 
quickly to the extent that there really is no statistical difference between using 6 UUV 
and 8 UUV sorties. Even the 4 UUV sortie has very little statistical difference when 
compared to the 8 UUV option. This type of analysis is especially useful when 
conducting an analysis of alternatives and determining future UUV procurement 
quantities. 
To summarize, the factors that may need to be considered when deciding 
on number of UUVs to use for an ISR mission in a highly contested A2AD environment 
include, but are not limited to: 
• 2 UUV vs. 1 UUV sorties result in significantly increased mission 
accomplishment 
• Greater distances traveled result in increased disparity between 
UUV mission success rates over the range of sortie sizes 
• Variation in success rate decreases with increased numbers of 
UUVs over the range of distances traveled 
• Law of diminishing returns takes hold as UUV sortie size is 
increased 
Revisiting the concept of the LDUUV program, in order to maintain a 
small UUV fleet size (approx. 10 LDUUVs), it seems that the vehicle currently being 
built will need to be quite robust and have an extremely low probability of detection to 
survive a heavily contested A2AD environment. Like many other high technology 
concepts, costs of the LDUUV program are beginning to soar, and as of right now there 
are no intentions of purchasing large quantities. Based on cost alone, the potential loss of 
an LDUUV may not satisfy expected returns on investment. Overall, the analysis 
presented indicates that greater numbers of UUVs provide much better success rates up to 
a point at which the law of diminishing returns takes precedence. Continued tradeoff 
analysis needs to occur prior to going all-in on the LDUUV program. For example, 
imagine that you could purchase eight less capable UUVs for the price of one LDUUV. 
Not only can mission success possibly increase, but the cost of losing one or more of the 
UUVs would be far less. 
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b. Expendable vs. Recoverable ISR UUVs 
Much of modern thinking and research in regards to UUV employment is 
centered on the need to design for recoverability. This is a sound approach when UUV 
costs are so high that loss of the UUV asset would place undue strain on future 
operations. Our project team seeks to challenge this line of thinking and provide some 
insight into the possibilities of designing UUVs explicitly for expendability. The 
expendable ISR UUV model scenario is designed just like the scenario used for the ISR 
mission success based on number of UUVs deployed per sortie in the previous section. 
The only difference being that instead of returning to the launch platform at the end of the 
ISR mission, the UUV surfaces and transmits the recorded data then self-destructs or 
scuttles itself. Figure 28 shows the data for a 1 UUV comparison. 
 
Figure 28.  One ISR UUV Expendable vs. Recoverable.  As the launch and recovery distance 
is increased, UUVs that are designed for expendability are able to exhibit higher mission 
success due to not having to make a return trip to the recovery area through the A2AD 
environment. 
 
Looking at the 1 UUV comparison there are a few things to note. It 
indicates that at shorter launch distances there is a negligible difference between 
recoverable and expendable mission success rates. However, as launch distance 
increases, expendable UUV success rates remain relatively static while recoverable UUV 
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success rates decrease. This is a result of the removal of the requirement for the UUV to 
return to the launch platform, hence less distance traveled in an A2AD environment. 
Further analysis was conducted to see whether the results of the 1 UUV model hold for 
increased numbers of UUVs. Figure 29 shows the results of the 2 UUV comparisons 
between expendable and recoverable UUVs. 
 
Figure 29.  Two ISR UUV Expendable vs. Recoverable.  Results of the 2 UUV 
configurations are similar to the 1 UUV configurations in Figure 29. UUVs that are 
designed for expendability are able to exhibit higher mission success due to not having to 
make a return trip to the recovery area through the A2AD environment. 
 
As seen from the results in the 2 UUV case, the mission success rate also 
remains relatively stable over all distances for the expendable variant. Like the 1 UUV 
case, there exists divergence in mission success for the recoverable variant, further 
supporting the use of expendable UUVs over recoverable UUVs. 
It is also useful to see how expendable UUVs of smaller sortie sizes 





Figure 30.  Consolidated ISR UUV Expendable vs. Recoverable.  Results show that similar 
probabilities of mission success can occur with an expendable sortie that is approximately 
half the size of a recoverable sortie. 
 
The comparisons show that mission success rates are statistically similar 
by using expendable UUV sorties that are half the size of a recoverable UUV sorties. For 
example, the 2 UUV expendable sorties success rates are statistically similar to those of 
the 4 UUV recoverable sorties, yielding greater than 95% mission success over the 
launch distances shown. These results support the notion of using expendable UUVs over 
recoverable UUVs due to the ability to achieve similar mission success probabilities with 
fewer UUVs. 
The future UUV force structure may incorporate both concepts. Decisions 
between recoverable and expendable depend most heavily on cost vs. benefit ratios and 
returns on investment. Unfortunately much of the costs associated with recovery will 
become sunk costs. Also much of the financial risk is tied with the fact that there is not 
sufficient real world data available to determine UUV survivability in A2AD 
environments. 
c. ISR UUV Avoidance vs. Non-Avoidance Programming 
With enemy combatants, mines, fishing nets, trawlers, commercial 
shipping, and natural barriers, UUV obstacle avoidance has become a critical 
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consideration for UUV design. This analysis explores whether avoidance programming 
(speed and maneuver) yields sufficient difference in mission success rates to justify 
utilizing it. This is an important analysis due to the fact that significant alterations in both 
speed and maneuver have a definite impact on UUV endurance. Figure 31 shows a 
comparison between using avoidance programming and not using avoidance 
programming for both 1 and 2 UUV sortie sizes. 
 
Figure 31.  ISR UUV Avoidance vs. Non-Avoidance.  Results show that UUVs that 
incorporate significant obstacle avoidance hardware and programming are able to achieve 
higher probabilities of mission success. 
 
From the data it is easy to see that as launch distance increases the use of 
avoidance programming also increases mission probability of success. Although 
percentages of all four combinations are greater than 80% at the 50 NM for the designed 
scenario, as launch distance increases there is divergence between the avoidance and non-
avoidance sets. For example, at 50 NM both 1 UUV scenarios have an 81% mission 
success rates, but as distance from shore increases the 1 UUV without avoidance 
programming success drops to 33% whereas the 1 UUV with avoidance programming 
success still maintains a 50% success rate (i.e., the difference grows from 0% to 17% 
over that range). A similar trend is also seen in the 2 UUV cases. Based off these findings 
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the merit of using avoidance programming is definitely justified and recommended, but 
must be factored into UUV range and endurance calculations. 
Although not captured directly from the data but recognized during 
scenario testing, avoidance maneuvers reduce the overall linear distance that can be 
traveled by the UUV. Linear distance will remain the same given a constant speed but 
since the path of the UUV is not a straight line, but rather a series of obstacle avoidance 
maneuvers in route to its intended destination, it travels a much further distance over the 
same linear displacement. As stated, this data was not a direct output of the model but 
was derived because the fuel endurance values had to be increased at 90 NM for the 
avoidance programmed UUV because it never made it back to the recovery vehicle due to 
fuel exhaustion. In the case of the non-avoidance programmed UUV the vehicle did not 
suffer a single fuel exhaustion casualty at the 90 NM distance. 
Overall the data suggests that the increase in mission success rate with 
avoidance programming justifies designing UUVs with avoidance programming. With 
the increase in mission success rate comes the trade-off of having a lower linear 
displacement of travel. Because of this, consideration must be made to designed launch 
distances if avoidance programming is utilized. 
d. Key ISR Modeling Takeaways 
Based on the three analysis factors of UUV sortie size, expendable versus 
recoverable UUVs, and avoidance programmed versus non-avoidance programmed 
UUVs resulted in the following key notions: 
• At least 2 or more UUVs should be utilized when high mission 
success probabilities are required 
• Multiple UUVs deployed at once yield better mission success rates 
to a point where the law of diminishing returns sets in 
• Use of expendable UUVs may result in greater probability of 
mission success over use of recoverable UUVs 
• Avoidance programming results in significantly greater probability 
of mission success over use of non-avoidance programming, but 
decreases overall max range 
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3. Information Operations (IO) 
Information Operations is a broad discipline with a wide variety of necessary 
skill-sets and capabilities. Particularly significant for the employment of UUVs, the areas 
of military deception and intelligence are elements of a notional IO cell (Scaparrotti 
2013). This analysis will address the effectiveness of UUVs deployed in this capacity. 
This mission area is envisioned with two distinct scenarios. The first subset of 
deception operations addresses employment against enemy naval exercises or operations 
in the open ocean environment. In this assessment and observation scenario, an SSN 
deploys a decoy UUV which proceeds into the enemy exercise area. Traditionally, SSNs 
will observe enemy exercises from a safe distance, gathering any available intelligence 
while minimizing risk of counter-detection. 
The second scenario of the military deception mission area consists of a SSN 
which must travel close to adversary shores and defenses to conduct a sensitive mission, 
such as SOF insertion/extraction or a specified high-priority intelligence collection. In 
this distraction scenario, a decoy UUV is deployed to confuse defensive resources and 
mitigate the risk of counter-detection or prosecution to the SSN. 
a. IO UUV Assessment and Observation Model 
There are different options on how to employ a decoy UUV in this 
capacity. One option is to deploy the UUV with a covert profile for the purpose of 
assessing the enemy ASW capability. In this posture, the UUV might be configured to 
display a profile approximately representing that of a friendly submarine. This profile 
could include acoustic characteristics as well as mast exposure. The UUV and standoff 
SSN assesses the response of the enemy force. 
Another option for deployment is for the UUV to present an overt profile, 
intentionally louder than friendly submarines and possibly with more constant mast 
exposure. This posture is employed with the intention of observing the enemy response 
upon detection of an unanticipated submerged contact. In both cases the UUV acts as a 




To analyze this concept, a range of possible enemy responses must be 
considered along with an appraisal of the likelihood that each of the responses would be 
used. These factors comprise a mixed strategy. The scenario is similar to a two person 
matrix game, with the SSN selecting a deployment posture for the UUV and the enemy 
force selecting a response upon detection. A failure to detect is also accounted for, though 
not part of the matrix game. The assumed possible responses are: 
• Actively prosecute the contact using all available ASW resources. 
In a peacetime scenario, this would result in overt tracking. A 
combat scenario could include weapons employment. 
• Halt the exercise or operation and vacate the area, evading the 
perceived contact. 
• Show no overt response but observe the contact, effectively 
collecting counter-intelligence. 
The matrix depicted as Table 8 shows nominal “payoffs” resulting from 
each of these scenarios, as envisioned for the initial encounter. The payoff numbers are 
not specifically derived from any driving factor. The numbers are only conceived in a 
“better, good, neutral, bad, worse” (+2 to -2) formulation. Note that while this is laid out 
similar to a two-person zero-sum game, this is a game of imperfect information. Each 
side does not know which choice the other side has made, and therefore does not know 
the payoff resulting from his choice. There is also a column representing the payoff 
associated with Red’s failure to detect the UUV, although this is not a strictly an 
available “choice” and therefore not typically included in a matrix game formulation. It 
can also be seen that there is a saddle point to the game where Blue deploys in overt 
posture, and Red reacts with observe. 
 
Table 8.   IO Assessment and Observation Initial Payoff Matrix.  This matrix shows the 





In order to capture the reality that this game is not played only once, but 
many times, expressions are generated to describe the change in payoff for each result as 
a function of the number of engagements. Number of engagements is used as an example 
of an independent variable controlling the change in payoff, but a specific time step or 
other temporal factor could also be derived. For a series of 20 engagements, the 
expressions in Figures 32 and 33 illustrate the payoff of each possible result. Blue payoff, 
p, and red payoff, q, are functions of the number of engagements, x. 
  
  
Figure 32.  IO Assessment and Observation Payoff Relationships.  The expressions and plots 
describe the change in Blue and Red payoffs over the course of multiple engagements, or 





Figure 33.  IO Assessment and Observation Payoff Relationships.  The expressions and plots 
describe the change in Blue and Red payoffs over the course of multiple engagements, or 
over the course of time of employment of the decoy strategy. 
 
The structure of the game is depicted as a sequential decision tree in 
Figure 34, with detection shown as a probabilistic event node. When analyzing the tree, 
the decision nodes are replaced with event nodes, and the probabilities on each branch 




Figure 34.  IO Sequential Decision Tree.  The decision tree depicts the structure of the game, 
with Blue first choosing an employment posture followed by a probability of Red 
detection and a Red choice of response. 
 
Because each branch has a definitive payoff and probability of occurrence 
given assumed mixed strategies for blue and red, the expected payoff of the game is a 
simple calculation of summing the probabilistic payoff of each branch. Mixed strategies 
are varied and the calculated payoff tabulated. Probabilities of detection for red against 
covert employments are assumed at 20% and overt employments are assumed at 95%. 
The results of the game theory analysis are generated using the MATLAB 
code included in Appendix H. As shown in Figure 35, the results can be graphically 
represented by plotting payoff as a function of blue mixed strategy, with a result for each 
engagement and each red “aggressiveness” mixed strategy. Each data series represents an 







Figure 35.  Payoff as a Function of Blue Mixed Strategy.  The plots represent the expected 
payoff for Blue resulting from each decoy engagement as a function of Blue mixed 
strategy. Each line represents one sequential engagement. There is a separate plot for 




Since each expected payoff is a strictly linear function of the specific 
result payoffs and probabilities, the distribution is always linear and not terribly sensitive 
in the region of assumed “reasonable” red aggressiveness strategies. The values in Table 
9 were used as probability of red response for each level of aggressiveness. 
 
Table 9.   Probabilities of Red Response for each Level of Aggressiveness.  This matrix 
shows all considered Red mixed strategies for response to the decoy scenario. 
 
The “Counter” and “Counter High” strategies were not initially included, 
but subsequently added to drive some variation in the response. These represent an 
increased willingness of the enemy to assume risk and attempt to “counter-collect” on the 
UUV. 
The results of this analysis should inform how to select an appropriate 
mixed strategy for blue employment in order to maximize expected payoff while 
mitigating risk, and how that balance of employment should change over the course of 
multiple engagements. Specifically, by assuming a Red aggressiveness posture and 
plotting the results of specific ranges of engagements, Blue could determine the best 
mixed strategy to employ over the course of those selected engagements. Based on the 
shape of the total solution space, the point can be determined where Blue can employ a 
mixed strategy that has the greatest minimum payoff, which correlates to the lowest risk. 
For example, against the conservative Red strategy, this point is approximately 60% 
covert employment. Against the aggressive strategy, this point shifts to approximately 
73% covert employment. Different criteria could be used to select the desired effect, and 
therefore best mixed strategy. 
 
Conclusions:  The summary conclusion of this analysis is embedded in the 
potential range of results for each scenario and the shape of the solution space. The data 
provide some intuition into the minimum and maximum payoff or utility and the factors 
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controlling the range of those results. A control payoff resulting from a traditional SSN 
collection unaided by UUV deception may be assumed, and the potential enhanced 
benefit assessed. Additional study of sensitivity of payoff functions, risk tolerance, and 
red mixed strategies may provide further insights. 
In Figure 36, an example is portrayed by plotting all blue payoff results 
from the first ten engagements against the conservative, moderate, and aggressive red 
strategies. 
 
Figure 36.  Blue Payoff vs. Red Conservative, Moderate, and Aggressive Strategies (10 
Engagements).  The first 10 engagements against the three basic Red response 
strategies result in the depicted composite solution space. 
 
This shows the blue mixed strategy with minimal risk is to employ 
covertly about 50% of the time, which generates a potential maximum payoff of about 
1.6, or approximately 86% of the global maximum in the result. Additionally, there are 
no negative payoffs in this solution space. 
For comparison, the results against the same red strategies are plotted for 
all 20 engagements in Figure 37. It can be seen that safest blue mixed strategy has shifted 
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to the right, to about 65% covert employment. The range of possible payoffs has also 
extended to include negative values, while the global maximum payoff has not increased. 
Therefore, continued employment after the first ten engagements introduces new risk 
with no new gain. This type of analysis could inform how blue should adapt its strategy 
over the course of a series of engagements. Depending on the scenario being considered, 
a selection of aggressiveness strategies and specific engagement series could be analyzed. 
This provides a framework to consider the sensitivity of the result with respect to the 
assumption of enemy posture, and the overall length of the campaign. 
 
Figure 37.  Blue Payoff vs. Red Conservative, Moderate, and Aggressive Strategies (20 
Engagements).  The payoff from 20 engagements against the three basic Red 
response strategies are shown together, creating the depicted composite solution space. 
 
This model generates many opportunities for further analysis. All payoff 
functions and probabilities were assumed with some discussion and input from SMEs, 
but more rigorous investigation to determine more supported values could bring validity 
to the result. Alternatively, a more in-depth analysis of the impact of risk tolerance would 
add to the value of the model. Some investigation into the impact of risk variation over 
the course of the campaign may yield interesting results. The same approach could be 
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employed to investigate the impact of changing red mixed strategies over the course of a 
series of engagements. Several options are presented in this analysis, but further study 
could provide valuable insights into which strategies should be analyzed at different 
stages of the campaign. 
b. IO Distraction UUV Model 
Utilizing MANA V, agents are created to represent the SSN, UUVs, red 
force ASW assets, and neutral maritime traffic. The UUV agents for this scenario adhere 
to the overt employment description described previously. They are intended to be 
detected to draw attention away from the operating SSN. As a result, their vulnerability to 
ASW sensors is systematically higher than that assumed for UUV agents in other mission 
areas. The UUV agents are subject to the constraints assumed for 21” vehicles in order to 
minimize cost, as these UUVs are intended to be expendable. 
The scenario geometry lays out an assumed target location on land which 
is monitored by a coastal radar and the adjacent waters patrolled by surface combatants. 
A maritime patrol aircraft and ASW-equipped helicopter perform periodic patrols. One 
red SSN is underway patrolling the operational area randomly. 
Factors to be studied include the speed profile of the UUV, the maritime 
traffic density, and the number of UUVs employed. All factors will be analyzed at all 
levels comprising a full factorial experiment. The scenario will be evaluated for the SSN 
without UUVs as the control. Due to the endurance limitation of smaller UUVs, the 
decoys are launched from around 40 miles from shore. The decoys attempt to draw the 
security forces to the north while the SSN conducts it mission in the southern area of the 




Figure 38.  IO UUV MANA V Distraction Mission Profile.  Objective of the simulation is for 
the UUVs to draw enemy forces to the north while SSN conducts missions or exfiltration 
to the south. 
 
The results in Table 10 and Figure 39 show the number of SSNs killed by 
each type of Red platform during 500 replications of each scenario. Of note, Red surface 




Table 10.   SSNs Losses With/Without UUV Distraction (500 Replications).  Total 
submarines killed tend to decrease as more UUVs are utilized for distraction. UUVs that 
are more survivable (sprint/obstacle avoidance) also tend to increase submarine survival. 




Figure 39.  Graphical Representation of SSNs Losses With/Without UUV Distraction.  In all 




There is not a great deal of variability in the results, the difference in 
survivability between the best and worst scenarios are less than 3%. Many more 
replications are required to validate the significance of variation in the results. The 95% 
confidence intervals portrayed on Figure 39 show the range of statistical variability 
involved. Further analysis is also required to examine the effect of different tactics with 
regard to UUV and submarine tracks. This model did not address the tactical employment 
as a factor. Variation in the UUV profile could also be analyzed in greater detail. The 
decoy UUVs were simulated with a constant overt profile. Further studies could evaluate 
the benefit of a more varied posture to retain the attention of red ASW forces for a longer 
period. 
c. Key IO Modeling Takeaways 
• UUVs force the opposition to expend resources and time to 
identify and prosecute the multiple threats presented 
• Using UUVs for decoy and distraction operations seems to suggest 
improved SSN survivability, but more analysis is required to 
confirm 
• Employing two UUVs for distraction provides improved 
survivability compared to one UUV 
• It is typically beneficial for the UUVs to have a sprint evasion 
capability otherwise referred to as object avoidance 
4. Offensive Attack Operations 
Attack UUV modeling is conducted to examine the contribution of UUVs in an 
attack role. While conducting the modeling it became readily apparent that UUVs do not 
currently possess the endurance and maneuvering characteristics necessary to conduct 
anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare in a traditional sense. The traditional track and 
trail and long decision timeline simply does not fit for the type of combat that is observed 
with armed UUVs. Combat occurs when UUVs sense a target of opportunity, and then 
make a decision on whether or not to engage the target. This concept of operations is 
heavily reliant upon the pillars of multi-sensory input, advanced processing, and 
communications. When the UUV gains contact via sensory inputs, it may have to match 
the signal to a library and discern if that is a signal of interest. This is also known as 
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Autonomous Target Recognition (ATR). An example of this is a UUV with visual, 
acoustic and ESM sensors that conducts data fusion to utilize all three data sources. 
Advanced onboard processing and data storage facilitate this capability. Without 
completely reliable data processing or sensing systems human-in-the-loop may be 
required to prevent the unintended targeting of innocent vessels. This scheme of 
engagement would require an over the horizon communication system to transfer data of 
interest to a human decision maker for the final engagement approval. 
The concepts examined in this model include recoverable UUVs of 48” and 60” 
diameter that represent a notional LDUUV and a 21” vehicle modeled after the proposed 
Modular Undersea Heavyweight Vehicle (MUHV). To model offensive mining a unique 
UUV glider style mine was modeled. This concept is modeled as a 21” vehicle that 
exhibits the characteristics of a sea glider in a search mode and retains propeller 
propulsion for a higher speed terminal phase. When a submarine operates in conjunction 
with the UUV the submarine operates on the periphery of the UUV operating area and 
conducts a combat patrol as a transit search. 
The 48” UUV has one Mk-46/54 equivalent weapon embarked for use and the 
60” UUV has two Mk-46/54 equivalent weapons available for use. The recoverable 
vehicles conduct a transit search tactic. Two vehicles of the same size conduct 
independent patrols of approximately 170 NM in each simulation. This distance was 
chosen based upon the endurance limitations of the vehicles. 
The MUHV is a configurable vehicle that is based on the Mk-48 torpedo 
(OPNAV N97 2012). Four vehicles are utilized in during each mission. The vehicles are 
expendable. Each vehicle conducts an independent transit of approximately eighty miles. 
When the vehicle reaches the final waypoint it loiters until onboard fuel is exhausted. 
When onboard fuel is exhausted the vehicle scuttles and is lost. If an enemy surface 
combatant or submarine is encountered the vehicle increases speed to twenty five knots 
and conducts a terminal attack. 
The 21” glider mine is modeled as a weapon that is deployed in pods of variable 
size. The weapon has half of the energy available as compared to the 21” MUHV but 
only consumes 25% of the energy of the MUHV. The patrol length is approximately 100 
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NM. These weapons could be delivered by a submarine, surface or air delivered. The 
mine transits like a glider at approximately two knots and has a terminal homing phase of 
fifteen knots. The weapon exhibits the same detection characteristics as the other UUVs 
but requires two hits to kill a surface vessel, and one hit to kill a submarine. The 
deployment scheme in these scenarios is in three salvos, or pods of varying size. 
Analysis of the results of the simulation is based upon the measures of 
effectiveness for attack vehicles. The primary measures of effectiveness analyzed are: 
1. Enemy casualty rate 
2. UUV survival rate 
3. Friendly submarine survival rate 
In tandem with friendly and enemy casualty rates, exchange ratios are utilized 
across variable contact densities. Full factorial experiments are executed for the attack 
missions with 100 replications of each simulation. In some areas, further simulation with 
500 replications is conducted to investigate the results and attempt to gain statistical 
significance. 
a. Enemy Casualty Rates and Combat Exchange Ratios 
Enemy loss rates as well as combat exchange ratios are investigated in this 
model. In the submarine only scenario, exchange ratios are first examined to inspect for 
simulation realism. To begin, exchange ratios are highly dependent upon contact density. 
The exchange ratios also vary greatly between surface combatants and submarines. This 
appears to be a function of the stealth of the submarine and its reduced acoustic signature. 
The enemy submarine to friendly submarine exchange ratio is 6:1. The enemy surface 
combatant to friendly submarine exchange ratio is 23:1. The total consolidated enemy 
threat to friendly submarine exchange ratio is 39:1. These exchange ratios are then 




Figure 40.  UUV Combat Exchange Ratios.  The larger and more capable UUVs provide 
substantially more combat capability than smaller and less capable UUVs. This is 
primarily a result of the increased sensor capabilities of the larger UUVs. 
 
The results in Figure 40 show that there is positive effect on combat 
exchange ratios when UUVs are used in conjunction with an attack submarine. The 
greatest improvement occurred with the addition of a highly capable 48” diameter UUV 
that increased combat exchange ratio of friendly submarines by almost two. 
Further analysis of the submarine survivability trends with 500 
replications of a friendly attack submarine operating in conjunction with a 48” diameter 
UUVs showed that there appears to be a positive relationship with submarine 
survivability. When submarines are operating without UUVs the loss rate is 
approximately 8% per mission. With UUVs the number drops to about 6.5% per mission. 
The data appears to show a difference in submarine survival rates when UUVs are 
utilized, however a two tailed t-test determined that the difference in the means is not 
statistically significant. 
The exchange ratios also show that while an attack UUV is viable, the 
concept would require large numbers of small UUVs to conduct an effective campaign in 
an A2AD environment. Analysis of the 21” MUHV concept shows an enemy to UUV 
exchange ratio of approximately 0.065:1. If this weapon is used in large numbers in a 
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coordinated attack of a defended area, enough enemy casualties may be generated to 
justify the cost of that many expendable UUVs. The data is analyzed using a binomial 
distribution (shown in Figure 41) to investigate this concept. The probability of success 
per attempt, or per UUV, is utilized to determine how many attempts are required to 
achieve X number of enemy casualties or greater. This is expressed as X, P(X≥k) = 1-
P(X≤(k-1)). For example, with the success rate of 0.0625 on any given attempt, the P(≥1 
enemy kill in 25 trials) = 1-P(0 kills in 25 trials) = 0.80. The results show that large 
quantities of expendable UUVs are required to have a significant impact on enemy 
operations. 
 
Figure 41.  21” Expendable Attack UUV Enemy Casualty Binomial.  This figure is used to 
show the number of 21” UUVs that must be deployed (Attempts) in order to achieve a 
desired cumulative probability of mission success of killing a variable number of 
enemies. 
 
The number of enemy casualties per mission is an even more telling 
measure of UUV effectiveness. For example, Figure 42 shows that the deployment of 
four 48” UUVs may result in one additional enemy casualty. While that may not seem 
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significant, imagine that the one extra casualty is an enemy diesel or nuclear submarine 
operating in close vicinity to friendly HVUs. 
 
Figure 42.  Enemy Casualties per UUV Deployed.  Nearly 35 expendable gliders and 20 
expendable 21” UUVs are required to achieve the same number of enemy casualties per 
mission as 4 recoverable 48” UUVs. 
 
By increasing the number of smaller less capable UUVs, there is potential 
to increase the average number of enemy casualties as shown in Figure 43. It is important 
to note that the modeling assumed that all UUV variants are equipped with autonomous 
target recognition (ATR) systems to target enemy combatants rather than civilian 
maritime traffic. ATR systems may or may not be feasible for smaller UUVs such as 




Figure 43.  Attack Vehicle Performance Based on Salvo Size.  By increasing the numbers of 
smaller UUVs, greater numbers of enemy casualties are possible, compared to that of 
fewer LDUUVs. 
 
In regards to the proposed force structure for attack UUVs, required 
quantities and capabilities of each variant must be subjected to a thorough analysis of 
alternatives and cost versus benefit analysis to determine optimally system selection. 
b. Attack UUV Loss Rates 
Another critical area of interest in UUV operations is avoidance behavior. 
In our modeling the UUV operations with a constant speed of four knots and a sprint 
object avoidance speed of eight knots for a six minute duration were compared. What 
was found was that UUVs with avoidance behavior were significantly more survivable. 
Figure 44 shows the losses for the constant speed UUVs and Figure 45 shows that the 
losses of UUVs that incorporate the eight knot sprint obstacle avoidance are much lower 




Figure 44.  UUV Losses Without Object Avoidance.  UUVs without obstacle avoidance 
transit at constant speed and direct routes from point A to point B. When compared to 
Figure 45 UUV loss rates are much higher for UUVs without object avoidance systems. 
 
 
Figure 45.  UUV Losses With Object Avoidance.  When compared to Figure 44 the UUVs 
that incorporate significant obstacle avoidance are much more survivable than UUV 





Detailed analysis on loss by cause was also conducted with this analysis. 
Loss by cause is important to determine the true threats to UUV operations. UUV loss 
rates are examined as a result of combatants and non-combatants. The UUV loss rate 
when combatants are included is 25 percent and 13.5 percent from non-combatants alone. 
A significant discovery from the modeling is that non-combatants are more of a threat to 
UUVs than combatants. In particular, trawlers are especially lethal to UUVs, accounting 
for 71 percent of non-combatant UUV casualties and 38 percent of UUV casualties from 
all sources. Drifting nets also pose a significant problem, accounting for 25 percent of all 
non-combatant UUV casualties and 14 percent of UUV casualties from all sources. 





Figure 46.  Proportion of Sources of UUV Casualties.  Non-combatants result in a 13.5% 
UUV loss rate, with the proportion of each source shown in the chart. When combatants 








c. Offensive Mine Modeling 
Attack modeling of a glider type mine is inspired by the 21” MUHV 
analysis that showed that an expendable vehicle could possibly be a valid approach to the 
attack mission area. Gliders are examined in particular due to low power consumption 
rates, and the inability of other mining platforms such as aircraft to operate in an A2AD 
environment. Also, traditional mine warfare modeling is conducted better with other 
simulation programs such as GAMET, which is produced by Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Panama City. To compare the effectiveness of a glider mine as compared to the 
MUHV concept, a binomial analysis is conducted in the same manner as a 21-inch 
diameter attack UUV. This analysis is shown in Figure 47. 
Results show that even more glider mines would be required to conduct a 
similar mission. Almost 50% more UUVs are required when conducting a glider mine 
attack as opposed to a MUHV attack. While this may seem disconcerting and 
disappointing, it is of note that two hits are required to kill surface vessels with a glider 
mine as opposed to one for all other attack UUV variants. We see here that a less capable 
weapon, and theoretically less expensive, would be able to execute this mission set if 




Figure 47.  Expendable Glider Attack UUV Enemy Casualty Binomial.  This figure is used to 
show the number of glider mines that must be deployed (Attempts) in order to achieve a 
desired cumulative probability of mission success of killing a variable number of 
enemies. 
 
To further examine the appropriate pod size for glider mine employment 
the number of glider mines employed is compared against the number of enemy 
casualties as shown in Figure 48. The figure shows that the three pod tactic utilized 
influences combat effectiveness. The greatest effectiveness observed is when pod size 




Figure 48.  Offensive Glider Mine Effectiveness.  The red curve represents the number of 
gliders deployed per pod. The blue curve represents the total number of gliders deployed. 
Three pod salvos of approximately 15–20 gliders each, for a total of approximately 45–60 
gliders, provides the greatest number of enemy casualties. 
 
d. Key Offensive Attack Modeling Takeaways 
• UUV attack missions are viable but best conducted with large 
numbers of expendable UUVs or small numbers of highly capable 
UUVs outfitted with multiple weapons 
• While the ASW/ASUW mission set may be viable, this is a 
mission set that may be best conducted utilizing an SSNs 
• UUV maneuvering behavior and autonomy can have a significant 
impact on the UUV survivability 
• UUV variants used in an offensive mining role show significant 
military capability 
5. Mine Countermeasures 
Mine countermeasure missions consists of two distinct mission profiles:  overt 
MCM, where concealment is not a priority, and covert, where concealment is of the 
highest priority. Initial analysis of these two mission profiles revealed that the UUVs 




a. Covert MCM Q-Route Modeling 
Q-route mapping for follow-on forces in an A2AD environment is critical 
to reducing the probability of kill for high value units (HVUs) transiting known 
minefields. A Q-route is defined as a system of preplanned shipping lanes in mined or 
potentially mined waters used to minimize the area the mine countermeasure commander 
has to keep clear of mines to provide safe passage for friendly shipping and HVUs. 
The MANA V MCM scenario models the mapping of a Q-route for a 
HVU transit through a 20 NM by 10 NM minefields that simulates many choke point 
transit areas around the world. Two different environments were setup in the model. One 
was a low density and low-tech mine environment, which consisted of 25 “low-tech” 
mines randomly distributed throughout the minefield. The second environment was a 
high density and high-tech mine environment, which consisted of 50 “high-tech” mines 
randomly distributed throughout the minefield. Variable quantities of UUVs transit the 
minefield searching for mines. When mines are discovered, their location is relayed back 
to the HVU. The HVU then follow the path taken by the UUVs avoiding any discovered 
mines while not venturing too far off the searched path as shown in Figure 49. 
 
Figure 49.  MANA V MCM Q-Route Mapping Scenario.  Red (+) signs indicate mines, the 
blue (+) signs indicate UUVs, and the blue ship indicates an HVU. The UUVs transit 
covertly ahead of the HVU localizing and transmitting mine positions to the HVU. The 
HVU then attempts to transit the minefield by avoiding known mine positions. In some 
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cases the UUVs are equipped with the capability to neutralize mines. 
 
The low-tech mine is modeled around the widely available Italian Manta 
Mine (Globalsecurity 2002). Assumptions in this model are that the mine would have a 
200-meter range that spans 360 degrees, a 90% probability of detecting a HVU, and 
would not be able to detect and target a UUV. The high-tech mine essentially doubled 
some of the characteristics of the low-tech mine. Assumptions are that the high-tech mine 
would have a 400-meter range that spans 360 degrees, a 90% probability of detecting a 
HVU, and a 30% probability of detecting a UUV. In all of the mine models, it is assumed 
that if a mine detects a target that target is destroyed, or in other words the mine’s 
probability of kill is 100% if it detects a target. 
The mine detection equipment is based on information received from the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center Panama City Division (Rodriguez 2013). It is assumed 
that there is no difference between the sensor on the UUV or on the HVU when 
equipped. It is also assumed that the sensors have a range of 800 meters that spans a 180-
degree arc (ninety degrees from the bow to the beam on each side) and the sensors have 
an 80% probability of mine detection. 
Speed, navigational accuracy, and safe distance from mines are important 
factors when transiting a Q-route. A ship transiting a Q-route needs to move slow enough 
to be able to detect mines with enough time to maneuver, but not so slow such that the 
ship would not have enough wash over its rudder to be able maneuver sufficiently. In the 
mine model it was assumed that the UUV would transit the minefield at 3 knots and the 
HVU would follow at the same speed. Additionally, the model was setup for the HVU 
would try to stay at least 1000 meters away from any discovered mines. 
In some runs the UUV is equipped with a weapon that can neutralize or 
destroy a mine. This weapon has a 90% probability of kill against a mine. It is assumed 
that the UUV is not equipped with a logic model to prioritize mine clearance. Its behavior 
is setup to attempt to neutralize the first mine it detected. 
The measures of effectiveness and performance for this model are: 
• HVU Survival Rate:  Percentage of times the HVU is not detected 
by a mine. This was considered the most important measure. 
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• Q-Route Success Rate:  Percentage of time the HVU was able to 
reach its intended destination. A failure occurred when the HVU 
was sunk or could not find a way through the minefield. 
• UUV Survival Rate:  Percentage of the total UUVs that were not 
detected by a mine. 
• Scenario Run Time:  Average time it took to complete a successful 
Q-route based on the number of successful Q-routes. 
15 variations of the scenario are run in both environments with 500 runs 
for each variation. Variable factors include the number of UUVs deployed, localization 
only or combined mine neutralization capability (shots), number of shots available for 
each UUV, and number of passes that UUVs make through the minefield prior to HVU 
entrance. MANA V data results are included in Tables 11 and 12. Graphical 
representations of this data are illustrated in Figures 50 and 51. 
Low-Tech Low Density Minefield Results: 
 
Table 11.   MANA V Low-Tech Low Density Minefield HVU Survivability and Q-Route 
Data.HVU survival is the rate at which the HVU remains undetected by any 
mines while transiting minefield. Q-route success is rate at which HVU is able to reach 
intended destination. Average time is related to length of time it takes for the HVU to 





Figure 50.  MANA V Low-Tech Low Density Minefield HVU Survivability and Q-Route 
Success.  10 x 20 NM minefields with 25 mines. Data shows that HVU survival 
increases as more UUVs are deployed to localize mines. Data also shows that mine 
localization with multiple UUVs is more effective for HVU survival than fewer UUVs 
equipped with mine neutralization capabilities. 
 
High-Tech High Density Minefield Results: 
 
Table 12.   MANA V High-Tech High Density Minefield HVU Survivability and Q-Route 
Data.  HVU survival is the rate at which the HVU remains undetected by any 
mines while transiting minefield. Q-route success is rate at which HVU is able to reach 
intended destination. Average time is related to length of time it takes for the HVU to 





Figure 51.  MANA V High-Tech High Density Minefield HVU Survivability and Q-Route 
Success.  10 x 20 NM minefield with 50 mines. Data shows that HVU survival 
increases as more UUVs are deployed to localize mines. Data also shows that mine 
localization with multiple UUVs is more effective for HVU survival than fewer UUVs 
equipped with mine neutralization capabilities. 
 
The results of the mine models suggest that larger quantities of UUVs that 
are not equipped with a neutralization capability are more effective than a smaller 
number of more capable UUVs equipped with neutralization capability. The 
neutralization capability did increase the Q-route success percentage; however HVU 
survival rate is the most important measure and the neutralization capability had little 
impact on HVU survivability. Increasing the number of passes the UUV does through the 
minefield increases the HVU survival rate but comes at a cost to UUV survival rates. 
Based on time required, 21-inch diameter UUVs are sufficient to complete this mission 
based on endurance analysis. 
b. Key Covert MCM Modeling Takeaways 
• Larger quantities of UUVs deployed to map Q-routes result in 
higher HVU survival rates 
• UUVs that are equipped with neutralization capability provide 
minimal advantages over localization only UUVs in regards to 
HVU survival rates 
• Average time required to map Q-routes not significantly improved 
with larger quantities of UUVs 
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 ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES VII.
A. UUV MISSION ALTERNATIVES 
UUV alternatives are analyzed in a consistent manner with the project scope, 
CONOPS and modeling. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of each vehicle or 
combination of vehicles, an overall effectiveness analysis is conducted with cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV). A cost effectiveness analysis (Chapter VIII) is factored in 
to the final evaluation and recommended force structure. The specific configuration of 
alternatives is based primarily from analysis of the modeling efforts in Chapter VI. 
Where multiple diameter vehicles are considered, values for the number of vehicles are 
derived from the point of maximum effectiveness observed in the modeling. For example, 
in the attack mission area (Chapter VI, Section 4.c) the most effective number of attack 
gliders is approximately 15, thus 15 gliders are utilized for the analysis of alternatives. 
This process is used for all modeling and mission areas. The analysis of alternatives 






Table 13.   Analysis of Alternatives Comparison Matrix.  Quantity and size of UUVs chosen 
for the analysis of alternatives are derived from mission modeling data. Combinations 
that resulted in the maximum mission effectiveness are included for the analysis of 
alternatives. 
 
The factors that are considered for effectiveness originate in the core capabilities 
that we identified early in the SEA-19A project life cycle. These enduring capabilities are 
translated into measures of effectiveness that allow for a comparison among alternatives. 
These capabilities are expressed in quantitative measures when possible. An attempt is 
made to limit the injection of qualitative data in the scoring of alternatives. The factors 
considered in the analysis of alternatives, as well as the definition and data sources are: 
• Mission Effectiveness – Mission effectiveness is how well the mission is 
achieved by the particular vehicle or combination of vehicles. This data is 
derived from the modeling of the missions. This data is unique for each 
mission area. Mission effectiveness for the attack mission is the mean number 
of enemy casualties. For IO and MCM the effectiveness is survival of the 
friendly submarine. In the ISR mission area the values for mission 
effectiveness are chosen based on probability of mission success, where 
mission success is defined as the successful recovery and subsequent upload 
of mission data in the recoverable UUV case and by successful transmission 
of mission data from a remote location in the expendable UUV case. 
• Endurance – Endurance is defined from the endurance capability model 
(Chapter VI, Section C.1) for all vehicles sizes. The total achievable ranges of 
specific vehicles are compared at a velocity of four knots. The maximum 
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achievable mission time is a ninety day mission of an attack submarine. This 
factor is consistent across all mission areas. Table 14 details endurance values. 
 
Table 14.   Notional UUV Endurance Based on Endurance Capability Model.  Notional UUV 
endurance is determined based of the endurance model located in Chapter VI, Section 
C.1. 
 
• Stealth – Stealth is defined as a factor of volume and mast signature at 
periscope depth. Volume is a large driver in the visibility of the vehicle when 
it is at or near the surface. It is also a large factor in the submerged signature 
of a vehicle when active sonar is employed against the vehicle. Active 
acoustic return of the vehicle is deemed an appropriate measure as modeling 
of the passive signature showed nearly zero difference between UUVs of 
differing dimensions and attack submarines. This factor is consistent across all 
mission areas. 
• Ease of Tactical Use / Risk to Host Platform – This factor weighs heavily 
upon the time required for deployment and recovery of vehicles. Ease of 
tactical use and risk to host platform are linked factors because the amount of 
time the host platform is at risk or vulnerable to attack is dependent upon the 
time it takes to launch or recover a vehicle. With this factor expendable 
vehicles do not account for the recovery time. This factor is variable among 




Table 15.   Host Platform Vulnerability Duration.  Assumed times required to launch or 
recover UUVs may place platforms at risk, due primarily to being restricted in ability to 
maneuver and potentially increased acoustic noise levels. 
 
 
• Mission Flexibility – Mission flexibility is a function of the volume of the 
vehicle. Vehicles of differing diameters are modeled as the same length of 
vehicle. The mission section is modeled as a ten foot section. An attack 
submarine is modeled to have the capacity to carry thirty-eight 21” weapons 
plus twenty-eight more weapons in the proposed Virginia Payload Modules 
(LaGrone 2011). 
• Years to Field – The number of years assumed that the alternative will take to 
be fielded is based on its respective Technology Readiness Level (TRL). The 
TRL is the maturity of, and the risk associated with, critical technologies to be 
used in Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) (Assistant Secretary 
of Defense for Research and Engineering 2011). 
With the attributes defined, the next step is to assign attribute values for each 
alternative on a value scale. Within each mission area all alternatives are compared 
against each other with regard to the attributes. Each attribute value is translated into a 
value between zero and one. A score of one is the best that any alternative is capable of 
achieving and a score of zero means that alternative has zero value with respect to the 
attribute. Once the attribute with the best value is set to one, all other values within that 
mission area are set as a ratio of the best value. Refer to Appendix F for a full listing of 
all attribute values and attribute value score tables for all mission areas. 
Once the values for each attribute are determined, multi-attribute decision 
analysis is used to quantitatively compare the alternatives. This decision analysis helps in 
selecting a recommended alternative with conflicting objectives that were previously 
mentioned. The multi-attribute decision analysis starts with assigning weights to each 
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attribute within each mission area. Each mission area must be analyzed separately since 
the attributes have different levels of importance in each mission area. Swing weighting 
is used to assign weights to each attribute. A swing weight takes into account the relative 
importance and variation between the attributes. The first step in assigning swing weights 
is to create an ordinal scale of the attributes by ranking the importance of each attribute 
within each mission area. This is done by a team vote and is based on how important each 
attribute is with respect to the mission area. Table 16 summarizes the rankings of the 
attributes. 
 
Table 16.   Mission Attribute Rankings.  Each mission area is evaluated separately and the 
capability attributes from each individual mission are ranked from 1 being the most 
important, to 6 being the least important. 
 
In order to assign swing weights, a relative importance rating is assigned to each 
attribute based upon its respective ranking. The highest ranked attribute gets an automatic 
rating of 100. Each attribute after this is assigned a rating based on its relative value as 
compared to the highest ranked attribute. The rationale in the highest ranked attribute 
receiving a rating of 100 is that if that attribute was maximized, it would be the most 
valuable, or in other words that alternative would have a 100 percent increase in value. 
For example, if the second ranked attribute is assigned a rating of 75, the translation is 
that the alternative would increase in value by 75 percent if the second attribute was 
maximized as compared to the highest ranked attribute. Once all ratings have been 
assigned, the ratings are normalized in order to sum to one. Table 17 summarizes the 




Table 17.   Mission Attribute Weightings.  Ratings are assigned to each mission attribute 
ranking and then normalized for a final weighting. 
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The next step is to use a mathematical model to calculate the final values to each 
alternative within each mission area. The mathematical model used is an additive model. 
The following equation is used to calculate each alternative’s value (Parnell 2013): 










( )v x  = the alternative’s value 
1i = to n is the number of the value measure 
ix  = the alternative’s score on the i
th value measure 
( )i iv x =  the single dimensional value of a score xi 
iw  = the weight of the i









  All weights sum to one 
To illustrate these calculations, the single twenty-inch expendable UUV has an 
“Offensive Attack” overall score of 0.18. The weights of each value measure for 
Offensive Attack are shown in Table 17. The single dimensional value score for each 
attribute for this alternative is as follows: 
• Mission effectiveness – 0.023 
• Endurance – 0.012 
• Stealth – 1.0 
• Ease of tactical employment – 1.0 
• Years to field – 0.333 
• Mission flexibility – 0.007 




( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
.508 .023 .254 .012 .127 1.0
.032 1.0 .016 .333 .063 .007 .179
Score = + +
+ + + =
 
Table 18 summarizes the overall scores for each alternative within each mission 




Table 18.   Mission Alternatives Final Scoring (with SUB).  As expected the submarine is the 
most effective platform for all mission sets except MCM. 
 
With the exception of MCM, the submarine alternative scores higher than any 
alternative, and this was an expected result. For MCM, six 21” expendable UUVs had the 
highest score, followed closely by six 21” recoverable UUVs. Six 21” UUVs, whether 
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recoverable or expendable, overwhelm the other alternatives. In the attack, ISR, and IO 
mission areas, the submarine score overwhelmed most or all of the other alternatives’ 
scores. This creates a concern that the submarine is skewing the value function scores of 
the other alternatives. The submarine performs better on such a higher magnitude that it 
makes the other alternatives appear as invaluable when comparing the final scores. A 
second analysis without submarines included as an alternative is necessary to see how the 
other alternatives’ scores change. The first step in this revised analysis is to assign new 
value function scores for each attribute of each alternative. With the submarine excluded 
the scale changes and new ratios are setup to assign each attribute new value scores. 
Refer to Appendix F for the revised attribute value score tables for all mission areas. 
With the revised attribute value scores, the same additive equation is used to 
calculate new final scores for each alternative. Table 19 summarizes the revised final 




Table 19.   Mission Alternatives Final Scoring (without SUB).  With the submarine removed, 
expendable platforms tend to dominate the final scoring for most of the mission areas. 
 
With the submarine alternative removed there is a significant change in the 
overall scores for each alternative. With the exception of IO, multiple 21” expendable 
UUVs score significantly better than the other alternatives within each mission area. In 
the IO mission area, a single 21” UUV scored higher than the other alternatives but by a 
close margin. The multiple 21” expendable UUVs were very close in score. Another 
beneficial analysis is to compare the rank of each alternative with submarine included as 
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an alternative and with the submarine alternative excluded. Table 20 shows the ranks of 
each alternative within each mission area with the submarine included and excluded. 
 
Table 20.   Final Mission Alternative Rankings.  These revised rankings take into account the 




In comparing the rankings of the alternatives with and without the submarine 
alternative, a significant change was not seen in the ranks with the exception of the 
alternatives for the attack mission. The attack alternative rankings underwent almost a 
complete rank reversal. This most likely happened due the submarine alternative 
dominating the other alternatives. The team’s consensus is that the attack alternative 
rankings with the submarine excluded as well as the final attack scores with the 
submarine excluded provide better results to make a recommendation for a UUV 
equipped to conduct attack missions. 
B. ATTRIBUTE WEIGHTING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
When dealing with complex decisions, systems engineer must be cognizant of the 
robustness of the analysis of alternatives (Driscoll, Henderson, & Parnell 2011). A 
sensitivity analysis will reveal if a change in an assumption changes the preferred 
solution. A common method is to analyze the sensitivity of the weighting of the attributes 
(Driscoll et al. 2011). In the sensitivity analysis, each attribute is analyzed one at a time, 
within each mission, by changing the attribute weight to one with all other attributed 
weighted to zero. The same additive equation used to calculate each alternative’s overall 
score is used to recalculate the scores with the revised weights. The original scores and 
new scores are plotted against the original weights and the revised weights. To determine 
the sensitivity of each attribute, points of inflection on the plot are compared against the 
original weights. Specifically, it is the x-coordinate of the points of inflection that are of 
concern. The project team used a rule of thumb that if a point of inflection is within 0.1 of 
the original weight, the alternative scores are sensitive to that weight. Table 21 
summarizes the results of the sensitivity analysis. In the columns labeled new weight, the 
number shown is the weighting of the attribute where a point of inflection is seen. A 
point of inflection is where an alternative preference changes. In the analysis of each 
attribute, there are usually several points of inflection. Table 21 shows the closest weight 







Table 21.   Attribute Weighting Sensitivity Analysis.  The weights in the gray shaded 
columns show the weight where the nearest point of inflection to the original weight is 
observed. Weights highlighted in yellow are those that are within 0.1 of the original 
weight. 
 
In Table 21, the highlighted weights are those that were within 0.1 of the original 
weight where a change in preference of the alternatives is seen. It is useful to analyze the 
plot of weight vs. scores to gain further insight into the sensitivity of this attribute. Figure 









Mission effectiveness 0.508 0.329 0.508 0.403
Endurance 0.254 0.438 0.127 0.186
Stealth 0.127 0.248 0.254 0.198
Ease of tactical employment 0.032 0.166 0.032 0.132
Years to field 0.016 0.593 0.016 0.118









Mission effectiveness 0.508 0.536 0.508 0.361
Endurance 0.127 0.248 0.127 0.241
Stealth 0.032 0.003 0.032 0.123
Ease of tactical employment 0.254 0.232 0.254 0.865
Years to field 0.016 1.000 0.016 0.158





Figure 52.  Endurance Sensitivity Plot (ISR).  The sensitivity plot shows how the alternative 
scores change as a result of changing the weighting of the endurance attribute. If the 
weighting of the endurance attribute is changed to approximately 0.28 from the original 
weight of 0.127, a 60 inch UUV becomes the highest scoring alternative. 
 
The closest point of inflection for the endurance attribute for ISR is 0.186, with 
the original weight being 0.127. At this point, a 60 inch UUV is now scored higher than 
four 21-inch expendable UUVs. However, at this weight four 21-inch recoverable UUVs 
are still the highest scoring alternative. The weighting would have to change to 
approximately 0.28 before the highest scoring alternative changes, which would be the 60 
inch UUV in this case. This makes sense as the 60 inch UUV has a higher endurance 
capability than the other alternatives, and if the weighting of endurance is increased, we 
would expect the scores of the vehicles with higher endurance to increase. The analysis 
of the other attributes highlighted in Table 21 for ISR is similar to the analysis of 
endurance. One other attribute that drew attention to the project team was mission 
effectiveness for IO. If the weighting is changed from 0.508 to 0.536, the preferred 
solution will change. It is useful again here to analyze the plot of weightings vs. scores 




Figure 53.  Mission Effectiveness Sensitivity Plot (IO).  This sensitivity plot shows how the 
alternative scores change for IO as a result of changing the original weighting for the 
mission effectiveness attribute. The highest scoring alternative changes with a slight shift 
of the weighting due to the fact that the single and two 21-inch UUV alternative had 
almost the same performance. 
 
At a weighting of 0.536, two 21-inch expendable UUVs score higher than a single 
21-inch expendable UUV. There are two explanations for this occurrence. One is that the 
performance of these two alternatives was almost exactly the same in the modeling and 
simulation of IO. Additionally, the modeling output of IO revealed there was little 
statistical significance in the difference between these two alternatives. 
  When the preferred solution changes as the weighting is varied, this information 
needs to be reported to key stakeholders and decision makers for resolution (Driscoll et 
al. 2011). The project team has highlighted which attributes are sensitive to the solutions; 
however the project team did not have much disagreement in the original weightings of 
the attributes. Therefore, the project feels confident in the results in the analysis of 






In regards to offensive attack operations, the LDUUVs provide the most 
significant capability. Glider mines also show significant promise but also pose 
significant issues in regards to legality since they may be viewed as floating mines. This 
concept will require further analysis before being included in the proposed force 
structure. 
Conducting covert Q-route mapping with multiple UUVs greatly increases 
submarine and HVU survivability. Use of advanced UUV decoys also shows significant 
promise of improving submarine survivability. 
All mission sets can benefit from operations with 21” UUV variants. LDUUV 
variants should have missions primarily focused on offensive operations and persistent 
ISR. Finally, both the IO and attack 21” UUVs have no requirement for recoverability so 
cost savings can be realized by designing them specifically for expendability. The next 
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 COST ANALYSIS VIII.
A. COST ESTIMATION METHOD 
How much is it going to cost?  This is one of the most frequently asked questions 
in regards to concept generation. In an era of rising costs and limited budgets, controlling 
expenditures and attempting to accurately predict the total taxpayer bill for a proposed 
system is a necessary endeavor. It is necessary to “abandon inefficient practices 
accumulated in a period of budget growth and learn to manage defense dollars that is 
respectful of the American taxpayer, at a time of economic and fiscal distress” (Carter 
2010). A strong cost estimation and analysis effort provides key input to the decision 
making body. Placed side by side with the analysis of alternatives (AoA) in Chapter VII, 
a system’s life cycle cost estimate (LCCE) can help decision makers decide which 
alternatives considered provide the best cost versus benefit ratios. This cost estimation 
process is “the art of approximating the probable worth, extent, or character of a system 
based on information available at the time” (Nussbaum 2013). Figure 54 outlines several 




Figure 54.  Cost Estimation Principles (From Nussbaum 2013).  Effort is given to provide 
educated decisions based on metrics and historical data, rather than gut feelings. These 
concepts are especially helpful when conducting trade-offs between system performance, 
cost, and schedule. 
 
Cost estimation is conducted in order to provide input for the AoA and to provide 
additional insights necessary for the implementation of the proposed notional force 
structure in Chapter IX. SEA-19A’s cost estimation efforts are intended to generate a 
reasonable LCCE within the constraints of the problem definition, in order to compare 
the benefits of each proposed solution to the associated program costs. These estimates 
are not intended to provide precise cost numbers for specific UUV systems, but instead 
are used to express an approximate order of magnitude of program costs, from which to 
analyze various alternatives. 
The top-down cost estimating approach is preferred since it allows for a high level 
of cost aggregation, where costs are statistically derived. This method emphasizes the use 
of cost driving factors such as mission capability, range, reliability, and other critical 
attributes (Michaels 1989). This approach also incorporates several quantitative analysis 
techniques such as data collection, regression analysis, learning curves, and risk analysis. 
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B. COST ESTIMATION ASSUMPTIONS 
Each phase of the project life cycle requires certain assumptions to accurately 
predict costs. For example, assumptions made in order to determine procurement costs 
are not necessarily applicable to the assumptions used for research and development cost 
estimations. Specific cost assumptions regarding each phase of the system life cycle are 
explained in greater detail in each individual cost estimation section. General 
assumptions include: 
• All dollar amounts are expressed in fiscal year 2013 dollars. 
• Where applicable, Joint Inflation Indices provided by the Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis (NCCA) are utilized. 
• Disposal costs are deemed to be constant for all alternatives and are 
determined by cost per pound. 
• UUVs proposed are assumed to be available for fleet use by 2020. 
• Six prototype units of each variant will be required for test and evaluation 
purposes. 
• Launch and recovery costs associated with UUV host platforms are not 
considered. 
• 98% learning curves will be applied from the first unit production to the last 
vehicle produced. 
• Operations and Support (O&S) and Procurement costs factor in replacement 
costs due to the assumed operational loss of one UUV every two years, or 
2.5% of active units due to unforeseen circumstances. This assumption 
corresponds to a similar assumption used by the LDUUV program. 
C. COST ESTIMATION DATA ANALYSIS 
UUV cost data collection and cost estimations are challenging since there are not 
many DoD UUV Programs of Record to draw historical data from. Even though there 
have been several developmental programs over the past 30 years, very few UUVs have 
progressed to operational stages of development. The majority of cost data is derived 
from programs the U.S. Navy has funded or is currently funding to include, UUVs, 
undersea weapons, SEAL delivery vehicles (SDVs/ASDS), and training systems that are 
comparable to proposed UUVs in size and structure. UUV cost data is also obtained from 
naval enterprise stakeholders for commercially available UUV systems of similar size 
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and capabilities. Historical data regarding replacement parts, sensor technologies, 
batteries, and power consumption costs are also used to aid in cost estimation. 
Significant effort is made to capture as many of the UUV life-cycle costs (LCC) 
as possible to develop realistic program cost estimates. The complexities involved in 
estimating the cost of conceptual systems which are not yet in development do not favor 
a detailed and accurate analysis of LCC; however, a cost estimation analysis is required 
to be able to choose between alternative solutions by way of an objective cost-benefit 
analysis (Nussbaum 2013). The remainder of this chapter analyzes the components 
related to UUV LCC estimates, which are very similar to typical LCC components of 
major DoD acquisition programs shown in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55.  Typical Life Cycle Cost (LCC) Structure (From Michaels 1989).  Operations & 
Support costs generally constitute the largest percentage of LCC. Program approval 
decisions however, are generally made with as little as 5% of the total cost invested. 





1. Procurement Costs 
Initial cost modeling efforts focus on procurement costs, due to the fact that the 
remaining phases of LCC are derived from the procurement cost when a system is still in 
a relatively nascent stage such as UUVs. Procurement costs are alternatively known as 
investment cost or construction cost. The Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) 
specifically defines investment cost as “production and deployment costs incurred from 
the beginning of low rate initial production through completion of deployment” (DAG 
2012). 
Linear regression models and adjusted inflation curves are used in conjunction 
with current and historical data to develop the cost estimation model. Cost data collection 
initially focused on commercially produced UUVs that are similar in size and capability 
to the UUVs envisioned in the 2024 UUV CONOPS (Chapter V). Due to the proprietary 
nature of commercial development data, civilian manufacturers were reluctant to provide 
their cost data in detail, or even at all. The lack of actual UUV data required the team to 
look at other platforms that perform similar functions. 
Analogous systems such as torpedoes and training targets are used to increase the 
data available to produce realistic cost estimates. In many ways, self-propelled torpedoes 
can be considered UUVs (Whitman 2002). The MK 46 Mod 5, MK 48 Mod 7 ADCAP, 
MK 50, and MK 54 LWT torpedo cost data is obtained from the Defense Cost and 
Resource Center (DCARC). Cost data for ASW training targets such as the MK 30 Mod 
2 is also used since the technology, size, and function of the vehicles are the similar to a 
basic UUV. Contract data is also readily available for these systems (Defense Industry 




Table 22.   Collected Historical Cost Data.  Historical UUV and torpedo cost data is obtained 
from manufacturers, DCARC and other applicable sources. Data is analyzed to provide 
evidence based cost estimates of proposed systems. 
 
Several variations of physical and performance characteristics of the set of 
vehicles are analyzed in contrast to cost in FY13 dollars, to include:  length, diameter, 
weight, range, sensors, endurance, payload, and propulsion characteristics. Analysis 
reveals that the single most conclusive cost driver for UUVs is weight out of the water. 
Cost data analyses of current UUV programs, future UUV budget proposals, and 
torpedoes show that the cost versus weight relationships have held fairly constant through 
different platforms and technologies. 
Weight versus cost data is plotted in Figure 56, resulting in a fairly linear trend 
line that produces the following cost estimating relationship (CER): 
Cost (FY13$K) = 0.842 (Weight in Pounds) + 501.7 
Vehicle Weight (lb) FY13$K Source
9"- UUV 134 562 Manufacture Data
12.5" A-UUV 470 995 Manufacture Data
12.5" B-UUV 530 1401 Manufacture Data
12.5" C-Torp 508 286 DCARC
12.5" D- Torp 800 546 DCARC
12.5"E- Torp 608 1250 DCARC
21" A- UUV 2780 2757 NUWC NPTASW AOA
21" B- UUV 2742 2961 DCARC
21" C- UUV 1650 2553 Manufacture Data
21" D- Torp 3695 3032 DCARC
48" A- UUV 14000 11952 RMS SAR




Figure 56.  Weight vs. Cost Plot in FY13 Dollars.  Very few UUVs or analogous systems 
over 4000 lbs have ever been produced, which makes it difficult to confirm linear 
relationships in the upper range. However, based on available data, weight vs. cost 
provides an adequate tool for UUV cost estimation purposes. 
 
In order to apply the CER, reasonable assumptions for the weights of each subset 
of vehicles are required. The weight approximation for the 21” diameter vehicles is 
calculated by taking the average of the weights of all the 21” variants. Then an 
expendable 21” vehicle’s weight is reduced by 300 pounds and a 21” recoverable vehicle 
is increased by 300 pounds to account for the assumed weight differences. The weight for 
the 60” variants are determined based on the known weights of commercially available 
60” vehicles plus the expected weight of additional items such as sensors, batteries, and 
mission-specific equipment. The weight of the 48” variant is extrapolated directly from 
the diameter vs. weight trend line. This is due to the fact that the only 48” vehicle 
currently available is the diesel Remote Minehunting System (RMS), which is much 
heavier than other UUV designs of similar magnitude. Figure 57 illustrates the derived 




Figure 57.  Diameter vs. Weight Plot.  The trend exhibits a slightly exponential curve. 
Increases in vehicle diameter result in significantly higher total vehicle weights. 
 
The final first unit procurement values (Table 23) are calculated based on the 
predicted weight vs. cost CER equation (Figure 56), using the UUV weights determined 
in the vehicle diameter vs. weight analysis. 
 
Table 23.   First Unit Procurement Costs per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Procurement 
costs are determined using the baseline cost estimating relationship (CER) of weight vs. 
cost – [Cost (FY13$K) = 0.842 (Weight in Pounds) + 501.7]. 
 
An issue of concern with the initial procurement costs is the 48” and 60” outliers. 
There is only one data point for 60” vehicles for comparison and none for a 48” variant. 
Sensitivity analysis is completed to investigate if the outliers may be significantly altering 
the resultant baseline CER. This is accomplished by completing three additional analyses:  
the first without the 48” variant, the second without the 60” variant, and finally an 
analysis without both the 48” and 60” variants. Costs returned in these analyses are then 
compared to that of the base model as shown in Table 23. 
Glider 21" Expendable 21" Recoverable 48" Recoverable 60" Recoverable
Weight (lbs) 115 2417 3017 7000 10500




Table 24.   Procurement Cost Sensitivity Analysis in FY13 Dollars.  Data shows that baseline 
CER model provides conservative cost estimates for UUV variants. Removal of the 48” 
variant is the only case that resulted is slightly higher cost estimates compared to the 
baseline CER model. Sensitivity analysis is completed to ensure that limited input data 
for the LDUUV variants is not manipulating the baseline CER model. 
 
Results of the sensitivity analysis illustrated in Table 24 show that our baseline 
CER provides conservative cost estimates in all cases, with the exception of the 48” data 
where the removal produced slightly higher cost estimates. This analysis shows that our 
baseline CER is not significantly affected by the outlying data points and that it provides 
a satisfactory model for procurement cost estimation. 
Procurement costs of glider UUVs are also calculated. Point estimates are used 
for the glider data to provide more accurate estimates based on the relatively low costs of 
the gliders and the high number of commercially available variants (Button 2009). To be 
conservative, the point estimate for the glider is assumed to be slightly higher than the 
most expensive glider at $75,000.00 in FY13 dollars. Data from glider programs of 
record are included for comparison in Table 25. 
 
Table 25.   Glider Cost Data in FY13 Dollars.  Considering that modifications may need to be 
made to gliders to meet scoped missions, the procurement cost has been assumed to be 
slightly higher that the most expensive glider and point estimated at $75,000. 
 
21" Expendable 21" Recoverable 48" Recoverable 60" Recoverable
All data 2,536,603.50$   3,143,072.75$            6,779,780.00$            9,975,280.00$          
No 48" or 60" 2,443,199.10$   2,916,719.10$            6,060,300.00$            8,822,500.00$          
No 60" 2,473,544.65$   2,963,024.65$            6,212,560.00$            9,067,860.00$          
No 48" 2,595,756.10$   3,143,676.10$            6,781,180.00$            9,977,380.00$          
No 48" or 60" -4% -7% -11% -12%
No 60" -2% -6% -8% -9%
No 48" 2% 0% 0% 0%
Length (in) Diameter (in) Weight(lb) Range (nm) Duration (days) Refueling Cost Cost
Spray Glider 79.2 7.9 112 3780 330 3,549.68$        31,137.50$        
Slocum Glider 58.8 8.3 115 810 20 996.40$           62,275.00$        
Seaglider 70.8 11.8 115 2430 200 1,712.56$        74,730.00$        
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2. RDT&E Costs 
Research, Development, Testing and Evaluation (RDT&E) costs are 
developmental costs incurred by parties involved in the acquisition of a particular system 
(both Government and Contractor) over the course of the Material Solution Analysis and 
Engineering and Manufacturing development phases of the acquisition process (DAG 
2012). Typical estimating techniques for this type of cost are normally very robust and 
involved. The majority of prospective UUV systems are still in various stages of RDT&E 
and as a result historical cost data in regards to development is not readily available. 
Instead of relying on raw historical RDT&E cost data, cost estimations are primarily 
based on historical percentages of RDT&E data (Table 25) obtained from the Naval 
Center for Cost Analysis, using data for missile weapon systems (Noreen and Bryan 
1992). In regards to RDT&E, it is assumed that missile systems are analogous to UUV 
systems due to similar form factors, technological requirements, and the relatively large 
number of systems being procured.  
Hardware costs are assumed to be the cost of prototypes procured. It is also 
assumed that the first prototype will cost twice that of the first unit procurement and that 
six prototypes are acquired for each vehicle size. For the total hardware cost, a 98% 
learning curve is applied to the cost of the first prototype. For each UUV system, the total 
hardware cost is assumed to be 23.4% (as shown in Table 26) of total development cost 
(Nussbaum 2013). All other percentages are estimated based on missile system RDT&E 
costs. 
 
Table 26.   RDT&E Historical Cost Percentages.  UUV hardware percentages are derived 
from first unit procurement costs, prototype costs, and learning curves. All other 
percentages are estimated based on missile system RDT&E costs (Noreen and Bryan 
1992). 
 
RDT&E Historical Data Mean Std Dev
Design 25.4% 11.4






Table 27 contains the RDT&E cost breakdown for each UUV variant analyzed. It 
should be noted that software cost is an artifact of the historical data. Current software 
costs have the potential to draw a greater percentage of total costs; however for the level 
of granularity required, the remaining percentages capture sufficient expectations for 
RDT&E costs. 
 
Table 27.   RDT&E Cost Breakdown per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Hardware costs are 
derived from first unit procurement costs, prototype costs, and learning curves. All other 
costs are generated based on percentages in relation to hardware costs. The corrected total 
accounts for sunk costs that have already been expended on UUV programs. 
 
3. Energy Cost 
Energy constitutes a significant portion of UUV Operation and Support (O&S) 
costs. Johns Hopkins APL recently conducted a study of lifetime cost of various power 
options for a notional 54” diameter UUV. Results are shown in Table 28 (Benedict 2012). 
 
Table 28.   Johns Hopkins APL 54” UUV Lifetime Energy Cost Alternatives in FY13 Dollars 
(From Benedict 2012).  Lithium-Ion, Silver-Zinc, and Alkaline battery types are 
all analyzed for cost effectiveness. 
Glider 21" Expendable 21" Recoverable 48" Recoverable 60" Recoverable
Design 901,694$                30,496,527$        37,787,854$       76,022,160$         112,245,002$        
Hardware (Protypes) 830,694$                28,095,226$        34,812,432$       70,036,164$         103,406,813$        
Software 110,049$                3,722,017$          4,611,903$          9,278,295$           13,699,193$          
Support 1,565,539$            52,948,694$        65,608,046$       131,991,231$       194,882,070$        
Misc 141,999$                4,802,603$          5,950,843$          11,971,994$         17,676,378$          
Total 3,549,975$            120,065,066$      148,771,078$     299,299,844$       441,909,455$        
Corrected Total 1,817,587$            89,568,539$        76,170,792$       275,397,394$       405,136,455$        
Type Li-Ion Ag-Zn Alkaline
Description Sat VL 52E cells BST HIGO DC Cells Duracells
FY13 High 4,136.07$                 10,383.57$              2,261.52$          
FY 13 Low 2,594.03$                 8,691.11$                680.93$             
Lifespan 5 Years 1 Year NA
4,594,500.00$          10,414,200.00$       2,246,200.00$   








Johns Hopkins APL battery cost data is assumed to be sufficient for cost 
estimation purposes. Using the endurance capability model (Chapter VI, C.1), required 
power for each hull is plotted to extrapolate the predicted cost for each power option for 
all UUV variants. Energy cost trends are captured in Figure 58 and extrapolated energy 
cost estimates are included in Table 29. 
 
Figure 58.  Energy Cost in FY13 Dollars versus UUV Size.  The endurance capability model 
(Chapter VI, C.1) is utilized with input data derived from the power source alternatives 
analysis from Johns Hopkins APL. Cost estimates are then extrapolated from the trends 
lines to estimate energy costs for applicable UUV variants. 
 
 
Table 29.   Lifetime Energy Cost per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Energy cost estimates 




4. O&S Costs 
The Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) 
program is the most complete source of Operating and Support (O&S) cost data currently 
available. VAMOSC is utilized to determine the O&S costs of various weapon systems 
and sensors to determine the key factors for deriving reoccurring annual O&S costs. 
Energy costs are derived in Section C.3. Replacement cost estimates assume that one 
non-expendable UUV would be lost every two years, an expendable UUV would be lost 
every five years (aside from those expended for mission and training) and one glider 
would be lost every three months. Long-Term Mine Reconnaissance System (LMRS) and 
ASW expendable training unit data from VAMOSC are analyzed to determine a 
maintenance cost per year. Maintenance costs are assumed to be approximately 7% of 
procurement cost for the recoverable units and 2% for expendable units. Software costs 
are assumed to be approximately 2% of procurement cost per year based on the LMRS 
data. 
Table 30 includes the cost estimates for critical O&S factors related to UUV 
operations. 
 
Table 30.   O&S Cost Breakdown per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Percentage and actual 
cost based approaches are used to derive O&S cost estimates, based primarily on 
VAMOSC data, manufacturer data, and critical analysis. 
 
O&S Glider   21" Expendable  21" Recoverable  48" Recoverable  60" Recoverable 
Maintenance 2,250.00$       50,732.07$           220,015.09$        474,584.60$        698,269.60$         
Software 7,500.00$       76,098.11$           94,292.18$          203,393.40$        299,258.40$         
Energy Cost 3,549.68$       5,535.27$             40,082.98$          146,744.49$        223,513.59$         
Replacement 1,875.00$       12,683.02$           78,576.82$          169,494.50$        249,382.00$         
Recovery 1,500.00$       6,341.51$             62,861.46$          135,595.60$        199,505.60$         




Figure 59.  O&S Cost by Year per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Costs are assumed to 
follow typical O&S trends. Program mid-life is expected to have the highest O&S costs 
due to the maximum number of operational UUVs still in service. As UUVs are 
expended or retired, O&S costs are expected to fall. 
 
In Figure 59, O&S costs rise over the first ten years of the program as units 
continue to be placed into service and then fall off as the older units are retired or 
expended. This is a typical trend of weapon systems and it is assumed that UUV systems 
will follow a similar trend. The analysis of O&S costs showed that using a function of 
production units cost per year is more consistent than evaluating O&S costs on a per 
deployment basis. 
5. Disposal Costs 
Disposal costs, while overall a very small section of the total life-cycle cost, are 
nonetheless an important cost to consider, especially when comparing recoverable units 
to expendable ones. Cost per pound is a frequently used method for accounting for 
disposal costs. Analysis of historical VAMOSC data resulted in an estimate of $5 per 
pound. This data is then combined with the weight of the vehicles to give a final disposal 
cost. The only exceptions are the expendable variants, of which only 20% at most are 
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expected to remain in inventory at program termination and require disposal; therefore a 
cost of $1 per pound is utilized for expendable variants. Table 31 summarizes the total 
disposal cost estimations for all UUV variants. 
 
Table 31.   Disposal Cost Breakdown per UUV Variant in FY13 Dollars.  Costs are based on 
UUV weight and cost per pound. Disposal costs for recoverable units are $5 per pound 
and expendable units are $1 per pound. 
 
D. LCCE FOR ALTERNATIVES 
Life cycle cost estimation (LCCE) for all of vehicle sizes is first determined by 
combining the LCC elements derived in Section C, which include RDT&E, Procurement, 
O&S and Disposal. 
 
Table 32.   Per Unit Life-Cycle Costs in FY13 Dollars. This provides a per unit consolidation 
of the life-cycle costs derived in Section C.   
Figure 60 illustrates that as size and capability increase, the life cycle per unit cost 
also increases drastically. Additionally, it shows that the O&S costs are the most 
significant cost driver of all life-cycle phases, which corresponds to historical cost 
















Figure 60.  Per Unit Life Cycle Costs in FY13 Dollars.  This figure provides a graphical 
representation of the information in Table 31. This shows the weight vs. cost relationship 
and the significant portion of cost related to O&S. 
 
1. Overall Acquisition Program LCCE 
Although per unit life-cycle cost provides valuable information, it leaves out 
many factors in the acquisition cycle that affect life cycle costs. Per unit cost estimates 
disregard critical factors such as the cost savings realized by purchasing large quantities 
of vehicles. Based on modeling efforts and the AoA, many smaller less capable UUVs 
would need to be purchased to provide the similar mission effectiveness as larger more 
capable units. To provide cost correction, acquisition program LCCE methods use the 
actual predicted cost of each unit based on a learning curve. The assumed acquisition 
program looks at each vehicle’s life cycle from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2034. 
Proposed UUV programs all have different estimated RDT&E phase completion 
timelines that correspond to the first production vehicle available for fleet use. Estimated 
RTD&E times are: 
• Glider:  1 year 
• 21” Expendable:  4 years 
• 21” Recoverable:  3 years 
• 48” Recoverable:  5 years 
• 60” Recoverable:  5 years 
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The primary factor evaluated is the per-year build for each vehicle. It is assumed 
that the total system purchase price is spread over a ten year period from the start of 
production. The Operations and Support costs are determined per year, for each vehicle 
that is in operation, multiplied by the estimated O&S per vehicle cost. The number of in-
operation vehicles is determined by summing the new production units placed in service 
and units already in an operational status. Expected vehicle loss rates are then subtracted 
from this total. UUV loss rates are assumed to be 20 vehicles per year for the expendable 
21” units and one vehicle every two years or 2.5% of operating units for recoverable 
UUVs. 
 
Table 33.   Acquisition Program Life-cycle Costs in FY13K Dollars.  All UUV variants are 
assumed to have one billion FY2013 dollars available for the total acquisition program 
LCCE. Intention is to investigate how many units of each variant can be purchased given 
a reasonable cost constraint. 
 
The acquisition program LCCE model is used to determine the maximum amount 
of units that can be acquired when constrained by a total program budget of one billion 
FY2013 dollars for each UUV variant, as shown in Table 33. This approach is useful in 
illustrating the different forces structures available, given a reasonable cost constraint. 
Figure 61 provides visualization of the data in Table 33 and highlights the relative 




Figure 61.  Platform Life-cycle Cost Given One Billion FY13 Dollar Cost Constraint.  This 
provides an approximate breakdown of LCCs given a specific budget constraint or 
procurement of the specified numbers of each UUV variant. 
 
General point cost estimates of programs based on a variable number of UUVs 




Figure 62.  Cumulative Life-Cycle Costs vs. UUV Quantity in FY13 Dollars.  The costs of up 
to 1000 UUVs of each variant can be extrapolated from the respective trend lines. Note 




Cost vs. Weight provides the best cost estimating relationship for UUVs. In 
general, the more the UUV weighs, the greater the cost. The weight normally corresponds 
to the UUVs physical dimensions. This concept is consistent with expectations, since 
large UUVs are able to house and power more capable payloads and sensors. 
Energy costs in the form of batteries are the most significant cost driver for O&S 
cost. Cost estimation showed that if UUVs do not require recoverability then they should 
be designed specifically for expendability and use less expensive power alternatives.   
The next chapter consolidates all of the analysis up to this point and provides a 









 FINAL DELIVERABLE:  RECOMMENDED FORCE IX.
STRUCTURE 
Serving as the final deliverable to this study, the recommended force structure is 
derived from over a years’ worth of UUV research and analysis conducted by the Naval 
Postgraduate School, Systems Engineering Analysis (SEA) project team. 
The final force structure is foundationally based upon the assets required to 
execute the 2024 UUV CONOPS, as described in detail in Chapter V. This CONOPS is 
designed around a forward deployed naval fleet, tasked with battlespace preparation in a 
heavily contested A2AD environment. In order to increase survivability and reduce risk 
to manned platforms, UUVs are deployed to carry out far-forward operations, such as 
ISR, MILDEC, MCM, and offensive attack operations. 
A. RECOMMENDED UUV CHARACTERISTICS: 
1. UUV Physical Size Dimensions 
Two approximate UUV sizes are recommended to most effectively execute the 
proposed CONOPS: 
1. 48” – 60” diameter LDUUVs capable of being launched from ULRM 
equipped submarines or from an LCS. The maximum size of 60” is 
constrained by the size of the Virginia Payload Module and SSGN missile 
tube diameters. 
2. 21” diameter or smaller UUVs capable of being launched from all manned 
platforms. The maximum size of 21” is constrained by current torpedo tube 
diameters. 
Generally speaking, baseline designs should approach the maximum diameters above, to 
allow for the greatest amount of mission flexibility. Larger vehicles allow for larger and 
more capable sensors, and increased energy capacity. The maximum length of both 




2. UUV Mission Design Considerations 
a. LDUVV Mission Design 
Based on analysis, LDUUVs are required for missions involving persistent 
ISR and offensive attack. These vehicles must have the most advanced and capable 
sensors of all UUV variants, to be able to collect, transmit, and receive critical mission 
data. The increased propulsion capability inherent to a LDUUV is also required to carry 
heavy weaponry for engaging multiple enemy surface and subsurface combatants. 
Modeling and simulation of the attack missions shows that LDUUVs are 
not an overly effective platform for traditional, open ocean ASW/ASUW missions. 
Instead, LDUUVs need to be designed consistent with the SEA-17B Advanced Undersea 
Weapon System (AUWS) proposal that is now being funded by the Office of Naval 
Research. This allows for LDUUVs to be deployed to the opening of an enemy harbor or 
chokepoint, conduct persistent ISR operations in this location, and when required, fire 
offensive weaponry at targets of interest. 
When compared to the 21” UUV variants, LDUUVs need to have a much 
higher probability of successful return to a recovery platform (Recoverability). As such, 
design factors related to obstacle avoidance and automated target recognition (ATR) are 
critical enablers for the LDUUV program. The high cost of LDUUVs will lead to 
relatively low procurement quantities, and to achieve significant return on investment it is 
beneficial to be able to use the LDUUV for multiple missions. Recoverability of a 
LDUUV is the ideal, but in no means a strict requirement. If an LDUUV is able to either 
destroy or provide a mission kill to even one enemy SSN or surface combatant attempting 
to leave port, the cost vs. benefit of the LDUUV is more than sufficiently justified. 
b. 21” UUV Mission Design 
Modeling and simulation of all mission areas show benefits of using 21” 
UUV variants.  21” UUVs provide significant capabilities but at much lower costs than 




Much of the analysis effort focuses on exploring the application of low 
cost, expendable 21” UUV variants. Both the IO and attack mission areas show that there 
is no requirement, nor is it desired, to have the 21” UUV return to a recovery platform. 
This facilitates significant cost savings of UUV design, especially in regards to power 
source alternatives. The ISR and MCM mission areas also revealed that expendability is 
an important factor, not so much in that these UUV variants should be designed for 
expendability, but that mission planners should expect that many of the UUVs sent out on 
missions may not return to recovery platforms. 
The MCM Q-route mission area analysis reveals that multiple 21” UUVs 
are the most effective platforms to carry out mine localization and neutralization due to 
the greater area of coverage afforded by multiple smaller UUVs, compared to that of one 
LDUUV. Critical design factors require the UUVs to accurately localize and transmit 
mine locations to a receiving platform. Highly capable automated target recognition 
(ATR) systems are a critical enabler for 21” MCM UUVs, to be able to distinguish mines 
from cluttered environments and reduce post mission analysis (PMA) time. The smaller 
size also allows for greater flexibility in regards to the platforms involved with launch 
and recovery operations. 
The IO decoy and deception mission area analysis reveals that 21” UUVs 
are an ideal platform, due to the fact that these systems are designed purely as expendable 
platforms. If a submarine captain is attempting to lure an enemy away from his operating 
position through the use of an advance UUV decoy, the captain surely would not then 
attempt to place his submarine at risk by trying to recover the decoy. The IO UUV 
payload is the critical enabler, in order to allow the UUV to effectively simulate the 
signature of a friendly submarine. The 21” size also allows for quick reaction times in 
regard to UUV deployment, thereby reducing the time that the submarine is held at risk 
during UUV launch. 
The ISR mission area analysis reveals that 21” UUVs should be deployed 
when there is a substantially high risk of the UUVs being unable to successfully return to 
a recovery area or when you need quick reaction, short duration ISR missions. Example 
missions include shallow water ISR missions within enemy ports and harbors. Design 
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factors related to secure, time critical data transmissions are critical enablers for the 21” 
ISR variant. The smaller size also allows for greater launch and recovery platform 
flexibility. 
The offensive attack mission area analysis reveals that 21” UUVs are 
essentially advanced torpedoes. The concept of a 21” attack UUV closely resembles the 
ongoing developmental programs like the modular undersea heavyweight vehicle 
(MUHV) and the improved submarine launched mobile mine (ISLMM). These programs 
essentially overhaul and upgrade aging MK-48 torpedoes to provide options for short 
range ASW/ASUW attack missions. ATR is the critical enabler for the 21” attack UUV, 
to provide acceptable levels of target discrimination. 
B. SUSTAINED UUV FORCE STRUCTURE QUANTITIES 
The required number of vehicles is derived from each individual mission area. 
Assumptions are made in regards to the type of operation to be undertaken and the 
requisite number of assets required to achieve the operational objectives. These 
assumptions are based upon a combination of quantitative and qualitative factors 
investigated during the modeling, simulation, analysis of alternatives, and cost estimation 
analyses performed over the duration of this study.   
In the MCM mission area the force structure is based upon an assumed need for a 
submarine or high value unit (HVU) to enter and exit a potentially mined area 10 times. 
Four 21” recoverable UUVs are used for every transit through a minefield. In the IO 
mission area, the force structure is based upon the assumption that 50% of a 60 
submarine fleet is deployed at any given time, and each deployed submarine is outfitted 
with two 21” expendable IO decoy UUVs. The force structure for ISR and attack 
operations is based on dual UUV coverage of four target areas, such as enemy ports or 




Table 34.   Recommended Sustained UUV Force Structure.  The UUV quantities for each 
mission area and the total force size based on UUV size are included. Goal is to reach and 
maintain these sustained force structure levels.  
 
Initially, a linear optimization model was developed to determine the force 
structure. The goal of the optimization model is to minimize cost while satisfying the 
mission requirement constraint and giving consideration for platform embarkation 
constraints. The model begins with a set of assumptions on the number of delivery 
platforms available as well as the carrying capacity of those platforms. It is assumed that 
three attack submarines and four LCS’s are available in theater at the onset of hostilities. 
It is assumed that the LDUUV will be part of the force structure and that each attack 
submarine will embark at least one LDUUV and each LCS will embark two LDUVs. The 
total carrying capacity of an attack submarine is one LDUUV and the LCS has the 
capacity to carry four LDUUVs. Stow space for 21” UUVs also affects the optimization. 
An attack submarine is assumed to have seven spaces available for stowage of 21” UUVs 
in the torpedo room and each LCS is assumed to have eight stowage spaces available for 
21” UUVs. Another assumption is that the force is in a wartime scenario where ISR 
missions will be conducted with UUVs and SSNs will be part of the force structure that 
executes attack missions. LDUUVs are also assumed to be multi-mission vehicles that 
can execute both attack and ISR missions. 
 174 
 
The input data for the model is based upon our cost data and modeling output. 
The attack modeling output that is utilized is the mean number of enemy kills per vehicle. 
The ISR model output is from the endurance model with total endurance hours per 
vehicle being the key measure of performance. It should be noted that all assumptions 
discussed are modifiable and in essence provide a framework for recommending an 











X1 = 21” expendable UUV 
X2 = 21” recoverable UUV 
X3 = 48” LDUUV 
X4 = 60” LDUUV 
X5 = SSN 
Constants 
C1 = 21” expendable UUV cost 
C2 = 21” recoverable UUV cost 
C3 = 48” UUV cost 
C4 = 60” UUV cost 
C5 = SSN cost 
E1 = 21” expendable UUV attack effectiveness 
E2 = 21” recoverable UUV attack effectiveness 
E3 = 48” UUV attack effectiveness 
E4 = 60” expendable UUV attack effectiveness 
E5 = SSN attack effectiveness 
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I1 = 21” expendable UUV ISR effectiveness 
I2 = 21” recoverable UUV ISR effectiveness 
I3 = 48” UUV ISR effectiveness 
I4 = 60” expendable UUV ISR effectiveness 
I5 = SSN ISR effectiveness 
Constraints 








where 13 is the minimum number of required enemy kills (determined from 
modeling output) 








where 5760 is the is the minimum number of required coverage hours (determined 
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where 154 is the total number of stow spaces available 
SSN requirement 




int, 1,...,5nx n= ∀ =  
Non-negativity constraint 
0, 1,...,5nx n≥ ∀ =  
Figure 63 summarizes the output of the optimization model for the quantity of 
vehicle. 
 
Figure 63.  Linear Optimization Model Output Summary.  The pie chart shows the optimal 
quantity of each type of UUV based on the linear optimization model and the proportion 
of stow space each quantity of UUVs is allocated to. 
 
The outputs of the optimization model are not surprising. Cost analysis in Chapter 
VIII showed that expendable UUVs are significantly cheaper than recoverable UUVs, 
hence the reason the expendable alternatives are the optimal choice when the objective is 
to minimize cost. The project team agreed however that a force with no recoverable 
UUVs would not be best recommendation. The results of the optimization model provide 
bounds on which to generate a mixed force structure of 21-inch UUVs and LDUUVs. By 
varying the number of enemy kills required and ISR coverage hours required it can be 
shown how 21-inch vehicles are added to the force structure as requirements change. 
Figure 64 shows a graphical representation of how the force structure changes as a result 




   
Figure 64.  Force Structure Changes from Requirements Changes.  The charts show how the 
force structure changes as a result of varying the number of enemy kills required and ISR 
coverage hours required. 
 
After achieving the base requirement, the ISR and attack optimization models 
were reconciled to achieve the maximum effectiveness achievable for both mission areas 
within the available stow space. The final result was 11 dual mission LDUUVs, 25 21-
inch ISR UUVs, and six 21-inch IO UUVs. This results in a total of approximately 14 
enemy kills and 46 dual UUV ISR coverage days. 
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Other assumptions used to determine the total force structure include a standard 
20% of vehicles unavailable for operational use due to various maintenance activities. 
This percentage is consistent with trends observed in UAV squadrons.   
Based on modeling and simulation of a highly congested maritime environment, 
operational UUV loss rates are conservatively estimated at approximately 20 percent 
based upon modeling efforts. This factor led many of the modeling and analysis results to 
suggest that for a single mission, expendable UUVs are the favored variant. However, 
this did not account for the additional utility obtained by a recoverable variant. Figure 65 
shows that in the worst case scenario based upon the Geometric distribution expected 
value function. In the most optimistic scenario of a 2.5 percent loss rate, the number of 
expected missions for a recoverable UUV is 40 missions. In the most pessimistic scenario 
of a 20 percent loss rate, 5 missions could be expected of a vehicle. If the true loss rate is 
somewhere in between, for example 8.75 percent, 11 missions could be expected of a 
UUV.   
 
Figure 65.  Expected number of UUV missions based on Geometric Distribution.  In the most 
optimistic scenario of a 2.5% loss rate, the number of expected missions for a recoverable 





This qualitative and quantitative analysis drives the conclusion that 21” 
recoverable UUVs provide greater utility to the ISR and MCM mission sets. The total 
number of missions completed ratio of recoverable UUVs vs. expendable UUVs also 
overcome the cost saving advantages seen with expendable UUVs. 
C. PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE LIFE-CYCLE COST 
Table 35 illustrates the life-cycle cost (LCC) for three separate UUV force 
structure options. UUV program costs include RDT&E, O&S, procurement, & disposal 
costs. The cost of one Virginia Class Submarine is included for general order of 
magnitude cost comparisons. The Virginia sub cost includes procurement and all O&S 
cost for a 20-year period, but does not incorporate the cost for RDT&E and disposal. 
 
Table 35.   UUV Force Structure LCC Alternatives in FY13K Dollars.  Cost comparisons for 
three alternative programs are shown. The recommended mixed force structure and LCC 
are shown in the second column under Exp, Rec, & LDUUV. 
 
The total life-cycle comparisons use the cost estimation methods explained in 
Chapter VIII. Total numbers of vehicles acquired over the life cycle for each alternative 
are shown in Table 36. These are the numbers of UUVs required to maintain and sustain 
the force structure shown in Table 34. In regards to loss rates, a 2.5% operational UUV 
loss rate is assumed. In addition, a constant 20 vehicle expenditure per year for the 21” 




Table 36.   Total UUV Procurement for 20 Year Life Cycle.  In order to sustain the UUV 
fleet structure allowances for anticipated mission losses, training units, and maintenance 
down time are factored into the total recommended procurement quantities. The 
recommended force structure procurement is shown in the Exp, Rec, & LDUUV row. 
 
Figure 66 provides a graphical representation of Tables 35 and 36. 
 
Figure 66.  20 Year Total UUV Procurement and LCC in FY13K Dollars.  Three alternatives 
are analyzed for total life-cycle costs and procurement levels required to maintain and 
sustain the UUV fleet force structure. 
 
An initial takeaway from this graph may be that the 21” expendable only and LDUUV 
alternative is preferred due to having the lowest LCC. This is not the case primarily due 
to the number of missions feasible per alternative as shown in Figure 67. The 21” 
expendable options are considered to be “one and done.”  Assuming a very conservative 
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average of eight missions executed per 21” recoverable UUV (derived from Figure 65), 
over twice the number of missions can be executed by the mixed expendable, 
recoverable, and LDUUV alternative. The 21” recoverable only and LDUUV option adds 
additional cost, with no value added, due to the fact that the 21” variants for IO and 
attack do not need to be recoverable. 
 
Figure 67.  Total Life-Cycle Cost Comparison Based on Equal Numbers of Missions 
Completed.  To realize the true cost savings associated with the recommended 
force structure, it is necessary to make cost comparisons on a per mission basis. 
 
D. TIME PHASED UUV IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY 
The primary purpose of a time phased implementation strategy is to 
provide capabilities to the operational fleet as assets become available. The proposed 
timeline in Table 37 assumes that all three UUV variants will have reached full 
operational capability by 2018 and have entered full scale production. Production levels 
are initially high in order to increase force levels. As total UUV fleet size reaches 
sufficient operational levels, production requirements drop in order to maintain the 
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Table 37.   UUV Force Structure Acquisition Timeline.  As all variants enter full rate 
production, yearly acquisition levels are initially high to raise UUV levels to acceptable 





Figure 68.  Total UUV Acquisition Levels per Year.  This figure provides a visualization of 
Table 37. As all variants enter full rate production, yearly acquisition levels are initially 
high to raise UUV levels to acceptable operational levels. Production levels then decrease 
to maintain desired UUV fleet levels. 
 
This implementation provides the assets necessary to effectively execute the 
proposed A2AD UUV CONOPS by 2024. Figure 69 illustrates how the implementation 





Figure 69.  UUV Force Structure Inventory by Year.  As all variants enter full rate 
production, yearly acquisition levels are initially high to raise UUV levels to acceptable 
operational levels. Production levels then decrease to maintain desired UUV fleet levels. 
 
E. DOTMLPF CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Facilities 
The cost analysis used to generate the LCC of the recommended acquisition 
program includes projected costs for all physical materials, to include the cost of 
production and support facilities. An exception to this is the 21” expendable UUV variant 
outfitted with an explosive charge for offensive operations, which may be required to be 
maintained at current ammunition handling and storage facilities. The UUV squadrons 
will require adequate facilities to store and maintain all UUVs not currently embarked 
onboard deployed units. The location of the UUV squadron or squadrons would benefit 
by being located adjacent to Air Mobility Command transportation assets. This allows for 
large numbers of UUV assets to be deployed anywhere in the world in a relatively short 
amount of time. 
2. Organization, Personnel, and Training 
The organization of the UUV fleet is highly dependent on platform size and 
capabilities. Based on the highly technical LDUUVs and 21” recoverable UUVs 
recommended as part of our force structure, specialized enlisted personnel or civilian 
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contractors will be required to operate and maintain the UUVs and associated launch and 
recovery equipment.   
UUV assets are intended to be rotational units that are moved from platform to 
platform to minimize the total number of UUVs required. This rotational concept also 
benefits greatly by having squadron based crews, much like the organizational concepts 
employed by existing helicopter squadrons. It would be fiscally imprudent to have the 
necessary number of personnel with the required Naval Enlisted Codes (NEC) onboard 
all supporting platforms, especially when UUV assets are not embarked. 
Notional operations consist of UUV squadron personnel being embarked onboard 
the host platform in the form of a detachment. LDUUVs are assumed to be deployed in 
detachments of one to two vehicles, with three individuals for operations and 
maintenance per detachment.  21” recoverable UUVs are assumed to be deployed in 
detachments of six vehicles, with two individuals for operations and maintenance. 
Notional deployed manning requirements are as follows: 
LDUUV manning will be approximately 39 personnel in 13 detachments. 
21” recoverable manning will be approximately 40 personnel in 20 detachments. 
A total of 79 personnel are recommended for detachment operations and 
maintenance. Considering the fact that not all personnel can be constantly deployed, the 
total personal required for the squadron is essentially doubled. The final number of 
operations and maintenance personnel is approximately 160. These personnel will be 
assigned a specialized NEC, and this will be considered a primary sea duty billet. 
Additional personnel allowances for leadership, logistics and administrative functions 
increase the total squadron manning to approximately 175 personnel. 
21” expendable UUVs are designed with very few shipboard maintenance 
requirements. The offensive attack variants require essentially the same care that existing 
torpedoes require. The IO variant is also treated like a torpedo for all intents and 
purposes. At most the operators will be required to upload mission software 
requirements. In regards to manning, the recommendation is to have operation and 
maintenance be conducted by current ships force, as a collateral duty for two currently 
existing ship crew members. Prospective source rates are Sonar Technician (STG/STS), 
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Machinist Mates (Submarine Weapons), Gunners Mate (GM), or Electronics Technicians 
(ET). Selected personnel will receive training on operations and maintenance of 
expendable UUVs and if required will receive the required NECs. 
For all UUV training, it is recommended that the appropriate “C” school be 
placed in the Catalog of Navy Training Courses (CANTRAC) and developed per the 
Task Based Curriculum Development Manual (Chief of Naval Education and Training, 
2009). Until the appropriate schools can be instituted, ships force should receive on-the-
job (OJT) training and augmentation from technical representatives, so that the culture of 
UUV operations can begin to foster in the United States Naval fleet. 
F. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
For less than the cost of one nuclear powered attack submarine the United States 
Navy can fund the entire proposed UUV force structure. Not only do the UUVs provide 
significant offensive capability, they also greatly improve the survivability of submarines 
and other high value units (HVUs) operating in contested A2AD environments. 
UUVs can act as force multipliers and provide critical extensions of capability to 
existing manned platforms. Based on modeling, simulation, and subsequent analysis, the 
proposed force structure can supplement two submarines in the ISR and attack roles for a 
period of approximately thirty days. Based on physical dimensions and inherent risk to 
manned platforms, UUVs also have the capability to access areas that manned platforms 
simply cannot, or would not want to access. The use of IO UUVs can decrease submarine 
loss rates from 8% to 5%. MCM UUVs have the ability to reduce submarine and other 
HVU loss rates by up to 73% by conducting covert Q-route mapping. 
Placing greater quantities of highly capable mission platforms in an environment 
forces the enemy to expend resources to counter the threats. Otherwise all of the enemies’ 
efforts can be directed towards friendly HVUs. Furthermore the loss or capture of several 
UUVs by enemy forces does not substantially affect the performance of the overall UUV 
force structure. Even though many UUVs are designed for recoverability, they are also 




 RECOMMENDED FUTURE ANALYSIS X.
Several innovative concepts studied throughout this report show significant 
promise in regards to undersea dominance. However, with our tasking primarily focused 
on recommending a UUV force structure capable of performing multiple missions in an 
A2AD environment, it made it difficult to dedicate significant amounts of time and 
resources to any one individual concept. Stakeholders that read this report may draw their 
own conclusions for areas that can benefit from further research, but the following 
concepts have been self-identified to benefit from future analysis. 
 
 Communication and Coordinated Sensing 
Modeling and analysis exposed communication as a cornerstone on which UUV 
mission success will be based upon. Communication is a critical link for relaying data 
from a UUV to a host platform for command and control functions. Future work that is 
able to research and determine the dependency of target resolution on data rate and SNR 
is recommended. 
Sensor data sharing between UUVs can potentially dramatically improve battle 
space effectiveness. Future work for coordinated sensing to include analysis of optimal 
UUV squad size and configuration for searching, tracking, and deceptive operations 
against enemy forces is recommended. For more information refer to Appendix E. 
 
 Deception and Decoy Operations 
Military deception is one of the most cost effective strategies used in preventing 
successful enemy engagements. Further analysis is recommended that looks at payoff 
versus risk tolerance for using UUV’s to conduct deception operations. In support of this, 
it is recommended that exhaustive modeling be conducted on distraction based deception 
that incorporates multiple track plans and the use of multiple decoy UUVs. This research 
may also need to take place at a higher classification level to explore technologies 




 Analysis of UUV Autonomy and Reliability 
UUVs must be highly autonomous and reliable to ensure mission success. Many 
R&D institutions and naval enterprise corporations are currently studying these critical 
operating issues. For this reason our report intentionally did not focus on these research 
areas. But considering the great importance of these capabilities, it is recommended that 
in depth analysis of the current and projected autonomy levels of UUVs be periodically 
revisited by independent research groups. 
 
 Analysis of 12” (MK 54 sized) UUVs 
The USN has several torpedo launch systems that utilize 12.75” diameter tubes. 
An analysis of the power, technology, and payload capabilities of a 12.75” diameter UUV 
is recommended. This could bring significant UUV capabilities to surface combatants 
and utilize existing launch equipment. 
 
 Analysis of Glider Mine UUVs  
The concept of mobile mine fields, using explosive UUV gliders, showed 
significant combat capability at a relatively low cost in the modeling and simulation 
portion of this study. The decision was made to not include them in the force structure 
due to the need for further analysis concerning command and control and the ethical 
concerns for such a weapon. 
 
 Analysis of Manpower Requirements 
Although a notional organizational structure and manpower requirement level is 
presented, more extensive analysis is recommended to determine the most effective and 
cost efficient manpower solution for UUV operation and maintenance. Analysis of the 
maintenance levels required by ships force and/or civilian contractors needs to be 
completed. With the exception of full overhauls, if all maintenance and operations are to 





 Analysis of Launch and Recovery Options 
The method of deployment and recovery is an important part of using UUVs. LCS 
and ULRM equipped submarines are the only considered launch platforms for this study. 
Therefore, an in depth analysis should be conducted to determine effectiveness of various 
launch and recovery options for a greater variety of platforms. 
 
 Analysis of Mission Payloads 
This report focused on a broad approach of analyzing various vehicles with 
standard payloads. Future work is needed to determine modular payloads and the payload 
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APPENDIX A:  STAKEHOLDER INTERACTIONS 
Stakeholder Organization / Role 
Mr. Mike Novak OPNAV N9IB 
Mr. Charles Werchado Executive Director of the Submarine Force 
RDML Barry L. Bruner Director, Undersea Warfare Division N97 
RADM (Ret.) Winfred (Jerry) Ellis NPS SME Advisor 
RDML (Ret.) Richard D. (Rick) 
Williams III 
NPS SME Advisor 
Bill Glenney Deputy Director CNO Strategic Studies Group 
CAPT Doug Marble Assistant Chief of Naval Research 
CAPT Jeff Jablon SUBDEVRON 5  
Douglas Humphreys Vehicle Control Technologies (VTC) 
Pierre Corriveau NAVSEA 
Scott Truver Gryphon Technologies 
Ronald Merlene PEO LCS 
Steve Castelin ONR X20 
David L Kubik John Hopkins APL 
Jon Wood Seebyte 
Jeff Currer 
Johns Hopkins (Former Submarine 
Commanding Officer) 
David E Everhart NSWC MIW Advanced Concept 
LCDR Matt Voracheck SUBDEVRON 5  
Ross Lindman, Dave DeMarino Columbia Group LDUUV 
Phillip McGillivary Science Liaison for U.S. Coast Guard 
Jeff Smith COO Bluefin Robotics 
Francois Leroy  Senior VP Liquid Robotics 
Tom Noonan Director Business Development – Sea Power 
Systems, Kongsberg Defense Systems 
Dan Kucik ONR X22 Automation and Dynamics 
Jim Bellingham COO MBARI 
Dave Scheid NAVSEA Future Fleet Concepts 
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APPENDIX B:  TRANSPORTATION ANALYSIS 
To determine a maximum size a basic transportation analysis is conducted that 
examined vehicle size in the context of transportation system limitations and a simulation 
that examined the time required for a UUV to deploy to a target area. This transportation 
analysis utilized the dimensions and weights associated with the Deep Submergence 
Rescue Vehicle (DSRV) and the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS). 
Both vehicles exhibited many characteristics and functions of a UUV, were 
designed to be air mobile, and analogous comparisons can be made. The ASDS weighs 
approximately 55 tons, is cylindrical in shape, and has dimensions of 65 feet in length 
and an 8 foot diameter. The DSRV weighs 38 tons, is cylindrical in shape, and has 
dimensions of 49 feet in length and an 8 foot diameter. If the volume is approximated 
based upon the dimensions of a cylinder a weight per volume can be calculated. The 
weight per volume of the ASDS and the DSRV is calculated and the average weight per 
volume is 504kg/cubic meter. This weight per volume is then utilized to make 
estimations of proposed vehicle weight based upon vehicle length and diameter. The ratio 
of length to diameter is averaged for both vehicles and then held constant for consistency. 
The estimations of vehicle length to weight are then plotted and compared to 
transportation system constraints as shown in Figure B-1. 
The basic transportation analysis considers movement to the theater of operations 
via strategic airlift, ocean cargo transport, and pre-positioning and stationing in the 
forward area. The strategic airlift capabilities include U.S. Air Force C-5, C-17, and C-
130 transport aircraft. The weight limits associated with these aircraft are 270,000lbs, 
170,900lbs and 34,000lbs respectively. Other limitations that apply to the transportation 
analysis are weight limits associated with the interstate highway system. Vehicles on the 
Interstate Highway System are limited to 80,000 pounds. Beyond 80,000 pounds a 
combination of rail and sea transport would be required to transport the vehicle to the 
theater of operations. The examples of the ASDS and DSRV show that even though a 
single vehicle can be designed to be air mobile, deployment of more than one vehicle at a 
time could be very problematic depending on UUV size. The insight gained from this 
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analysis has a direct impact on the transportability of the weapon system and the ability 
to employ effective combat power in a timely manner. 
 
Figure B-1:  Weight vs. UUV Transportation Analysis 
 
The optimum goal is to deliver credible combat power to the area of operations as 
quickly as possible.   In the transportation analysis a basic simulation is conducted to 
evaluate the need for system transportability and mobility. Two scenarios are compared 
via simulation to assess how quickly a UUV can transit to the target area. The first case is 
a pre-positioned, in-theater pier launched UUV that transits to the target area under UUV 
power alone. The second scenario is a U.S. based UUV element that deploys upon order 
to the theater and then is transported from in theater base via LCS or SSN to the target 
area. This scenario takes in to account the time to embark and debark the aircraft, aircraft 
transit time, embarkation on to the transport ship, and then the time required for the 
transport ship to transport the UUV to the target area. In the simulation values are chosen 
for embarkation and debarkation times, transit distances and transit speeds are varied 
using a rand between function in Excel. It is assumed with this distribution that the values 




Table B-1:  Transportation Analysis Data 
 
The result of the simple simulation shows that the air mobile mean time to target 
area is 99.4 hours with a standard deviation of 17.8 hours. The Pier launched mean time 
to target area is 115.7 hours with a standard deviation of 55.5 hours. To verify the 
difference in the means is statistically significant, a hypothesis test for means is 
conducted at the .05 significance level. The null hypothesis was that the difference in the 
means was zero. The p-value is less than the significance level therefore we rejected the 
null hypothesis; showing there is a difference in the means. An ANOVA also shows that 
the difference in the means is statistically significant. Consolidated results are show in 
Table B-2. 
 
Table B-2:  UUV Average Transportation Time (Hours) 
 
Also of interest in the results is the descriptive statistics, histograms and box plots 
associated with each data set as shown in Figure B-2. Air transportable UUVs provide a 
more predictable arrival time in the target area. Pier launched UUVs take longer to arrive, 
have greater variability and can have arrival times of up to 280 hours. This maximum is 
double that of the air transportable UUV maximum time. Assuming worst case conditions 
MIN MAX MIN MAX
Aircraft Embarkation (HR) 8 12 0 0
Aircraft Transit (HR) 20 36 0 0
Aircraft Debarkation (HR) 8 12 0 0
Ship Embarkation (HR) 8 12 0 0
Target Area Distance (NM) 250 1400 250 1400
Speed Enroute (KT) 18 22 5 10
U.S. Based / Air Mobile Forward Based / Pier Launched
Transportation Analysis Input Data Table
Air Mobile Pier Launched
Mean 99.53253955 116.3951683
Known Variance 317.84 3081.68
Observations 10001 10001
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0
z -28.92265732
P(Z<=z) one-tail 0
z Critical one-tail 1.644853627
P(Z<=z) two-tail 0
z Critical two-tail 1.959963985
Transportation Analysis z-Test: Two Sample for Means
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for both UUVs, the pier launched UUV would arrive up to 5 days later than the air 
mobile variant. The transportation logistics associated with a large vehicle limits the 
application of the weapon system in time critical hostilities. It is unlikely an adversary 
will allow the United States Navy the amount of time required for adequate build-up of 
force size and deployment to the target area. 
 
Figure B-2:  ANOVA Transportation Data (Hours) 
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APPENDIX C:  MODELING AND SIMULATION DATA 
A. UUV ENDURANCE PERFORMANCE DATA TABLES 
21” UUV Performance Characteristics 
Speed (Knots) Power (kWh) Endurance (Hours) Distance (NM) 
1.00 0.00 45.70 45.70 
2.00 0.10 39.16 78.31 
3.00 0.30 32.89 98.67 
4.00 0.59 26.91 107.62 
5.00 1.01 21.33 106.66 
6.00 1.59 16.53 99.17 
7.00 2.38 12.66 88.62 
8.00 3.42 9.68 77.43 
9.00 4.75 7.44 66.95 
10.00 6.42 5.77 57.71 
11.00 8.45 4.53 49.80 
12.00 10.90 3.60 43.14 
13.00 13.81 2.89 37.57 
14.00 17.21 2.35 32.90 
15.00 21.15 1.93 28.98 
16.00 25.66 1.60 25.67 
17.00 30.80 1.35 22.87 
18.00 36.60 1.14 20.48 
19.00 43.10 0.97 18.43 
20.00 50.34 0.83 16.67 
21.00 58.37 0.72 15.13 
22.00 67.22 0.63 13.80 
23.00 76.94 0.55 12.63 
24.00 87.56 0.48 11.59 








48” UUV Performance Characteristics 
Speed (Knots) Power (kWh) Endurance (Hours) Distance (NM) 
1.00 0.40 324.12 324.12 
2.00 0.44 315.29 630.57 
3.00 0.99 228.92 686.76 
4.00 2.16 144.11 576.42 
5.00 4.07 89.65 448.23 
6.00 6.85 57.93 347.59 
7.00 10.62 39.15 274.07 
8.00 15.49 27.59 220.68 
9.00 21.59 20.14 181.24 
10.00 29.03 15.15 151.46 
11.00 37.94 11.68 128.48 




60” UUV Performance Characteristics 
Speed (Knots) Power (kWh) Endurance (Hours) Distance (NM) 
1.00 0.04 756.07 756.07 
2.00 0.49 507.18 1014.35 
3.00 1.50 302.86 908.57 
4.00 3.29 176.14 704.54 
5.00 6.12 106.23 531.17 
6.00 10.21 67.46 404.75 
7.00 15.80 45.00 314.97 
8.00 23.14 31.32 250.54 
9.00 32.46 22.60 203.36 
10.00 44.00 16.80 168.02 
11.00 57.99 12.82 140.99 






B. SENSOR CAPABILITY DATA TABLES 
























0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0 0.2545 0 0.9408 0.9591 
3 0 0.1879 0 0.8735 0.91 
4 0 0.1439 0 0.788 0.8514 
5 0 0.112 0 0.7194 0.8088 
6 0 0.087 0 0.6512 0.7583 
7 0 0.0684 0 0.5817 0.7078 
8 0 0.054 0 0.5186 0.665 
9 0 0.0433 0 0.4626 0.6245 
10 0 0.033 0 0.4098 0.5823 
11 0 0.0256 0 0.3664 0.5453 
12 0 0.0193 0 0.3202 0.5047 
13 0 0.0148 0 0.2829 0.4675 
14 0 0.0119 0 0.2417 0.4216 
15 0 0.0071 0 0.2091 0.3901 
16 0 0.0048 0 0.1866 0.3613 
17 0 0.0035 0 0.1602 0.3312 
18 0 0.0028 0 0.1413 0.3069 
19 0 0.0018 0 0.1202 0.2782 
20 0 0.0011 0 0.1072 0.2548 
30 0 0.0006 0 0.0879 0.2271 
40 0 0 0 0.0149 0.0777 














Passive Sonar Vs. 
SSN/UUV (Pd) 
Enemy Destroyer 
Active Sonar Vs. 
SSN (Pd) 
Enemy Destroyer 
Active Sonar Vs. 
UUV (Pd) 
0 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
2 0 0.1732 0 
3 0 0.119 0 
4 0 0.0825 0 
5 0 0.0595 0 
6 0 0.0432 0 
7 0 0.0331 0 
8 0 0.0218 0 
9 0 0.0164 0 
10 0 0.0115 0 
11 0 0.0087 0 
12 0 0.006 0 
13 0 0.004 0 
14 0 0.0023 0 
15 0 0.001 0 
16 0 0.0005 0 
17 0 0.0003 0 
18 0 0.0003 0 
19 0 0 0 
20 0 0 0 
30 0 0 0 
40 0 0 0 






























0 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
1 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
2 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
3 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
4 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
5 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
6 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
7 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
8 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
9 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
10 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.04 
11 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
12 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
13 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
14 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
15 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03 
16 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
17 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
18 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 
19 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
20 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 
30 0.01 0.01 0 0 
40 0.01 0.01 0 0 














Patrol  ISAR Vs. 
SSN (Pd) 
Enemy Maritime 




Vs. SSN (Pd) 
Enemy Helo 
Patrol Radar Vs. 
UUV (Pd) 
0 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.45 
1 0.4455 0.4455 0.441 0.441 
2 0.441 0.441 0.432 0.432 
3 0.4365 0.4365 0.423 0.423 
4 0.432 0.432 0.414 0.414 
5 0.4275 0.4275 0.405 0.405 
6 0.423 0.423 0.396 0.396 
7 0.4185 0.4185 0.387 0.387 
8 0.414 0.414 0.378 0.378 
9 0.4095 0.4095 0.369 0.369 
10 0.405 0.405 0.36 0.36 
11 0.396 0.396 0.342 0.342 
12 0.387 0.387 0.324 0.324 
13 0.378 0.378 0.306 0.306 
14 0.369 0.369 0.288 0.288 
15 0.36 0.36 0.27 0.27 
16 0.351 0.351 0.252 0.252 
17 0.342 0.342 0.234 0.234 
18 0.333 0.333 0.216 0.216 
19 0.324 0.324 0.198 0.198 
20 0.315 0.315 0.18 0.18 
30 0.225 0.225 0 0 
40 0.135 0.135 0 0 
























Vs. UUV (Pd) 
0 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
1 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
2 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
3 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
4 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
5 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
6 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
7 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
8 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
9 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
10 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
11 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
12 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
13 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
14 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
15 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
16 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
17 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
18 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
19 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
20 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
25 0.45 0 0.1 0.1 
30 0 0 0.1 0.1 






































0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0.5343 0.2167 1 0.2729 1 
3 0.4578 0.1628 1 0.1804 0.9977 
4 0.3875 0.1177 1 0.1213 0.9848 
5 0.3458 0.0907 1 0.0868 0.9755 
6 0.3058 0.0761 1 0.0613 0.9649 
7 0.2684 0.0623 1 0.0406 0.9507 
8 0.2355 0.0476 1 0.0269 0.9326 
9 0.2168 0.0429 1 0.0182 0.9261 
10 0.1934 0.0332 1 0.0113 0.9099 
11 0.169 0.0304 1 0.0061 0.8855 
12 0.1532 0.0259 1 0.0019 0.8788 
13 0.1346 0.0216 1 0.0004 0.8606 
14 0.1157 0.0195 1 0 0.8351 
15 0.1063 0.0172 1 0 0.8292 
16 0.0901 0.0146 1 0 0.8045 
17 0.0817 0.013 1 0 0.7959 
18 0.0699 0.0108 1 0 0.7693 
19 0.0645 0.0084 1 0 0.759 
20 0.0528 0.0072 1 0 0.734 
30 0.0461 0.006 0.5 0 0.7243 
40 0.0048 0 0.25 0 0.5543 




































0 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 0.6271 0.297 1 0.3945 1 
3 0.5478 0.2017 1 0.264 1 
4 0.4847 0.133 1 0.1781 1 
5 0.4424 0.0965 1 0.1305 1 
6 0.4045 0.0676 1 0.0885 0.9994 
7 0.3662 0.0454 1 0.0628 0.9953 
8 0.3301 0.0286 1 0.0417 0.9883 
9 0.3036 0.0187 1 0.0276 0.9837 
10 0.2782 0.0117 1 0.0179 0.9755 
11 0.2464 0.0057 1 0.0099 0.9623 
12 0.2219 0.0023 1 0.0046 0.9543 
13 0.2002 0.001 1 0.0018 0.9404 
14 0.1713 0 1 0 0.9211 
15 0.1592 0 1 0 0.913 
16 0.1365 0 1 0 0.8931 
17 0.1251 0 1 0 0.8931 
18 0.1069 0 1 0 0.8593 
19 0.0967 0 1 0 0.8479 
20 0.0792 0 1 0 0.8259 
30 0.0718 0 0.5 0 0.8166 
40 0.007 0 0.25 0 0.6483 









Friendly Submarine and UUV ESM Sensor Capabilities 
Range 
(KM) 




SSN ESM Vs. 








UUV ESM Vs. 




0 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 1 
2 1 1 1 1 
3 1 1 1 1 
4 1 1 1 1 
5 1 1 1 1 
6 1 1 1 1 
7 1 1 1 1 
8 1 1 1 1 
9 1 1 1 1 
10 1 1 1 1 
11 1 1 1 1 
12 1 1 1 1 
13 1 1 1 1 
14 1 1 1 1 
15 1 1 1 1 
16 1 1 1 1 
17 1 1 1 1 
18 1 1 1 1 
19 1 1 1 1 
20 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 0.5 1 
40 0 1 0 1 



















Based Radar Vs. 
SSN (Pd) 
Enemy Land 
Based Radar Vs. 
UUV (Pd) 
0 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
1 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
2 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
3 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
4 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
5 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
6 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
7 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
8 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
9 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
10 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
11 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
12 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
13 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
14 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
15 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
16 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
17 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
18 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
19 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
20 0.45 0.45 0.1 0.1 
25 0.45 0 0.1 0.1 
30 0 0 0.1 0.1 









C. KINEMATIC PROBABILITY OF KILL TABLES 
  
UUV Probabilities of Kill 
Threat Submarine Threat Surface Merchant 
Range                               
(Meters) 
0 0.603 0.603 0.9 
1000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
2000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
3000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
4000 0.603 0.3326 0.9 
5000 0.603 0.0441 0.9 
6000 0.1954 0 0.9 
7000 0 0 0.7992 
8000 0 0 0.7507 
9000 0 0 0.649 
10000 0 0 0.545 
11000 0 0 0.4523 
12000 0 0 0.3528 
13000 0 0 0.2466 
14000 0 0 0.15201 
15000 0 0 0.0517 
















Friendly Sub Probabilities of Kill 
Threat Submarine Threat Surface Merchant 
Range 
(Meters) 
0 0.603 0.603 0.9 
15000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
16000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
17000 0.603 0.603 0.9 
18000 0.603 0.5458 0.9 
19000 0.603 0.1628 0.9 
20000 0.603 0 0.9 
21000 0.603 0 0.9 
22000 0.603 0 0.9 
23000 0.603 0 0.9 
24000 0.603 0 0.9 
25000 0.603 0 0.9 
26000 0.5379 0 0.9 
27000 0.0385 0 0.8529 
28000 0 0 0.8489 
29000 0 0 0.8022 
30000 0 0 0.7557 
40000 0 0 0.3963 















Threat Probabilities of Kill 
Threat Submarine Threat Surface 
Threat Maritime 
Patrol 
UUV  Submarine UUV  Submarine UUV  Submarine 
Range                                             
(Meters) 
0 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 
1000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 
2000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 
3000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 
4000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.603 
5000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.4267 0.765 0.4267 
6000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0.0352 0.765 0.0352 
7000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0 0.765 0 
8000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0 0.765 0 
9000 0.765 0.603 0.765 0 0.765 0 
10000 0.765 0.603 0.1715 0 0.1715 0 
11000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
12000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
13000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
14000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
15000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
16000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
17000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
18000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
19000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
20000 0.765 0.603 0 0 0 0 
21000 0.765 0.60257 0 0 0 0 
22000 0.765 0.2313 0 0 0 0 
23000 0.765 0.0003 0 0 0 0 
24000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
25000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
26000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
27000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
28000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
29000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
30000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
31000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
32000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 




Threat Probabilities of Kill 
Threat Submarine Threat Surface 
Threat Maritime 
Patrol 
UUV  Submarine UUV  Submarine UUV  Submarine 
34000 0.765 0 0 0 0 0 
35000 0.0516 0 0 0 0 0 
36000 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
D. MODELED ENTITY BEHAVIOR TABLE 
Unit Behavior State 
Name 





Passive Search Transit Search - Transit from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction towards enemy 
units. 
Indefinite 
Shot at Increase speed to 25 knots, avoid all 
enemy contacts. 
1350 
Periscope Depth Transit Search- Proceed from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction toward enemy 
units. No active transmissions. ESM 
sensor is enabled 
60 
Fully Submerged Transit Search- Proceed from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction toward enemy 




Unit Behavior State 
Name 




Conduct ISR - 
Periscope Depth 
Transit - Conduct ISR along defined 
transit path.  
800 
Fully Submerged Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint along defined transit path. 
200 





Passive Search Transit Search- Proceed from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction toward enemy 
units. No active transmissions. 
Indefinite 





Increase speed to 8 knots to avoid 
merchants and trawlers. 
360 
Fuel Out UUV is lost. Indefinite 
Attack UUV Periscope Depth Transit Search- Proceed from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction toward enemy 
units. No active transmissions. ESM 




Unit Behavior State 
Name 
Behavior Time Length 
(Seconds) 
Fully Submerged Transit Search- Proceed from 
waypoint to waypoint with a 
positive attraction toward enemy 
units. No active transmissions. 
3240 
Post Attack Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint avoiding enemy contact. 
No active transmissions 
Indefinite 
21” Attack UUV 
Terminal Phase 
Once contact is made with an 
enemy surface combatants or 
enemy submarine increase speed to 
25 knots and intercept hostile 
vessel. 
Indefinite 
Glider Attack UUV 
Terminal Phase 
Once contact is made with an 
enemy surface combatants or 
enemy submarine increase speed to 
15 knots and intercept hostile 
vessel. 
Indefinite 
ISR UUV Passive Search Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint avoiding enemy contact. 
No active transmissions 
3240 
Conduct ISR - 
Periscope Depth 
Transit - Conduct ISR along defined 




Unit Behavior State 
Name 
Behavior Time Length 
(Seconds) 
Fully Submerged Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint along defined transit path. 
200 
IO UUV Deceive - Profile 1  Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint avoiding enemy contact. 
Active acoustic and radio frequency 
emissions.  
Indefinite 
Deceive - Profile 2A  Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 
waypoint avoiding enemy contact. 
Active acoustic and radio frequency 
emissions.  
720 
Deceive - Profile 2B Transit - Proceed from waypoint to 




Passive Search Random movement with average 
path length of 10,000 meters. 
Passive sonar utilized. 
1600 
Active Search Random movement with average 





If passive move away from enemy if 
within 100,000 meters. If active 





Unit Behavior State 
Name 




If passive move away from enemy if 
within 30,000 meters. If active 
move towards enemy if within 
30,000 meters. 
Indefinite 
Shot At Increase speed to 18 knots. Avoid all 




Passive Search Random movement with average 
path length of 10,000 meters. 
Passive sonar utilized. 
1800 
Active Search Random movement with average 





If passive move away from enemy if 
within 100,000 meters. If active 





If passive move away from enemy if 
within 30,000 meters. If active 
move towards enemy if within 
30000 meters. 
Indefinite 
Shot At Increase speed to 30 knots. Avoid all 
enemies and friends. 
1350 
Enemy Search Conduct ladder search. Indefinite 
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Unit Behavior State 
Name 






Aggressive pursue enemy. Indefinite 
Inorganic Enemy 
Contact 
Aggressive pursue enemy. 600 
Enemy 
Helo 
Search Conduct ladder search. Indefinite 
Organic Enemy 
Contact 
Aggressive pursue enemy. Indefinite 
Inorganic Enemy 
Contact 
Aggressive pursue enemy. 600 
Trawler Trawling  Random movement with average 
path length of 10,000 meters. 
Indefinite 
Merchant Transit Movement along a defined shipping 
lane with average path length of 
50,000 meters with a shipping lane 





APPENDIX D:  REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
The goal of deriving requirements is to determine several critical system 
characteristics that are applicable to the scoped mission areas. Modeling and simulation 
efforts are utilized to analyze relevant requirements, which in turn provide significant 
insights for the analysis of alternatives. 
Approaching system requirements from both a functionally derived perspective 
and by determining critical operational issues (COIs), results in a more comprehensive 
requirements analysis. Furthermore, by using two different approaches, requirements 
were captured that would have otherwise been overlooked. 
This analysis presents a top-level set of notional requirements, which are used to 
evaluate potential alternatives. It is important to note that these requirements are not 
intended to be used as “design-to” technical specifications and requirements. It is 
expected that as solutions are developed more technical requirements will be determined 
based on the resultant designs, technology constraints, and additional in-depth analysis of 
particular mission areas. 
E. FUNCTIONALLY DERIVED REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS 
Each primary sub-function defined in Chapter IV is analyzed for applicable 
measures of performance (MOP). Notional minimum, maximum, and goal parameters of 
each MOP are determined in order to quantify the functions and aid in system 
requirement development. MOPs included in Table D-1 are based on multiple factors 
including:  expected mission time requirements, current technology available, analogy 








Table D-1:  Functionally Derived MOPs 

























Successful launch of 
force from homeport 





Successful launch of 
vehicle from launch 
platform within 2 
hours of execution 
order 
 
Min: 90% time requirement 
met 
Max: 100% time requirement 
met 
Goal: 100%  time requirement 
met 
 
Min: 90% time requirement 
met 
Max: 100% time requirement 
met 


























(% vehicle losses 

























of force/vehicle to 
OPAREA within 10 days 
of call up 
 
Min: 98% of force/vehicles 
arrive to OPAREA 
Max: 100% of force/vehicles 
arrive to OPAREA 
Goal: 100%  of force/vehicles 
arrive to OPAREA 
 
Min: 1% of vehicles allowed to 
be lost 
Max: 0% of vehicles allowed 
to be lost 
Goal: 0% of vehicles allowed 
to be lost 
 
Min: 95%  time requirement 
met 
Max: 100%  time requirement 
met 












(% Returned to 









vehicles launched that 




launched that are 
 
 
Min: 98%  vehicles return 
Max: 100%  vehicles return 
Goal: 100% vehicles return 
 
 
Min: 99%  vehicles destroyed 
Max: 100%  vehicles 
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and/or scuttled to 
point of not 
compromising OPSEC  
destroyed 




























































diagnostic testing of 
vehicle 
 
Vehicle depth accuracy 
in meters 
 
Vehicle speed through 
water accuracy in 
knots 
 
Min: 99% time successful 
detection 
Max: 100% time successful 
detection 
Goal: 100% time successful 
detection 
 
Min: 0 meters 
Max: 2 meters 






Min: 0 meters 
Max: 3 meters 
Goal: <3 meters 
 
Min: 0 kts 
Max: 2 kts 











































location relative to 








depth relative to 
vehicle  in meters 
 
 
Min: 0 meters 
Max: 20 meters 
Goal: <10 meters 
 
Min: 0 meters 
Max: 10 meters 
Goal: <5 meters 
 
 
Min: 0 meters 
Max: 10 meters 
Goal: <5 meters 
 
Min: 0 meters 
Max: 10 meters 



















Contact speed through 
water in knots 
 
 
Contact speed relative 
to vehicle in knots 
Min: 0 kts 
Max: 2 kts 
Goal: <1 kts 
 
Min: 0 kts 




































accuracy in degrees F 
 
 

















Max: .5   
Goal: <.3 
 
Min: 0 kg/m3 
Max: 1 kg/m3 
Goal: <1kg/m3 
 
Min: 0 kts 
Max: 2 kts 





















Time it takes 
transmitted data to 
reach receiving 
platform per packet 
(Air) 
 
Time it takes 
transmitted data to 
reach receiving 
platform per packet 
(Undersea) 
 
Min: 1 ns 
Max: 2 min 




Min: 1 ns 
Max: 10 min 
Goal: <1 min 
C.3 Receive Data 
(Decryption rate 
in time units) 
 
Rate at which 
encrypted data 
received is decrypted 
per packet for further 
processing  
 
Min: 1 ns 
Max: 5 sec 







(Onboard ROM in 
 
 






Function Sub-function /Units MOP Min / Max / Goal 

































































(Probability of hit 
for weapons 
release in %) 
 
 
Total HD video/audio 
monitoring time during 
ISR mission (vehicle) 
 
Continuous time 
vehicle can emit decoy 
acoustics/EM radiation 
 
During mine hunting 
mission the rate at 
which vehicle finds and 
identifies mines in a 
known minefield 
 
The number of 
identified mines 
neutralized by a 
vehicle per hour 
 
The number of mines 




Total hours of EM 
radiation intercepted 




enemy asset is hit 




Min: 24 hours 
Max: 144 hours 
Goal: 72 hours 
 
Min: .5 hours 
Max: 72 hours 


















Min: 24 hours 
Max: 144 hours 























memory on vehicle 
necessary to perform 
all mission areas 
 
Time it takes for CPU 
to process instruction 
 
Min: 128GB 





Max: 1 sec 
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Function Sub-function /Units MOP Min / Max / Goal 
latency in time 
units) 
in CPU time (i.e., not 
elapsed time) 




















time in hours) 
 
 
The percentage of time 
each vehicle is 
available during total 
force operating time 
 
The maximum time a 
vehicle requires for 
preventative 
maintenance when all 











Max: 8 hours 









The total number of 
operators required to 









(Ratio of trained 
operators to 
number of 
vehicles in UUV 
force) 
 
The ratio of trained 
operators to the 






F. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL ISSUE REQUIREMENT ANALYSIS 
The mission analysis performed in Chapter V CONOPS identified several initial 
critical measures of effectiveness (MOEs) of UUV systems. MOEs provide a way to 
measure the extent that a system accomplishes or supports a particular mission or task. 
Important UUV system MOEs include, but are not limited to: 
Host Platform Survivability 
UUV Survivability 
UUV Endurance Capability 
UUV Signal Detection Capability 





UUV Interoperability  
UUV Maintainability 
UUV Modularity 
These initial system MOEs are used in conjunction with functional analysis, 
mission analysis, and initial capabilities assessment to determining COIs. COIs are 
defined by their relevancy to the mission, the importance to mission accomplishment, and 
the risk of not achieving mission objectives (Hoivik 2013). As shown in Table D-2, UUV 
system COIs are often represented in the form of a question related to the problem at 
hand. 
Table D-2:  Critical Operational Issues Derived From CONOPS Analysis 
COI Issue Question 
1 Endurance Is the endurance capability of the UUV sufficient for 
mission accomplishment? 
2 Mobility Is the mobility of the UUV sufficient to support 
accomplishing the mission with regards to speed, 
reaction time, and obstacle avoidance? 
3 Autonomy Does the UUV have sufficient autonomous 
capabilities to accomplish the mission without the 
need for human control once launched from the host 
platform? 
4 Transportability Does the UUV have the capability to be transported, 
launched, and recovered from multiple U.S. Navy 
platforms? 
5 Compatibility Is the compatibility of modular components and the 
UUV sufficient to provide mission flexibility? 
6 Lethality Is the lethality of the UUV lethal payload packages 
sufficient for mission accomplishment? 
7 Interoperability Are communication capabilities of the UUV 
sufficient for mission accomplishment? 
8 Command and Control 
(C2) 
Are the command and control capabilities of the 
UUV sufficient for mission accomplishment? 
9 Sensor Effectiveness Are the sensor capabilities of the UUV sufficient for 
mission accomplishment? 
10 Employment Are behavior patterns developed through software for 
the UUV effective in mission accomplishment? 
11 Human Systems 
Integration 
Are users aboard the host platform able to fully 
utilize the capabilities of the UUV? 
12 Survivability Is the survivability of the UUV satisfactory for 
operations in various maritime threat environments? 
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Identification of COIs led to the development of more detailed MOEs and MOPs. 
MOEs address specific COIs and MOPs provide a quantitative or qualitative measure of 
the system’s MOEs. It should be noted that unlike the functional requirement analysis 
method, the COI method does not include notional quantitative values for MOPs.  
• COI 1 - Endurance 
o MOE 1.1 Capability to operate for XX time 
 MOP 1.1.1 Proportion of power for mission profile 
 MOP 1.1.2 Fuel consumption rate 
 MOP 1.1.3 Battery discharge rate 
o MOE 1.2 Recharge capability 
 MOP 1.2.1 Battery recharge rate 
o MOE 1.3 Energy storage capability 
 MOP 1.3.1 Average battery storage capacity 
 MOP 1.3.2 Fuel storage capacity 
• COI 2 - Mobility 
o MOE 2.1 Navigation capability 
 MOP 2.1.1 Proportion of detected obstacles 
 MOP 2.1.2 Average location error 
 MOP 2.1.3 Average error for self-location 
o MOE 2.2 Maneuvering capability 
 MOP 2.2.1 Rate of speed 
 MOP 2.2.2 Average speed for sea conditions 
 MOP 2.2.3 Rate of ascent/descent 
• COI 3 - Autonomy 
o MOE 3.1 Autonomous operations capability 
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 MOP 3.1.1 Proportion of data elements transmitted correctly. The 
ratio of the total number of data elements transmitted correctly to 
the total number of data elements entered for a specific task. 
 MOP 3.1.2 Proportion of tasks completed using UUV automated 
systems to the total number of tasks attempted by UUV automated 
systems 
 MOP 3.1.3 Proportion of problems resolved by UUV internal 
systems. The ratio of the total number of problems solved by the 
UUV internal systems to the total number of problems identified 
by the UUV internal systems. 
• COI 4 - Transportability 
o MOE 4.1 Capability to be launched and recovered by current U.S. Navy 
platforms 
 MOP 4.1.1 Proportion of existing U.S. Navy platforms capable of 
being launched/recovered from 
o MOE 4.2 Capability to be transported by current U.S. Navy platforms 
 MOP 4.2.1 Proportion of existing U.S. Navy platforms capable of 
being transported by 
• COI 5 – Compatibility 
o MOE 12.1 Compatibility of different sensors 
 MOP 12.1.1 Proportion of sensors compatible with the UUV 
o MOE 12.2 Compatibility of batteries 
 MOP 12.2.1 Proportion of battery types compatible with the UUV 
• COI 6 - Lethality 
o MOE 6.1 Engagement timeliness effectiveness 
 MOP 6.1.1 Average time from target acquisition to engagement 
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o Moe 6.2 Weapons effect 
 MOP 6.2.1 Proportion of target engagements vs. acquisitions 
 MOP 6.2.2 Probability of kill (Pk) 
 MOP 6.2.2 Average hit range 
 MOP 6.2.3 Loss exchange ratio 
 MOP 6.2.4 System exchange ratio 
 MOP 6.2.5 Force exchange ratio 
• COI 7 - Interoperability 
o MOE 7.1 Atmospheric link capability 
 MOP 7.1.1 Average signal range 
 MOP 7.1.2 Average data rate 
o MOE 7.2 Receiving capability 
 MOP 7.2.1 Proportion of uninterrupted communications 
 MOP 7.2.2 Message accuracy 
o MOE 7.3 Transmission capability 
 MOP 7.2.1 Average data message completion time (MCT) 
 MOP 7.2.2 Average transmission backlog 
• COI 8 - Command and Control (C2) 
o MOE 8.1 Commander’s requirement management 
 MOP 8.1.1 Proportion of intelligence requirements satisfied 
 MOP 8.1.2 Proportion of tasking successes 
o MOE 8.2 Situation development 
 MOP 8.2.1 Proportion of mines reported 
 MOP 8.2.2 Average time to generate safe Q-route 
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• COI 9 – Sensor Effectiveness 
o MOE 9.1 Target search capability 
 MOP 9.1.1 Target search rate 
o MOE 9.2 Target detection 
 MOP 9.2.1 Proportion of detections 
 MOP 9.2.2 Average range of detection 
o MOE 9.3 Target recognition 
 MOP 9.3.1 Time from detection from recognition 
 MOP 9.3.2 Proportion of identifications vs. recognitions 
 MOP 9.3.3 Proportion of correct recognitions 
• COI 10 – Employment 
o MOE 10.1 Target development 
 MOP 10.1.1 Proportion of High Payoff Targets 
o MOE 10.2 Search coverage efficiency 
 MOP 10.2.1 Proportion of planned area successful y searched per 
mission 
• DR 10.2.1.1 Square nautical miles of planned area 
successfully searched 
• DR10.2.1.2 Square nautical miles of planned area 
 MOP 10.2.2 Proportion of planned area searched multiple times 
• COI 11 - Human Systems Integration 
o MOE 11.1 System task performance 
 MOP 11.1.1 The average time required to successively plan and 
load a mission package 
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 MOP 11.1.2 The average usability ratings of system critical tasks:  
The average ratings of system critical task characteristics given by 
test players at the end of each task trial, based on the ease-of-use 
o MOE 11.2 Safety hazards 
 MOP 11.2.1 The proportion of trials where safety/hazard related 
incidents occur:  The ratio of the total number of trials where 
safety related or hazardous incidents occur to the total number of 
trial 
 MOP 11.2.2 The average interface usability ratings:  The average 
ratings for each interaction category of various characteristics of 
human-machine interfaces rendered by the test players at the 
completion of the test 
• COI 12 - Survivability 
o MOE 12.1 Detection avoidance 
 MOP 12.1.1 Detection avoidance proportion 
 MOP 12.1.2 Detection survivability ratio 
o MOE 12.2 Situation awareness capability 
 MOP 12.2.1 Threat false alarm rate 
• DR 12.2.1.1 Number of alarms 
• DR 12.2.1.2 Number of false threats 
 MOP 12.2.2 Average system response time 
o MOE 12.3 Acquisition avoidance 
 MOP 12.3.1 Average expose time 
 MOP 12.3.2 Acquisition avoidance proportion 
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G. CONSOLIDATED UUV SYSTEM REQUIREMENTS 
Using both methods described in this chapter, an initial set of system 
requirements is established. To provide traceability to the function analysis, the 
requirements are organized in regards to the functions that the system must care out. 
Navigate Requirements: 
N.1 The entire force needed to complete UUV supported missions must be deployable 
within  72 hours 98±2% of the time when ordered. Accuracy will be measured by 
the ratio of deployments conducted in less than 72 hours to total deployments 
requested. 
N.2 UUVs must have successful launch from launch platform within 2 hours of 
execution order 98±2% of the time. Accuracy will be measured by the ratio of 
sorties conducted in less than 2 hours to total sorties requested. 
N.3 In the case of total force movement, the entire force must make it to the OPAREA 
98% of the time at a minimum. In the case of individual UUV mission 
deployment, the UUV must make it to the mission space at least 98% of the time. 
N.4 UUV losses per 100 sorties should not exceed one vehicle due to environmental 
obstacles to include fishing nets, landforms and currents. This does not include 
losses due to enemy combatants, UUV system failure or UUVs pre-programmed 
to self-destruct. 
N.5 In addition to meeting the 72 hour deployment requirement, the force including 
the UUVs required for the mission must be able to be on station within 10 days of 
call up. This assumes forces called up will be the closest regional forces to the 
OPAREA. 
N.6 For non-disposable UUVs, a maximum of two UUVs can be lost per 100 sorties. 
This includes losses for all reasons except for UUVs pre-programmed to self-
destruct. 
N.7 For disposable UUVs, only up to one UUV can fail to self-destruct or scuttle in 
deep ocean for every 100 self-destruct orders given. Design should attempt to 




S.1 UUV should be designed to detect water intrusion of its pressure hull. Design 
testing  should meet 99% success rate at detecting water intrusion at operational 
depths. UUV  should be pre-programmed to self-destruct if water intrusion levels 
endanger further UUV operation. 
S.2 UUV force including support platforms must meet accuracy of less than 20 meters 
off geospatially when considering own vehicle/platform. Goal should be to 
achieve minimal deviation from actual geospatial position. 
S.3 UUV shall be programmed to run periodic and prompted self-diagnostic tests. The 
programming should be robust enough that during design testing the system shall 
not experience run-time errors more than 1% of the time self-diagnostics are run. 
S.4 UUV self-depth accuracy shall be resolved to an accuracy of less than 10 meters 
with a  goal to achieve minimal deviation from actual depth. 
S.5 UUV speed accuracy shall be resolved to an accuracy of less than 2 knots from 
actual  speed through water with a goal to achieve minimal deviation from actual 
speed through water. 
S.6 Due to fire control considerations, sensed contacts from the UUV shall meet 
accuracy of less than 20 meters off geospatially with a goal of minimal deviation 
from actual  geospatial position.  
S.7 In addition to actual geospatial positioning, due to evasion and fire control 
considerations, the UUV shall meet accuracy of less than 10 meters off relative 
geospatial position to the sensed contact. 
S.8 Due to fire control considerations sensed submerged contacts from the UUV shall 
meet accuracy of less than 10 meters off of actual depth with a goal of minimal 
deviation from actual depth. 
S.9 In addition to actual contact depth, due to evasion and fire control considerations, 




S.10 Due to fire control considerations sensed contacts from the UUV shall meet 
accuracy of less than 2 knots speed through water off of actual contact speed with 
a goal of minimal deviation from actual speed through water. 
S.11 In addition to actual contact speed through water, due to evasion and fire control 
considerations, the UUV shall meet accuracy of less than 2 knots off relative 
speed through water against sensed contact. 
S.12 UUV shall resolve environmental temperature to an accuracy of less than 2F from 
actual environmental temperature and shall be designed to operate well outside 
of global oceanographic temperature extreme averages. 
S.13 Due to acoustic detection range considerations, UUV must be able to resolve 
salinity to at least .5 standard salinity units. 
S.14 Due to water intrusion considerations, the UUV should be able to resolve external 
hull pressure to at least 1kg/m3. 
S.15 In order to determine geospatial speed, the UUV should be able to resolve 
external current speed to within 2 knots of actual current speed. 
Communicate Requirements: 
C.1 Data transmitted above the surface of the water from UUV shall have a 
transmitted latency to intended receiving station not to exceed 2 minutes per 
packet of data with a goal of <15 seconds to meet projected worst-case mission 
time sensitivity. 
C.2 Data transmitted undersea from the UUV shall have a transmitted latency to 
intended receiving station not to exceed 10 minutes per packet of data with a goal 
of <1 minute to meet projected worst-case mission time sensitivity. 
C.3 For communications between UUVs and force platforms, any encrypted data 
received on either end shall meet a maximum decryption speed of <5 seconds per 
packet of data with a goal of <1 millisecond. 
Command and Control Requirements: 
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C2.1 UUVs designed for ISR shall have a minimum of 500GB onboard read-only 
memory to allow for at least 24 hours of continuous HD (720p) video recording 
capability with audio. The UUV should be designed to have the ability to convert 
to a lower resolution and/or audio only and EM data recording if so desired by 
mission planners. 
C2.2 UUVs shall meet a minimum capability of 24 hours of continuous HD video 
recording capability with audio with a goal of 72 hours of continuous monitoring. 
Due to current projected onboard power limitations, maximum continuous HD 
video monitoring should be capped to 144 hours. 
C2.3 UUVs performing decoy missions shall produce a continuous decoy signal for a 
minimum of half an hour while maneuvering at a speed of up to 5 knots with a 
goal of 24 hours of continuous signal. 
C2.4 UUVs performing mine hunting missions in a known mine location shall identify 
and locate at least one mine per hour of mine hunting operation with a goal of five 
mines per hour. 
C2.5 UUVs performing mine neutralization missions in a known mine location shall 
neutralize at least one mine per hour of mine neutralization operation with a goal 
of two mines per hour. 
C2.6 UUVs performing mine laying missions shall meet a minimum requirement of 
laying three mines per mine laying sortie to justify use of UUVs in lieu of other 
platforms due to mine laying capacity projected by surface vessels. 
C2.7 In addition to optical/audible monitoring requirements, UUVs shall meet a 
minimum capability of 24 hours of continuous EM radiation monitoring with a 
goal of 72 hours of continuous EM radiation monitoring.  
C2.8 UUVs performing attack missions must test to a probability of hit of at least 60% 
if weapons solution has been determined organic to the UUV (i.e., weapons 
solution not determined by operator). 
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C2.9 UUV must have minimum of 128GB of random access memory onboard to 
ensure  enough memory available to meet any future requirements as more 
complex processing requirements evolve due to programming improvements. 
C2.10 UUV CPU time latency, not elapsed time which includes user time and 
instruction wait time, shall achieve a maximum lag of 1 second. 
Provide Support Requirements: 
PS.1 UUV operational availability shall exceed 80% with a goal of 95%. This is based 
on UUVs deployed with an operational force underway and does not include 
UUVs attached to forces in port. 
PS.2 UUVs shall be designed to allow for completion of the most complex preventative 
maintenance item in less than 8 real time hours with a goal of 4 hours. Man-hours 
may exceed 8 hours. 
PS.3 UUVs shall be designed such that a maximum of 3 operators are needed to 
operate the UUV for any mission set with a goal of a single operator. 
PS.4 Manning for the UUV force shall ensure at least two trained operators exist for 
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APPENDIX E:  COORDINATED SENSING MODELING 
A. COORDINATED SENSING INTRODUCTION 
The UUV Master Plan identified intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) as the top priority mission area for unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs) (UUV 
Master Plan 2004). To better inform our analysis of alternatives for the appropriate 
employment and vehicle selection for this mission, various modeling tools are used to 
develop an understanding of the relevant parameters for consideration in the analysis. We 
discuss, in the following sections, the design and results of our coordinated sensing 
model, which investigated the specific application of UUVs in target tracking scenarios. 
The intent of this model is to develop a better understanding of the dependency of target 
resolution on various employment and vehicle design parameters.   
B. COORDINATED SENSING MODEL 
This section discusses the design of our coordinated sensing model for stationary 
and mobile tracking of a target with unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). The spatial 
arrangement of the model is introduced, and the underlying mathematical relationships 
for multi-vehicle sensor data fusion are briefly discussed. This model is used to 
understand the dependency of target position uncertainty on various vehicle and sensor 
parameters, including: 1) sensor bearing accuracy; 2) UUV inter-vehicle separation 
distance; 3) UUV speed in relation to target speed. The results of this analysis are in 
included in Section C. 
1. MODEL DESIGN 
Figure E-1 shows the two-dimensional arrangement of the target and UUVs in the 
model. The target is centrally placed in a -Cartesian coordinate system with initial 
position of  and . The UUVs were equally spaced along the x-axis to attain 
symmetry between the number of vehicles left and right of the target (for a single vehicle 
scenario, the UUV is placed at x=0). Whether for a static or mobile analysis, the target 
and vehicles maintained a constant  separation for all time, , and are always in the 
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same plane. Additionally, UUVs maintain a constant separation distance, , from each 
other and never deviate from the x-axis. While we understand vehicle employment in a 
real tracking scenario would likely not have this arrangement, it is used for simplicity, 
since the aim is only to develop a general understanding of parameter dependency in 
target tracking. 
 
Figure E-1:  Geometric relationship between target and UUVs in the model. This 
arrangement was used for both mobile and static analyses. 
2. SENSOR MEASUREMENTS AND THE COVARIANCE 
INTERSECTION 
Each UUV in the model took measurements of the relative bearing and range of 
the target, using acoustic sensors only. Measurements are assumed to be unaffected by 
environmental constraints and are of sufficient signal-to-noise ratio to distinguish the 
target from background noise. Measurements are also assumed to have some level of 
noise associated with them. For simplicity, noise is modeled as zero-mean, white and 
Gaussian. Therefore, uncertainties of the bearing ( ) and range ( ) measurements at 
each time step are defined as: 
   
where,  and were the standard deviations of the measurement distributions; 
was the randomly generated Gaussian noise. 
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As shown in Figure E-2, the basic problem of the model is fusing these sensor 
measurements to yield an estimate of the target’s position relative to the UUVs, while 
minimizing its uncertainty and maintaining consistency. 
 
Figure E-2:  Fusion of bearing and range measurements to yield an estimate of target 
position.   and  are the variances of the bearing and range measurement 
distributions, respectively. 
 
There were different ways to do this, but the widely accepted covariance 
intersection algorithm (Julier and Uhlmann 1997), takes a convex combination of the 
sensor data variances to minimize the uncertainty in the estimated target position. 
Mathematically, this combination is expressed as , where  is 
the inverse of the covariance matrix of the ith UUV given by: 
   
and is a weighting factor used for different design specifications. This method builds 
off the observation that the ellipses formed by  and are always contained within 
the intersection region bounded by and , regardless of their values. This suggests 
the fused data will consistently fall within this intersection region, even without 
knowledge of the correlation between  and  (Julier and Uhlmann 1997). The 
tighter the intersection region shown in Figure E-3 becomes, the more accurate the 




Figure E-3:  The covariance intersection region. The solid-lined ellipses would represent 
the variances of the bearing and range measurements in our model. The dash-lined 
ellipses would be the estimate of the target’s position. (From Julier and Uhlmann 1997) 
 
3. DATA FUSION IN THE MODEL 
To more easily apply this algorithm, sensor measurements are assumed to be 
uncorrelated, which means they have no dependence on each other. It is also assumed 
there is no spatial dependence of the range measurement, which means every vehicle has 
the same standard deviation in their range uncertainty regardless of distance to the target. 
This is done to prevent overcomplicating the model. Therefore, the covariance matrix of 
the ith UUV in its local reference frame (i.e., bearing ( ) and range from itself) is given 
by: 
  
As (Chung, Burdick, and Murray 2006) suggest, this matrix structure is consistent 
with the standard range-finding sensor models of (Ramachandra 2000). To transform 
from the local to global Cartesian reference frame, the rotation matrix provided by 
(Fitzgerald 1985) is applied: 
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at each time interval to give . Owing to the mathematical form of the 
covariance intersection algorithm, the fused observations of M UUVs at each time 
interval become: 
 .  
For a more detailed discussion of multi-sensor data fusion, see (Bar-Shalom and 
Fortmann 1988). 
4. COST FUNCTION 
The cost function to be minimized is given by , where  is the trace 
of the inverse fused matrix. The determinant can also be used for this purpose, but we 
elected the trace approach since our matrices had element values on the diagonals only. 
The term trace is defined as the “resolution” of the fused data. The objective, therefore, is 
to investigate how to improve the resolution of the target position by minimizing the cost 
(i.e., uncertainty). 
5. SECTION SUMMARY 
This section introduced the structure of our basic target-tracking model. The 
relevant theory for our data fusion algorithm was discussed, and the cost function 
defined. The assumptions made in the model, however overly simplistic, are appropriate 
for the level of research and did not diminish the value of the analyses conducted. 
C. COORDINATED SENSING RESULTS 
This section discusses the results obtained from the coordinated sensing model 
when applied to both static and mobile tracking scenarios. A parametric analysis is 
conducted to develop an understanding of the cost function dependency on various model 
parameters. Where appropriate, general conclusions are drawn and observations made to 
aid in understanding the results. 
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1. STATIC TRACKING 
The model is first employed in a static tracking scenario, where neither the target 
nor the UUVs have a velocity component changing their position over time. The UUV 
and target separation, , is 1000 meters. Two analyses are conducted—the first adjusted 
inter-UUV spacing while keeping sensor accuracy constant, and the second adjusted the 
quality of the sensor while maintaining vehicle separation constant. The results of the two 
analyses are shown in Figures E-4 and E-5 respectively. For clarity, sensor quality is 
adjusted by only varying the standard deviation of the bearing measurement. The range 
measurement, from the operational experience of the authors, is assumed to be difficult to 
vary without appropriate vehicle ranging techniques. 
 
Figure E-4:  Trace of fused covariance versus the number of UUVs for varying UUV 





Figure E-5:  Trace of fused covariance versus number of UUVs for varying sensor quality 
(i.e., varying standard deviation of bearing measurement). The UUV separation distance 
is 25m. 
Figures 4 and 5 both show resolution of the target’s position improving (i.e., fused 
covariance decreasing) with more and more UUVs added to the scenario. Intuitively, this 
is expected. More sensors on target provided more information to help shape the position 
estimate. If anything, this result indicated that the model is working as expected. The 
more telling results arise when looking at how the number of UUVs required for a given 
resolution varied with different separation distances and sensor qualities. For example, 
Figure 4 shows for a traced covariance of 0.7, varying the UUV separation distance from 
25m to 50m reduces the number of UUVs from eight to five. For the same resolution, 
Figure 5 shows a reduction in the number of UUVs from seven to four for a sensor 
improvement of 2.5 degrees (i.e., from +/-5 degrees uncertainty to +/-2.5 degrees 
uncertainty). Though these two separate analyses appeared to yield similar results, it is 
difficult to draw any substantive conclusions by comparing them. Any attempt to do so is 
like comparing apples to oranges. The general conclusion is that there are two different 
ways to attain a desired target resolution with multiple UUVs. The first, by increasing 
UUV separation distance, has the advantage of using a mediocre sensor, but with greater 
range over which to communicate the fusion of data. This is also the cheaper option. The 
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second method, improving sensor quality, has the disadvantage of higher cost, but the 
advantage of being able to communicate between vehicles over shorter distances.   
2. MOBILE TRACKING 
The model is then employed in a mobile tracking scenario, where both the target 
and UUVs have a velocity component adding to their x-position at each time interval. To 
verify the model is setup properly, a test case is ran with the target having a greater 
velocity then the UUVs. Figure E-6 shows the target resolution degrades over time, as 
expected, since the target continuously opens lateral range on the vehicles.  
 
Figure E-6:  Trace of fused covariance versus number of UUVs over time. The target 
velocity is ~10kts and the UUV velocity is ~6kts (in the +x-direction). UUV separation 
was 25m and bearing accuracy is +/-5 degrees. 
 
These results confirm that the model is working correctly. The model is applied to 
an identical set of analyses as the static tracking problem of Section 3.1, but with a 
standardized velocity ratio of . This corresponds to a target velocity of 8kts 
and a UUV velocity of 5kts. Figure E-7 shows the results of varying UUV separation 
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distance for a standardized sensor accuracy of +/-5 degrees. Figure E-8 shows the results 
of varying sensor quality for a standardized UUV separation of 25m. 
 
Figure E-7:  Trace of fused covariance versus number of UUVs for various UUV 
separation distances at . The time step is five minutes and bearing accuracy 





Figure E-8:  Trace of fused covariance versus number of UUVs for various sensor 
accuracies at . The time step is five minutes and the UUV separation 
distance is 25m. 
 
These figures indicate that the UUV performance is similar to the static scenario 
in both analyses, though with slightly lower reduction in vehicle count for a given 
resolution. This is not a particularly useful result, so a third analysis varying a different 
parameter—speed ratio between the target and UUVs is attempted. The intent is to 
understand the relationship between resolution and the relative difference between target 
and vehicle speeds. Figure E-9 shows the results of this analysis for a standardized UUV 




Figure E-9:  Trace of fused covariance versus number of UUVs at different target/UUV 
speed ratios. The time step is five minutes; bearing uncertainty is +/-5 degrees; UUV 
separation distance is 25m. 
At first glance, these results indicate the speed ratio does not significantly affect 
the resolution. Little is gained by matching UUV speed with target speed, or, conversely, 
little is lost by using a UUV speed of half the target speed. Perhaps this is an artifact of 
the performance parameters selected for the analysis (i.e. UUV separation distance and 
sensor quality), but an identical run with a UUV separation of 50m yields comparable 
results, though with greater resolution. Therefore, we confidently concluded target/UUV 
speed ratio is less of a concern for UUV tracking capability as sensor quality or vehicle 
separation distance. That said, this analysis does show target resolution can be achieved 
with greater energy efficiency by using more vehicles at a slower speed versus fewer 
vehicles at a higher speed. Since the required vehicle count for a given resolution does 
not dramatically reduce from one extreme of the speed ratio spectrum to the other (i.e., 
target speed equals UUV speed versus target speed equals twice UUV speed), this is a 
logical outcome that is easily verifiable by comparing energy consumption of a desired 
vehicle type for one case versus the other. The caveat to this particular conclusion is if 
the UUVs are tasked with tracking a target long term, the environmental conditions may 
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easily prevent maintaining contact on the target as UUV-target separation distance 
increases, in which case a higher UUV speed is more desirable. 
D. MODEL CONCLUSIONS 
A desired target resolution can be achieved by either improving the sensor 
quality, or varying UUV separation distance. The tradeoff is in the additional cost of 
improving the sensor quality, or in the potential degradation of the communication link 
between the vehicles due to increasing the separation between them. 
The speed separation between the UUV and target has little impact on the number 
of vehicles required to attain a desired target resolution. Instead, the real effect in the 
speed separation is in the energy consumption required to achieve that resolution. More 
vehicles operating at slower speeds can achieve the same result as fewer vehicles 
operating at faster speeds, though with significantly less energy consumed. The tradeoff 
is in how much lateral separation the target achieves when a slower vehicle speed is used. 
A greater speed ratio (i.e., target speed/UUV speed) will result in greater distance 
separation, which would likely increase the probability of losing contact on the target due 
to signal attenuation. 
Our model, therefore, gave useful insights to the design parameters affecting the 
employment of UUVs in a target-tracking mission. We expect the results of this model 
will better inform our analysis of alternatives for vehicle selection and employment in the 
broader mission area of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR). 
E. FUTURE WORK RECOMMENDATIONS 
The coordinated sensing analysis does not consider the impact of different UUV 
configurations on target resolution. In other words, the effect of arranging the UUV pack 
in a configuration other than a straight line is not considered. Future work to identify 
optimal tracking configurations, such as a diamond or square pattern, would greatly 
enhance the operational employment of the vehicles. This may likely enhance energy 
efficiency, as well. 
The relationship between target resolution and information transfer rate between 
vehicles is not strictly analyzed for in the model. Future work could investigate this 
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relationship and develop a cost-benefit analysis of using higher-data-rate undersea optical 
communications versus lower-data-rate acoustic communications between vehicles. A 
key to this future study is determining how much information really needs to be sent 
between vehicles, and how often the vehicles need to fuse the information to optimize 
target resolution.  (Haertel 2013), (Cochenour 2012), and (Cox 2012) provide in-depth 
analysis of optical signal propagation in the undersea environment, as well as data rate 
limitations incurred from the undersea channel. Dr. Joe Rice of the Naval Postgraduate 
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APPENDIX F:  ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES DATA 
A. UUV ATTRIBUTE DATA 
ISR Attributes Raw Data 
 
 
ISR Value Function Scores (with SSN) 
 
 


















Mission effectiveness 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.83 1 0.97
Endurance 107.62 576.42 704.54 107.62 8640 107.62
Stealth 1.514 7.831 12.24 3.028 24.48 3.028
Ease of tactical employment 60 60 90 4 2 120
Mission flexibility 0.436 2.89 4.68 0.872 59.296 0.872















Mission effectiveness 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.830 1.000 0.970
Endurance 0.012 0.067 0.082 0.012 1.000 0.012
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.500 0.062 0.500
Ease of tactical employment 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.500 1.000 0.017
Mission flexibility 0.007 0.049 0.079 0.015 1.000 0.015















Mission effectiveness 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.830 0.970
Endurance 0.153 0.818 1.000 0.153 0.153
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.500 0.500
Ease of tactical employment 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.500 0.017
Mission flexibility 0.093 0.618 1.000 0.186 0.186
Years to field 0.889 0.889 0.667 0.667 0.667
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MCM Value Function Scores (with SSN) 
 
 



















Mission effectiveness 22.6 22.6 22.6 78 9.8 78
Endurance 107.62 576.424 704.544 107.62 8640 107.62
Stealth 1.514 7.831 12.24 9.084 24.48 9.084
Ease of tactical employment 60 60 90 360 1440 12
Mission flexibility 0.436 2.89 4.68 1.744 59.296 4.36











Mission effectiveness 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.780 0.098 0.780
Endurance 0.012 0.067 0.082 0.012 1.000 0.012
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.167 0.062 0.167
Ease of tactical employment 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.006 0.001 1.000
Mission flexibility 0.007 0.049 0.079 0.029 1.000 0.074











Mission effectiveness 0.226 0.226 0.226 0.780 0.780
Endurance 0.153 0.818 1.000 0.153 0.153
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.167 0.167
Ease of tactical employment 0.033 0.033 0.022 0.006 1.000
Mission flexibility 0.093 0.618 1.000 0.373 0.932
Years to field 1.000 0.500 1.000 0.750 0.250
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IO Attributes Raw Data 
 
 
IO Value Function Scores (with SSN) 
 
 





















Mission effectiveness 29 32 32 22 35 22
Endurance 107.62 576.424 704.544 107.62 8640 107.62
Stealth 1.514 7.831 12.24 3.028 24.48 3.028
Ease of tactical employment 2 60 90 60 2 4
Mission flexibility 0.436 2.89 4.68 0.872 59.296 4.36











Mission effectiveness 0.759 0.688 0.688 1.000 0.629 1.000
Endurance 0.012 0.067 0.082 0.012 1.000 0.012
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.500 0.062 0.500
Ease of tactical employment 1.000 0.033 0.022 0.016 1.000 0.500
Mission flexibility 0.007 0.049 0.079 0.015 1.000 0.015















Mission effectiveness 0.759 0.688 0.688 1.000 1.000
Endurance 0.153 0.818 1.000 0.153 0.153
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.500 0.500
Ease of tactical employment 1.000 0.033 0.022 0.500 0.500
Mission flexibility 0.093 0.618 1.000 0.186 0.186
Years to field 0.667 0.444 0.444 0.667 0.667
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Offensive Attack Attributes Raw Data 
 
 
Offensive Attack Value Function Scores (with SSN) 
 
 





















Mission effectiveness 0.063 0.25 0.235 0.26 2.73 0.45
Endurance 107.62 576.424 704.544 107.62 8640 430.48
Stealth 1.514 7.831 12.24 6.056 24.48 11.355
Ease of tactical employment 2 60 90 8 2 30
Mission flexibility 0.436 2.89 4.68 1.744 59.296 3.27











Mission effectiveness 0.023 0.092 0.086 0.095 1.000 0.165
Endurance 0.012 0.067 0.082 0.012 1.000 0.050
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.250 0.062 0.133
Ease of tactical employment 1.000 0.033 0.022 0.250 1.000 0.067
Mission flexibility 0.007 0.049 0.079 0.029 1.000 0.055











Mission effectiveness 0.140 0.556 0.522 0.578 1.000
Endurance 0.153 0.818 1.000 0.153 0.611
Stealth 1.000 0.193 0.124 0.250 0.133
Ease of tactical employment 1.000 0.033 0.022 0.250 0.067
Mission flexibility 0.093 0.618 1.000 0.373 0.699
Years to field 0.333 0.222 0.222 0.333 0.222
 253 
 




















































C. SUPPLEMENTAL POWER SOURCE ANALYSIS 
A variety of power source solutions are considered with the exception of nuclear 
power solutions and those that have small probabilities of reaching sufficient TRL 
maturation over the next decade. Although there are many promising power alternatives 
for UUVs, there are not many that are at TRL-4 or above or that have been approved for 
use on submarines or surface ships. The two most practical alternatives within the study 
time frame are advanced lithium-ion batteries and a diesel engine/lithium-ion battery 
combination. Aside from the high TRLs of these alternatives, they do not involve the 
handling and storage of exotic or dangerous materials on shipboard environments. 
Current Navy ratings and specialties also have experience handling and operating both of 
these technologies. Installed shipboard casualty mitigation systems, such as fire 
protection, mitigate the risks associated with the storage of diesel fuel and battery 
systems. Another significant advantage for lithium-ion batteries is they are on track for 
submarine and surface combatant approval and use. Several approvals have already been 
granted for systems, such as the Bluefin Robotics Hovering Autonomous Underwater 
Vehicle (HAUV), which is designed for undersea hull and infrastructure inspection. As 
recently as April 2013, the standard 1.5 kWh Bluefin Robotics Subsea Battery was 





Figure F-1:  Standard Bluefin Robotics 1.5 kWh Subsea Battery (From Bluefin Robotics 
2013) 
Multiple high profile incidents in commercial and military applications regarding 
lithium-ion batteries have both delayed their implementation and unrestricted use. These 
incidents provided a wealth of knowledge to industry regarding battery use and failure 
modes. The most recent publicized battery failure in commercial applications is the 
lithium-ion battery failure in the Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Thermal runaway of the 
batteries and a subsequent fire have been cited as the cause. This case unfolded during the 
SEA-19A study and provided a unique opportunity to examine the current state of 
lithium-ion battery technology and the main dangers associated with the technology; fire 
in the batteries and potential explosion. The Federal Aviation Administration grounding 
of the entire 787 Dreamliner fleet and subsequent recertification, exposed that technical 
problems with battery technologies may occur, but can be quickly overcome and are not 
technically insurmountable (Boeing 2013). This case also illustrates that further safety 
testing must occur before we place these onto operational units such as submarines where 
fire and explosion can be potential catastrophic. 
The most significant failure of a lithium-ion in naval applications was the fire 
aboard the Advanced Seal Delivery Vehicle (ASDS) on November 9th, 2008. This failure, 
among other complications, effectively ended the ASDS program (Cavas 2008). The 
battery fire cascaded and caused extensive damage to the entire vehicle. Figure 2 shows 
the approximate arrangement of the battery that was destroyed in the fire. It is relatively 
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easy to see how the failure or overheating of a single cell could have a catastrophic 
cascading effect in the battery. This cascading failure proved especially difficult to stop 
due to the battery being located in an inaccessible space.  
Following the failure, an extensive investigation by the USN and the battery 
manufacturer was conducted. During the January 11th, 2013 Menneken Series lecture at 
the Naval Postgraduate School a representative of Yardney stated that much has been 
learned regarding lithium-ion battery failure modes since the failure of the ASDS battery 
(Yardney 2013). The technology and design of the batteries has progressed to a degree 
that the risk of cascading failure is significantly reduced. Yardney’s has demonstrated 
success in reliability and performance with lithium-ion batteries in several highly 
successful applications. Yardney lithium-ion batteries are utilized in critical applications 
such as the B-2 Spirit, and Mars Rovers. 
 




The ASDS vehicle and large format lithium-ion batteries pushed the battery 
technology envelope. The amount of risk undertaken with the early fielding of the 
systems on submarines may have been disproportionate with the utility of the vehicle. 
Uncontrollable battery fire on the ASDS or a similar vehicle while embarked on a 
submarine would certainly result in the loss of the vehicle and may even result in the loss 
of the submarine. The advancement of lithium-ion technology and successful fielding of 
lithium-ion batteries in automobiles and aircraft suggest that the technology may be ready 
for shipboard use, and even submarine use in the immediate future. An excellent pathway 
to utilize this technology would be extensive testing for shipboard use, followed by 
limited trials on surface ships, and then finally testing onboard submarines. 
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APPENDIX H:  MATLAB UUV DECEPTION MODELING CODE 
% UUV Deception Operations 
% Game Theory/Decision Tree Model of UUV employment against enemy naval 
% exercise or operation 
  
% develop payoff for blue and red and utility for blue. 
% payoff and utility variables are three dimensional in: 
% (engagement, fraction covert employment, red aggressiveness) 
% calculated for 20 engagements, blue covert employment 0 to 1,  
% and 5 levels of red aggressiveness 
  
  
% prob detection/no detection_covert/overt 
Pd_C = .2; 
Pd_O = .95; 
Pnd_C = 1 - Pd_C; 
Pnd_O = 1 - Pd_O; 
  
% Red mixed strategies of aggressiveness 
% 1-con, 2-mod, 3-agg, 4-counter, 5-counter high 
Pp = [.2 .3 .7 .3 .2]’; 
Pc = [.7 .5 .1 .2 .1]’; 
Po = [.1 .2 .2 .5 .7]’; 
  
% Engagements 
eng = [0:19]’; 
  
% payoff_blue/red_covert/overt-no detect/prosecute/cease ops/observe 
payoff_b_cn = 2-exp(-eng/2);  
payoff_b_cp = exp(-eng);  
payoff_b_cc = -ones(20,1);  
payoff_b_co = -eng/10–2; 
              
payoff_b_on = 3-exp(-eng/2);  
payoff_b_op = 1.5*sin((eng+1.4)/4.5)+1.5;  
payoff_b_oc = exp(-eng);  
payoff_b_oo = -eng/10–1; 
     
payoff_r_cn = exp(-eng)-1;  
payoff_r_cp = eng/10+1;  
payoff_r_cc = exp(-eng);  
payoff_r_co = 2+eng/10; 
  
payoff_r_on = exp(-eng)-3;  
payoff_r_op = exp(-eng)-3; 
payoff_r_oc = zeros(20,1); 
payoff_r_oo = 1+eng/10; 
          
% Blue mixed strategy for employment, covert and overt 
strat_b_c = [0:.1:1]’; 




% Indices for 3-dimensional payoff or utility database 
% i-engagement (1 through 20) 
% j-blue mixed strategy (fraction covert - 0 to 1) 
% k-aggressiveness (1 through 5) 
  
for i=1:20 
    for j=1:11 
        for k=1:5 
            pay_b(i,j,k) = ((Pp(k)*payoff_b_cp(i) +... 
                Pc(k)*payoff_b_cc(i) + Po(k)*payoff_b_co(i))*Pd_C +... 
                Pnd_C*payoff_b_cn(i))*strat_b_c(j) +... 
                strat_b_o(j)*((Pp(k)*payoff_b_op(i) +... 
                Pc(k)*payoff_b_oc(i) +... 
                Po(k)*payoff_b_oo(i))*Pd_O + Pnd_O*payoff_b_on(i)); 
             
            pay_r(i,j,k) = ((Pp(k)*payoff_r_cp(i) +... 
                Pc(k)*payoff_r_cc(i) + Po(k)*payoff_r_co(i))*Pd_C +... 
                Pnd_C*payoff_r_cn(i))*strat_b_c(j) +... 
                strat_b_o(j)*((Pp(k)*payoff_r_op(i) +... 
                Pc(k)*payoff_r_oc(i) +... 
                Po(k)*payoff_r_oo(i))*Pd_O + Pnd_O*payoff_r_on(i)); 
        end 




% exponential utility adjustment with constant risk tolerance 
RT_b = 1; 
  
% H_b is max blue payoff for that engagement, L_b is min payoff 
for i=1:20 
H_b(i) = max([payoff_b_cn(i), payoff_b_cp(i), payoff_b_cc(i), 
payoff_b_co(i), payoff_b_on(i), payoff_b_op(i), 
payoff_b_oc(i),payoff_b_oo(i)]); 
L_b(i) = min([payoff_b_cn(i), payoff_b_cp(i), payoff_b_cc(i), 
payoff_b_co(i), payoff_b_on(i), payoff_b_op(i), 
payoff_b_oc(i), payoff_b_oo(i)]);  
end 
  
% u calculates utility of the payoff on scale from 0 to 1 




    for j=1:11 
        for k=1:5 
            util_b(i,j,k) = 
((Pp(k)*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_cp(i)) +... 
                Pc(k)*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_cc(i)) + ... 
                Po(k)*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_co(i)))*Pd_C +... 
                
Pnd_C*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_cn(i)))*strat_b_c(j) +... 




                Pc(k)*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_oc(i)) +... 
                Po(k)*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_oo(i)))*Pd_O +...  
                Pnd_O*u(H_b(i),L_b(i),RT_b,payoff_b_on(i))); 
        end 





title(‘Blue Utility against Red Conservative’) 






title(‘Blue Utility against Red Moderate’) 






title(‘Blue Utility against Red Aggressive’) 






title(‘Blue Utility against Red Counter’) 






title(‘Blue Utility against Red Counter High’) 
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